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Trainers in IAF

The fleet of trainer aircraft in the IAF that plays a critical role in building strong foundations has been in disarray over the last decade

Issue: 09-2015By Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd)Photo(s): By Pilatus

In the initial years of the post-independence history of the nation, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was reasonably well equipped with aircraft for basic training of pilots. However, the fleet of trainer aircraft in the IAF that plays a critical role in building strong foundations, has rather unfortunately been in a state of complete disarray over the last decade. This has impinged seriously on the training of pilots and perhaps the worst affected has been training for the fighter stream. The cascading effect of this malaise is too obvious to be stated.

Training Pattern

Traditionally the IAF has been following three-stage training for combat pilots designated as under:

    Stage I. Up to 2009, Stage I training was conducted on a basic trainer aircraft, the last being the Hindustan Piston Trainer (HPT)-32, Deepak designed developed and manufactured by the Indian aerospace major the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). With effect from 2013, Stage I training has been conducted on a turboprop aircraft, the Pilatus PC-7 Mk II.

    Stage II. Initially conducted on the piston-engine Harvard IVD and the Texan T-6G, in the 1970s, these aircraft were replaced by the Hindustan Jet Trainer (HJT)-16, designed developed and produced by HAL.

    Stage III. After the retirement of the Vampire, the IAF never really had a truly dedicated advanced jet trainer (AJT) till the induction of the Hawk 132 from BAE Systems that commenced in February 2008.

The Basic Trainer Imbroglio

The normal lifespan of a trainer aircraft referred to as the Total Technical Life, is around 40 years which, subject to availability of product support, may be extended by another five years or so. The IAF took the decision in July 2009 to ground the fleet of HPT-32 aircraft following a series engine failures in flight that resulted not only in loss of aircraft but of precious lives as well. The flaw in the design that led to engine failure lay essentially in the routeing of the pipeline that carried fuel to the engine. Although the problem had been identified with the help of Lycoming, the manufacturer of the engine, despite all good intention and effort by HAL, the problem remained unresolved. The IAF had no option but to take the hard decision to rather prematurely reject the HPT-32 fleet that had another 15 to 20 years of useful life remaining.

The premature grounding of the HPT-32 fleet generated serious problems in its wake. The IAF was suddenly left without a basic trainer and HAL had no ready solution to offer. The net result was that Stage I training fell into complete disarray. The IAF attempted to correct the situation through some ad hoc arrangements which could not effectively compensate for the absence of a basic trainer. While in 2003, on a suggestion by the IAF, the HAL had begun to explore the possibility of developing a basic turboprop trainer which was later dubbed as the HTT- 40, even after the lapse of six years since the demise of the HPT-32, the HTT-40 is yet to undertake its maiden flight. From the pace at which the project has progressed to far, at this point in time, it would be difficult to predict as to when this momentous event would be witnessed.

In this situation, the IAF had no option but to explore options to procure a basic trainer aircraft from abroad. The government sanctioned procurement of 75 Pilatus PC-7 Mk II turboprop trainer from Switzerland and tasked the HAL to supply 106 of the indigenous HTT-40, the total requirement of the IAF being 181. Induction of the Pilatus commenced in February 2013, in less than four years after the grounding of the HPT-32 and is on schedule to be completed by the end of 2015. On account of the delay in the HTT-40 programme becoming endemic, the IAF urged the government to scrap the programme and authorise purchase of another 106 Pilatus PC-7 Mk II aircraft. The government sanctioned the purchase of 38 platforms and insisted on HAL supplying the balance of 68 of their own product. After all, the defence public sector undertaking must be seen to be delivering for their continued existence to be justified. The Ministry fo Defence has now found a fresh reason to justify the HTT-40 project – the new thrust on ‘Make in India’! The stand-off between the IAF and HAL over the basic trainer continues only aggravating the imbroglio.

The redeeming feature is that the IAF is extremely pleased with the performance of the Pilatus fleet both in terms of flight line availability of aircraft and its attributes as a basic training platform.

The Sitara – A Fading Dream?

The IAF has been using the HJT-16 Kiran fleet since the early 1970s for training in Stage II also referred to as the Intermediate Stage. As the Kiran fleet was expected to be phased out latest by 2010, HAL embarked on the development of its replacement in 1999. The maiden flight of the new trainer dubbed as the intermediate jet trainer (IJT) was undertaken just four years later on March 7, 2003, a remarkable achievement by any standard. The event was witnessed by the then Prime Minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee who christened the IJT as ‘Sitara’, a word in Sanskrit meaning ‘Star’. Induction of the Sitara was expected to commence in 2007.

Unfortunately, after the initial success, the project has floundered for a variety of reasons. First was the issue of the Snecma Turbomeca Larzac engine being underpowered. A Russian engine from NPO Saturn designated as the AL55I was selected to replace the Larzac. This itself delayed the project and the date of induction was revised to 2010 and once again to 2015. During the test flight phase, the programme has also been afflicted with accidents. Apart from cost overrun, if there is one thing that HAL has been consistent about in this project is missing of deadlines.

And now it transpires that the stall characteristics of the aircraft are unsatisfactory on account of which spin trials have not yet been carried out. As reported, the problem has been traced to certain deficiencies in design of the airframe which need to be corrected through redesign of the airframe. This may take years as with a redesigned airframe, the IJT would have to be put through a complete test flight schedule. As to how long this process will take cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. This discovery 16 years after the project was launched, has thus cast a shadow of uncertainty over the plans of the IAF for replacement of the Kiran fleet. Non-availability of the Sitara IJT in time will seriously undermine the training of pilots for the fighter stream.

Having lost all confidence in the ability of HAL to deliver the IJT in any respectable time frame and as the IAF needs the IJT urgently to obviate disruption of Stage II training on account of the depleting Kiran fleet, it has begun exploring options to procure an equivalent platform from foreign sources. Consequently, a request for information (RFI) for a lightweight, single-engine, twin-seat trainer with a secondary light attack capability, has been issued. However, unless the Defence Procurement Procedure, which is under revision, is simplified, the process of induction may take around five years at the very least. In the meantime, the IAF has advised HAL to discontinue with the project to build the Sitara. The IAF may also consider adopting a two aircraft three-stage training for pilots of the fighter stream at least for the interim.

The Advanced Jet Trainer

In order to facilitate transition from basic jet trainers to high performance combat aircraft, in 1982, the IAF initiated a case for procurement of AJT. The platform identified was the Hawk from BAE Systems. However, the process of procurement dragged on for over two decades and the contract for 66 Hawk 132 aircraft was signed on March 26, 2004. Induction of the aircraft began on February 23, 2008. The first 24 aircraft were supplied directly by BAE Systems in flyaway condition and the remaining 42 were manufactured under licence by HAL. In July 2010, it was revealed that a follow-on order for another 40 aircraft for the IAF had been placed on the British original equipment manufacturer. These are being produced by HAL under licence.

Designed to deliver a seamless transition from basic training to high performance combat jets, the Hawk 132 is the world’s most successful and proven platform as an AJT. It is also endowed with operational capability, an attribute that would be of relevance to the IAF in the context of its dwindling fleet of combat jets. The IAF has perhaps the largest fleet of Hawk 132 AJT. However, if the aircraft is expected to live up to its global reputation in the IAF, HAL will have to seriously focus on quality issue that have been plaguing the fleet in the recent past.