The Author is Former Director General of Information Systems and A Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army

The US Space Force announced in December 2024 that it has Remote Modular Terminals (RMTs) designed to disrupt satellite signals, which it plans to deploy in the Indo-Pacific, mainly to target the expanding spy satellite network of China, as disruptive "kill chains". The RMTs aim to disrupt the communication links between China's surveillance satellites and their targeting systems. The US Space Operations Command has reportedly approved the first phase of deploying the jammers, with 11 expected to be fielded initially. Eventually the US military plans to deploy up to 200 RMT's, focusing on the Indo-Pacific; albeit the efficacy of jammers against 'optical' satellites is suspect.

According to a report by the Washington-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China's 'Yaogan' satellite network can track objects as small as a car from space and provide continuous surveillance over the Indo-Pacific Command. The US Space Force Indo-Pacific Commander has admitted that China's satellite network allows it to track US and allied forces and potentially exploit vulnerabilities. China launched a constellation of 600 satellites in 2024. Incidentally, Chinese scientists claim China has beaten Starlink in satellite-to-ground laser communications at speed 1,000 times faster than 5G.

The US Space Force Indo-Pacific Commander has admitted that China's satellite network allows it to track US and allied forces and potentially exploit vulnerabilities.

America's deployment of RMTs in the Indo-Pacific is sure to be discovered by China whether these are activated to test their efficacy or as prelude to a future war. This is sure to trigger an electronic war between the US and China, the Indo-Pacific being as important to China as the US, if not more. China's space capabilities, though shrouded in ambiguity, are expanding at a rapid pace. China may already be having RMTs.

Also, China would seek to develop counter-EW capabilities to identify, locate and attack these jammers through directed EW attacks or kinetic means, like missiles. Most importantly, China may already be in possession of weapons for directed EW attacks. India needs to take note of China's surveillance, EW and disruptive EW capabilities, since China eyes vast tracts of Indian Territory, including in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh.

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of the space domain, with Russian forces operating in an environment of Starlink satellite cover provided to Ukraine. In the Indo-Pacific, the US has deployed a new US Space Force unit in South Korea to counter North Korea's nuclear and missile threats. One view is that jamming might become an acceptable grey-zone tactic; that increases the pressure on an adversary without resorting to outright warfare because it carries little risk of escalation. But another view is that growing space rivalry between the US and China would lead to a rapid expansion of the US Space Force's role, with US President Donald Trump hoping to extend operations to around the moon and establish a space national guard. Who among the US and China would win this war is difficult to predict.

China would seek to develop counter-EW capabilities to identify, locate and attack these jammers through directed EW attacks or kinetic means, like missiles

Concurrently, according to a recent report in the South China Morning Post, Chinese scientists have released powerful software that can design electronic warfare weapons. The test results indicate that the software performs better than a US product in terms of both speed and memory usage and will be available for free. The software 'Yaoguang' can be used in other military applications like analysing the electromagnetic scattering characteristics of a large electromagnetic catapult aircraft carrier, taking one-third less time than the US software for presenting more details.

The electronic warfare equipment used by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is evolving rapidly. For example, the multi-band antenna used in the new phased array radar has "complex structures like curved surfaces, multilayer dielectrics, metal conductors and thin dielectric layers. This antenna also produces other complex phenomena during operation, such as vibration and heat generation, but simulating these types of electromagnetic characteristics on a computer is extremely challenging, now made easy by Yaoguang. Yaoguang is rapidly evolving and already replacing Western products used in China's industrial design field.

India needs to take note of China's surveillance, EW and disruptive EW capabilities, since China eyes vast tracts of Indian Territory, including in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh

On the Indian front, 'Rubia Data Sciences', a technology and analytics-based B2B risk management and monitoring company, in its report titled 'India Targets $500 Billion in Electronics Production by 2030 dated January 14, 2025 states that India aims for global leadership in electronics manufacturing by 2030. The report highlights the following

• Government initiatives like the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme have attracted investments of over $17 billion, driving growth in sectors like mobile phones, semiconductors, and consumer electronics.
• India's semiconductor market is projected to reach $109 billion by 2030.
• Mobile phone exports grew by over 40 per cent in FY2024 to $15.6 billion. Domestic value addition in mobile manufacturing is expected to reach 50 per cent by 2030. Apple and Samsung are capitalising on India's growing manufacturing ecosystem.
• India continues to rely on imported high-value components like semiconductors, Printed Circuit Board Assemblies (PCBAs), and chipsets. Electronics imports from China alone exceeded $12 billion in FY2024.
• India's average electronics tariff rate of 7.5 per cent is a 5-6 per cent cost disadvantage in assembly and 4-5 per cent disadvantage in component manufacturing, compared to say Vietnam and Malaysia; resulting in 10-14 per cent cost disability in assembly and 14-18 per cent in component manufacturing.'
• India's R&D investment is just 0.64 per cent of GDP compared to 2.41 per cent and 5.71 per cent in China and Israel respectively; limiting innovation in critical sectors like semiconductors and Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
• Assembly operations are successful but component manufacturing, especially high-complexity components, remain nascent.
• Addressing tariff complexity, R&D gaps, and infrastructure development is crucial to unlocking the full potential.

In the above context it may be said that the government's approach towards investments in R&D has always been lackadaisical; expecting the private sector to invest more but without guarantees. Same goes for the provision of adequate infrastructure. This is also because of funds diverted for elections; witness freebies offered (including by the ruling party at the Centre) for the Delhi assembly elections next month. Despite the much-publicised schemes and incentives, 49,000 MSME shut shop in the last 10 years, as Parliament was informed in July 2024. The complexity of tariffs may increase with Donald Trump threatening more tariffs on China and India. Also, Indian businesses prefer low-priced Chinese imports.

The government's approach towards investments in R&D has always been lackadaisical; expecting the private sector to invest more but without guarantees

Ironically, with the focus of boosting the economy any which way, threats to our security, especially in the realm of grey-zone warfare remains a casualty; leaving India to be easily exploited surreptitiously by inimical forces. Israel's exploding pagers and walkie talkies in Lebanon demonstrated that the whole range of electronics (from hearing and teleprompters worn by politicians and heads of states to household gadgets and the like) can be weaponised. Not only are we importing Chinese electronics, Chinese investments and technicians in electronics are allowed. Our telecommunication networks, containing Chinese components, may already be compromised. With regard to the Indo-US semiconductor plant. It was also pointed out in these columns concerns over potential security risks, including possibility of compromised semiconductors embedded with malware, given America's history in geopolitical contexts. Will the government bother to introspect these serious issues?