The candid admission by Air Marshal B.S. Dhanoa, Vice Chief of the Air Staff (VCAS), Indian Air Force (IAF), while briefing the media on March 10 this year just prior to the commencement of Exercise Iron Fist at Pokhran in Rajasthan that the strength of the fleet of combat aircraft in the IAF was not adequate to execute a full air campaign in a scenario of a war simultaneously on two fronts. Coming on the eve of a demonstration by the IAF of its firepower and operational capability, the public statement by a senior functionary of the IAF was regarded by some as being inopportune and ill-timed as it had the potential to undermine the exercise the IAF was about to embark upon. While the statement by the VCAS did raise eyebrows, the fact of the matter is that the VCAS, who is responsible for operations, was downright honest in stating a brutal fact which incidentally has not been a closely guarded secret for some time now. The VCAS cannot be faulted for his observation.

The IAF has been authorised by the government to increase the strength of its fleet of combat aircraft from the existing 39.5 squadrons to 42 squadrons. However, unfortunately, the number of combat squadrons is steadily dropping with the MiG-21 and MiG-27 series being retired from service. As stated by the VCAS, currently, the strength of combat squadrons in the IAF stands at 33, its lowest in recent times. If no inductions are made and soon enough, in another five years or so, the strength of the combat fleet will dwindle further to 25 squadrons or down to less than 60 per cent of its authorised strength. The plight of the IAF has been further worsened by the fact that the serviceability of the fleet of Su-30MKI has been around 50 per cent as against the required level of 75 per cent. To a large extent, this is attributed to the inadequate product support available from the Russian original equipment manufacturer Sukhoi over which the IAF does not appear to have any influence or control. The Indian aerospace major the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) that manufactures the Su-30MKI at Nasik, has also not been of much help, repeated assurance notwithstanding.

The IAF has been authorised by the government to increase the strength of its fleet of combat aircraft from the existing 39.5 squadrons to 42 squadrons. However, unfortunately, the number of combat squadrons is steadily dropping with the MiG-21 and MiG-27 series being retired from service. As stated by the VCAS, currently, the strength of combat squadrons in the IAF stands at 33, its lowest in recent times. If no inductions are made and soon enough, in another five years or so, the strength of the combat fleet will dwindle further to 25 squadrons or down to less than 60 per cent of its authorised strength. The plight of the IAF has been further worsened by the fact that the serviceability of the fleet of Su-30MKI has been around 50 per cent as against the required level of 75 per cent. To a large extent, this is attributed to the inadequate product support available from the Russian original equipment manufacturer Sukhoi over which the IAF does not appear to have any influence or control. The Indian aerospace major the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) that manufactures the Su-30MKI at Nasik, has also not been of much help, repeated assurance notwithstanding.

As for the nation’s indigenous capability to meet with the requirement of combat aircraft, the track record of the Indian aerospace industry has so far not been very inspiring. The HF 24 project of HAL in the early 1960s had recorded a reasonably high degree of success. Unfortunately, the aircraft was retired from service quite prematurely in 1985. Besides, the Indian aerospace industry has failed to build on the experience gained in the HF 24 project as has been amply evident in the way the indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas project has been managed so far. Over three decades have gone by since the project for the development of the LCA Tejas was launched and despite the huge investments made in the project over the years, there is still no certainty of the time frame in which this indigenous platform will be available to the IAF in terms of quality and numbers required. The project to indigenously develop the advanced medium combat aircraft, a fifth-generation platform, was initiated in 2008, but continues to remain a distant dream.

It ought to be evident that the IAF will continue to suffer perennially from serious deficiencies in its fleet of combat aircraft unless true capability to design, develop and manufacture such platforms indigenously or in collaboration, is built by the Indian aerospace industry.