By Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd) Former Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief of Training Command, IAF

On December 18, 2015, a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India tabled in the Parliament pertained to the eroding operational capabilities of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Army Aviation Corps (AAC).

Sukhoi Su-30MKI and the AWACS Fleets

The report highlighted the poor state of serviceability of the most recent acquisition by the IAF of the fleet of the Sukhoi Su-30MKI combat aircraft from Russia. Of the 272 aircraft ordered by the IAF, 210 have been inducted so far and the serviceability of the fleet has only been around 55 to 60 per cent as against the required 75 per cent. The Su-30 fleet also suffers from a high rate of AOG (aircraft on ground) owing to lack of spares and non-availability of adequate repair facilities. The jets also suffer from frequent snags in the fly-by-wire system and deficient radar warning receivers.

It is unlikely that the MoD as well as the political leadership would be oblivious of the debilitating problems that have been afflicting the IAF and the AAC for years

The CAG has observed that the fleet of three Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft has not been utilised at the authorised rate. The report said that there was suboptimal utilisation of their operational capabilities in terms of flying tasks due to poor planning and serviceability. On an average, there was a 43 per cent shortfall against the established task of 1,500 flying hours per annum.

Comments

The contract for licensed production of 140 Su-30MKI aircraft by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) was signed with Russia in the year 2000. The order was subsequently increased to 272 with completion of delivery by 2016-17. However, the revised time frame for delivery is 2019. The delay of two-and-a-half years was on account of the IAF’s requirement for changes in the platform to improve aerodynamic performance. As for the low serviceability, there is a combination of factors. Firstly, HAL is totally preoccupied with the production of the Su-30 and is not in a position to divert human resources required to provide maintenance support for the operational fleet. Hopefully the situation will improve after HAL completes delivery by 2019. However, if the IAF places additional orders for the Su-30, the flight line availability of the Su-30 may continue to be low for some more time.

As for maintenance issues pertaining to both the Su-30 fleet and the three IL-76-based AWACS platforms, both of Russian origin, there is possibly a commonality of problems. As for non-availability of spares and frequent snags, the IAF is dependent on the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for product support. However, maintenance problems are compounded by the inadequacy of product support from earlier the USSR and now Russia, in respect of military hardware supplied by them. This has been an endemic problem. This is one of the reasons why the IAF has been keen on alternative sources for import of aircraft and weapon systems. Under-utilisation of the AWACS fleet, as would be the case with the Su-30 fleet with under 60 per cent serviceability, is therefore not very surprising.

Replacement of Cheetah and Chetak Fleets

The CAG has held the Ministry of Defence (MoD) responsible for failure to replace the ageing fleets of Cheetah and Chetak helicopters most of which are over 30 years old. The AAC employs these platforms for reconnaissance and logistic support to forward areas such as the Siachen Glacier. There is a deficiency of 32 per cent in the fleet strength authorised and with the low rate of serviceability, the effective operational availability is only 40 per cent of authorisation.

Comments

The tender for 197 light utility helicopters (LUH) was cancelled twice for some not entirely convincing reasons. HAL has also not been able to deliver on this front and there is no certainty of time frame in which it will. However, recently, there have been a number of joint ventures driven by the spirit of ‘Make in India’, both in the public and private sectors of the Indian aerospace industry to meet with this requirement of the IAF and the Army which at this point in time stands at 400 platforms.

The Final Word

The essence of the observations by the CAG has been available in the public domain for years and as such these have neither been closely guarded secrets nor are these original by any stretch of imagination. These problems as also many others afflicting the state of equipment in the Indian armed forces have been frequently highlighted in defence journals as also have been discussed in seminars and conferences. It is unlikely that the bureaucracy in the MoD as well as the political leadership that together are part of the government, would be oblivious of the debilitating problems that have been afflicting the IAF and the AAC for years.

What is also interesting and pertinent is that the present CAG was the Defence Secretary two-and-a-half years ago!