By Lt. General P.C. Katoch Former Director General of Information Systems, Indian Army

With reference to Pakistani involvement in the terrorist strike on Pathankot IAF base on January 1, Home Minister Rajnath Singh had stated that there is no reason to doubt Pakistani cooperation in the probe. However, the news from Islamabad is that a team constituted by Pakistan to investigate the said terrorist attack has concluded that there is no substantive evidence to suggest Maulana Masood Azhar, the head of the outlawed Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) terrorist organization ordered or masterminded the assault. India had claimed that the attackers belonged to the JeM and they had sneaked in from southern Punjab district of Bahawalpur, the claim based on mobile communication intercepted between the attackers and their alleged handlers in Pakistan. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had formed a Special Investigation Team (SIT) after India shared the ‘leads’ with Pakistan. The conclusion of the Pakistani SIT investigation is despite Masood Azhar publicly gloating after the attack that many more such attacks can be engineered. The evidence of JeM’s involvement in the Pathankot terrorist attack was also shared by India with the US, Britain, France and Japan.

The Pakistani SIT findings have reportedly been conveyed to New Delhi that there was no substantial evidence that could prove the involvement of Maulana Azhar in the Pathankot assault. According to a news report in The Express Tribune, the Pakistani NSA has contacted his Indian counterpart to work out possible dates for talks between the foreign secretaries of the two countries. Pakistan is reportedly to send its SIT to India but obviously this would be another exercise in futility when Pakistan refuses to accept evidence already provided. In fact, Pakistani NSA Janjua reportedly told his Indian counterpart that the SIT was ready to visit to India but New Delhi should not pin high hopes on the team which has already completed investigations based on the ‘leads’ provided by India. Concurrent to this development is the deposition of Pakistani-American David Headley in the investigations of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack during 2008. Headley has clearly brought out the involvement of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) cum- Jamat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Pakistan’s ISI in these terrorist attacks, revealing amongs other thing that: he had joined LeT in 2002, trained with them and met Hafiz Saeed and Zaikiur Rehman Lakhvi; ISS supports LeT, JuD, HuM militarily, morally and financially; he visited India seven times and undertook reconnaissance of the intended targets in Mumbai; Sajid Mir of LeT was his handler; it was in the third attempt that the terrorist attack was successful in Mumbai in 2008; and, he was in contact with Majors Abdul Rehman Pasha, Ali and Iqbal of Pakistan’s ISI.

Headley recognized JuD Chief and Mumbai terrorist attack Hafiz Saeed’s photograph and ISI’s in the court. Surely, this is damning evidence against Pakistan which India will definitely share with Pakistan. However, it is unlikely to make any difference to the Pakistani Military that controls the foreign and defence policies of Pakistan, or rather Pakistan itself with a weak democracy. The major reason is the support that the Pakistani military continues to get from the US, China and Saudi Arabia despite the terrorism it is exporting. That is why despite the soft cajoling by President Barak Obama and John Kerry, it has made no difference at the ground level. Hafiz Saeed, despite having a price on his head placed by the US, holds public rallies in Pakistan unleashing radical vitriolic against India. Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, another accused in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack though in Pakistani jail is being accorded royal treatment by admission of Pakistani media, and is free to meet military personnel and his colleagues. Significantly, a recent article titled ‘Pakistan’s Hand in the Rise of International Jihad’ in New York Times highlights the following: experts have found a lot of evidence that Pakistan facilitated the Taliban offensive into Afghanistan; US and China have been asking Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to make peace, but Afghanistan argues that Islamabad instead has encouraged Taliban to raise the stakes in hopes of gaining influence in any power-sharing agreement; Pakistan is intervening in a number of foreign conflicts, Pakistan’s ISI has long acted as the manager of international mujahedeen forces, many of them Sunni extremists; prior to Pakistan’s offensive into North Waziristan militants were tipped off early, and hundreds escaped, many fleeing into Afghanistan; and most troubling, there are reports that Pakistan had a role in the rise of the Islamic State, and much more. The author argues that when no one has held Pakistan to account for this behavior, why would Pakistan give it up now? The bottom-line is that Pakistan’s message to India is the same - you can talk but our military cannot be reined in from exporting terror.