Although it is repeatedly stressed at all levels that India is prepared for any eventual conflict with its irksome neighbours, honest evaluation of the country’s air defence capability in the mountains could throw up some chilling facts

It doesn’t require much perspicacity to appreciate that be it peace or war, defence of national air space is a con-tinuous 24X7, 365-days-a-year task. Air defence as they say, must never sleep. Equally, it takes years of strenuous effort to plan, organise and train to put in place an effective air defence system. It is a silent assurance of security which may not capture headlines in normal times, but consequences of neglect or failure can be catastrophic.

While the crucial importance of maintaining a credible air defence system at all times is not contested, often priority accorded to this vital aspect of national security in terms of allocation of resources, urgency manifested in addressing glaring shortcomings and even revamping of organisational structures for better and smoother functioning has left much to be desired. In all its component parts—surveillance of air space (particularly at low level), communications, integration and networking of sensors, point and area defence weapons—the story is similar.

The world has been witnessing the acceleration in growth of Chinese air power for several years now. The area of contention where a conflict could occur between the two neighbouring nations is largely mountainous which presents challenging problems to air defence. Although it is repeatedly stressed at all levels that India is prepared for any eventuality, honest evaluation of the country’s air defence capability in the mountains could throw up some chilling facts. The terrain along most of India’s western borders with Pakistan is relatively more benign for deployment of air defence resources. Appraisal of capability in the western sector should give an idea of the overall state of play. Air space at medium levels is monitored by long range THD 1955 and medium power TRS 2215 radars. While both have done commendable duty over the last several decades, numbers have remained inadequate to cover the entire country’s airspace.

Outdated & Outmoded

By contemporary standards, these are also legacy systems which would sooner rather than later merit honourable retirement. However, it is at low level that a large proportion of the threats are likely to emerge and that is where India’s Achilles Heel has remained for the last several decades. In the current arrangement, early warning of intruders at low level is provided by Mobile Observers Flights equipped with binoculars and HF R/T sets. In some areas a sprinkling of Indra I and II radars are deployed for early warning purposes. Behind the chain of mobile observers, in times of tension ad hoc Control and Reporting Centres (CRCs) are rigged up to cover the most likely routes of ingress. P-18 surveillance radars detached from Pechora SAM III units and a handful of more modern ST-68s constitute the surveillance resources of these CRCs.

When required these transportable radars are moved to pre-determined forward locations sometimes hundreds of kilometres away. Communications between them with ‘Radio relays’ and mobile tropo-scatter equipment is patchy at best. The entire procedure involved in intercepting a low level intruder where timely sequence of actions measured in seconds divide success from failure, remains manual. Long standing plans to introduce automation in the ‘control and reporting’ did not get off the ground for a variety of reasons. Operating under severe environmental conditions, it is to the credit of field personnel (fighter controllers and maintenance crew) that they have evolved effective operational procedures. However, their commendable ingenuity and diligence can neither hide the utter obsolescence of the entire arrangement nor its inadequacy against any meaningful air threat.

Fresh Look at Inductions

Recent induction of aerostat radars has undoubtedly enhanced low level surveillance capability by an order of magnitude—but besides the gross inadequacy of numbers, their survivability during a shooting war cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, although extremely useful, they cannot be a substitute for secure surface based sensors.

Induction of the first Air Borne Warning and Control System (AWACS) is another leap forward in capability. However, any notion that it is the panacea of the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) low level surveillance problems is entirely misplaced. This precious resource cannot and must not be employed for general area surveillance or to fill in gaps left by inadequate sensors on the ground.

Another case of drift over the years relates to the utter obsolescence of the standard point defence SAM system employed to defend all forward airfields of the IAF, that is, Pechora SAM IIIs. Belonging to the analogue technology era, cumbersome to deploy and requiring intensive maintenance, the system was always difficult to manage. However, a vast pool of highly skilled technicians kept it coasting along until about a decade ago when lack of essential spares and failure to find suitable substitutes seriously diminished its reliability. Consequently, the aging weapon system has been surviving on life support for the last several years. It is a telling comment that a small country like Poland which was operating the same equipment developed a comprehensive upgrade package centred on a digital transmitter/receiver block to replace the original magnetron based hardware. The new TX/RX coupled with other improvements has increased the target detection range by 44 per cent, while that for target tracking is improved by 21 per cent. The system also has far better ECCM capabilities. The size of a Polish SAM battalion has been reduced from 19 vehicles down to eight. The battalion is able to relocate to a new firing position in 20 to 25 minutes as against three hours or more required earlier.