The Author is Former Director General of Information Systems and A Special Forces Veteran, Indian Army

Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met his Chinese counterpart, Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun, on November 20, 2024 in Vientiane, the capital city of Laos, on the sidelines of the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus). ADMM-Plus is a platform comprising the 10-nation ASEAN and its eight dialogue partners: India, China, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Russia, and the United States. The meeting was hosted by Laos.

During the bilateral meeting between the Indian and Chinese defence ministers, both sides agreed on rebuilding mutual trust and understanding, with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh calling for drawing lessons from the "unfortunate border clashes" in 2020 during his talks with Admiral Dong Jun. This was the first meeting between the two defence ministers following the India-China deal to resume patrolling in eastern Ladakh, a process that took more than four years for China to permit Indian troops to patrol their own territory.

India and China have agreed to work towards confidence-building measures following the October 21, 2024, deal to resolve friction points in Ladakh.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated in a press release that Rajnath Singh underscored the need for "greater trust and confidence-building between the two sides through de-escalation," adding that both sides "agreed to work together towards a roadmap for building mutual trust and understanding." The statement also noted that Singh emphasised that "amicable relations" between India and China would have "positive implications for global peace and prosperity," and called for a focus on cooperation rather than conflict.

India's Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had indicated a thaw in bilateral ties with Beijing when it announced on October 21, 2024 that a deal had been reached with China on patrolling arrangements for the two remaining points of friction in Ladakh—Depsang and Demchok. Following this, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar stated that "disengagement" between Indian and Chinese troops had been completed in eastern Ladakh. Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi commented, "We want to go back to the status quo of April 2020. Thereafter, we will be looking at disengagement, de-escalation, and normal management of the LAC... As of now, we are trying to restore the trust."

On November 3, 2024, Jaishankar remarked in Brisbane, "In terms of India and China, yes, we have made some progress... in what we call disengagement, which is when troops were very close to each other, with the possibility that could lead to some untoward incident... we have to see after the disengagement, what is the direction we will go."

Despite the thaw, concerns remain over Chinese intrusions in Depsang and the construction of dual-use border villages with strategic capabilities.

The October 21 thaw paved the way for the first bilateral meeting in five years between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia.

Interestingly, while meeting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 19, 2024, Jaishankar stated that he was "glad to note that on the ground, the implementation of that understanding (of October 21, 2024) has proceeded as planned." This marked the first time an Indian official referred to the October 21 deal as an "understanding." Both the Indian foreign secretary and the MEA's readout of the Modi-Xi meeting had previously referred to the deal as an "agreement" for disengagement.

The MEA's framing of Chinese intrusions as "friction points" was apparent from the outset, reflecting the government's desire to obfuscate the Chinese ingress into Ladakh during April-May 2020. This narrative persisted, with the Defence Minister asserting that India had not lost even an inch of territory. However, the 20-km deep PLA presence in Depsang could not be concealed once discussions on resuming patrolling began.

Even today, doubts persist about whether Indian troops in Depsang are allowed to patrol up to their pre-April 2020 positions or only up to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) as perceived by China. Meanwhile, the PLA continues to patrol Indian territory. The significant question remains: why did China agree to allow Indian troops to resume patrolling their own territory after a delay of over four years?

China's decision to allow Indian troops to patrol their own territory after four years is linked to its anticipation of a Trump presidency and potential US sanctions.

The answer to the above (explained in detail in these columns elsewhere) is that China was monitoring US communications, including the phone calls of politicians, military/civil officials and American public at large, concluding that the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential race was certain. China knew that with Trump would come massive sanctions and tariffs on China/Chinese goods, which NATO-EU and American allies would be forced to comply with. Therefore, the thaw with India to gain full control of the Indian markets, which anyway it had in some measure. Xi Jinping perhaps also wanted to concentrate more on Taiwan – rather than conflict on two fronts.

But this does not mean India-China relations are back to Bhai-Bhai for good. De-escalation and disengagement must be viewed holistically. Reversion of PLA to the April-May 2020 posture will remain a chimera, given the new permanent defences, support and logistics infrastructure China has developed since then. In addition, are the dual-use border villages, including in Arunachal Pradesh and Bhutan constructed during the standoff, which according to US analysts have EW and AD elements also. China is developing one such dual-use village bang on the LAC in Demchok presently.

During the visit of Nepal's Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli to Beijing commencing December 2, 2024, Nepal is proposing a China-India expressway through Nepal linking six border outposts. Oli would have consulted Beijing before doing so. Obviously, China wants access to the Indian Ocean through India, which would make India party to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) indirectly.

India's paramount concern should remain China's history of violating agreements and its territorial ambitions. Despite the current thaw, China continues to claim the entirety of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, along with parts of the Middle Sector. It is also building a second expressway near Galwan, Hot Springs, and Pangong Tso, expected to be completed by 2035. The likelihood of further attempts to claim Ladakh cannot be ruled out. Yet, India's policymakers appear more focused on economic gains, as evidenced by allowing Chinese access to India's electronic sector and the establishment of an Indo-US semiconductor fabrication facility.