Air power is acknowledged as the main instrument of modern warfare. It has to have the primacy of attention. No country can aspire to even be a regional power without the backing of a well developed and capable aircraft industry.

During his recent visit to India, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao had said, “Sino-Indian border issues are a historical legacy and it will not be easy to completely resolve this question. It requires patience and will take a fairly long period of time.” Resolution of the Sino-Indian border dispute will thus be a long haul. Meanwhile, the economic powerhouse, China, is marching forward to get the status of a superpower and catching up with the United States. With huge resources available for military modernisation, the aviation industry and in turn the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) are building domain expertise in developing stealth technology, heavy transport aircraft, attack helicopters, ballistic missile defence systems and space-based systems.

With a sizeable nuclear triad, China is building up military power to compete with the the United States. Its military might is already allowing it to influence global decisions. On the other hand, India began the process of economic globalisation over a decade later than China. Significant funds were available for modernisation of the Indian armed forces only early this century. The IAF still has a long way to go before it can catch up with the PLAAF.

Bridging the Gap

Limitations of resources and slow procurement processes have resulted in the strength of combat squadrons reducing to 33 from the authorised level of 39.5. This number would have been even lower had the IAF phased out the ageing MiG-21 and MiG-27 fleets. Despite the difficulties in the procurement of spares, maintenance and high accident rate, the IAF continues to operate a large fleet of the MiG-21. Undoubtedly, the first priority for India should be to reduce the expanding capability and gap in numbers vis-à-vis the PLAAF. Through quick and long-term strategic decisionmaking, China has focused on developing indigenous aerospace industry using the proverbial options of ‘beg, borrow or steal’ to get their aircraft industry going. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, China bought off low-paid Russian aircraft designers and acquired the expertise and technologies that go into making an aircraft. This included stealth, engine design, avionics, active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, large transport aircraft, and attack helicopters. It should be a lesson for India to get its act together and build a viable aircraft industry. The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has hitherto concentrated mostly on licensed production of foreign designed aircraft. Much higher levels of funding are required to be infused in design and development. With the IAF and the defence industry under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), this should not be difficult to achieve. Greater specialisation needs to be inducted into the MoD to drive the defence industry. This was also recommended by the Naresh Chandra Committee. Thirtythree combat squadrons is an abysmally low figure for the IAF when it has to defend the most threatened region of the world. If the PLAAF grows to around 80 squadrons, the IAF must have at least 55 squadrons, especially to cater to a two-front war.

PLAAF Strategy

China lays claim over the territories of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. China also wishes to consolidate its hold over the Tibet autonomous region (TAR). The PLAAF strategy against India is thus related to these two requirements. The PLAAF can operationalise up to 14 airfields in the TAR with the capability to operate up to 28 squadrons against India with in-flight refuelling. To cater to degraded performance of aircraft operating at airfield altitudes of around 14,000 feet, the airfields have long runways. In any case, with in-flight refuelling and precision munitions available, the aircraft are capable of carrying maximum weapon loads. Other airfield and logistic infrastructure including hardened aircraft shelters is in place. Of late, the airfields are activated more frequently and for longer durations by frontline combat aircraft. Quantum and type of flying is increasing. Chinese electronic surveillance aircraft are known to be monitoring the Sino-Indian border regularly. A Rand Corporation report on the PLAAF indicates a trend towards the unification of air and space defence, requiring integrated command and control and the understanding that whoever controls space, controls the planet. A world-class road and railway network is in place for speedy large-scale mobilisation and move of aviation fuel and weapons. China through its ‘String of Pearls’ strategy, has built important trade and military links with many of India’s neighbours. Pakistan is likely to collude with China; Myanmar is likely to allow over flights to the PLAAF during a conflict with India; Nepal may remain neutral; Bangladesh may be arm-twisted for increasing nuisance value and may support Chinese naval operations. Air Vice Marshal (Retd) A.K. Tiwary in an analysis, has considered the possibility of Pakistan handing over its critical airfields of Gilgit, Skardu, Chilas, Chitral and Muzaffarabad to the PLAAF during a two-front war with India. Any Chinese strategy would be to make quick gains in conflict to be able to bargain from a position of strength. Chinese Generals would like to cut off India’s Northeast region. Of late India’s bonds with Bhutan also seem to be weakening. One significant advantage that China has over India is the position of power enjoyed by the People’s Liberation Army in the governing hierarchy. This helps decision-making during peace and war. Lt General Liu Yazhou of the PLAAF regarded as Douhet of China, said, “PLAAF’S first task is to gain command of air fighting in a local war under hightech conditions. PLAAF has to free their service from supporting ground forces and become an independent strategic force.”

Challenges and Options for the IAF

Keeping in mind strategy of the PLAAF, the IAF would have to take some immediate actions. Air Chief Marshal S.K. Sareen, former Chief of the Air Staff, IAF said, “There is a need to strengthen airfield infrastructure in Central and Eastern regions opposite China. Air defence radar cover in the North and Northeast has to go up manifolds. It should be done even at the cost of buying a few aircraft less, if funds are a constraint. Lastly, the cockpitto-crew ratios are currently adverse. We need to nearly double the strength of aircrew. You cannot run a Su-30 squadron with crew strength of MiG-21 squadron.” Central India and Northeast would require at least six additional fighter squadrons over and above the planned replacements. The IAF needs to train more in the mountains and develop suitable interdiction techniques. Other than airfields, there are no important targets across the border. Interdiction missions against Army positions and logistics nodes would have to be the main focus. While action is known to be in hand to create or upgrade airfields in the North and Northeast, a lot needs to be done more quickly. Hardened air shelters should be a priority area. The quick mobility of swing forces from the West to the East would require further enlargement of the transport aircraft fleet in terms of numbers and capability. All advanced landing grounds should be able to handle the C-130J Super Hercules. Inter-valley move of troops and materials would need sizeable commitment of helicopter fleet. The Assam valley requires at least two more operational airfields to cater to redundancy. The IAF needs to flood the valley with surface-to-air missiles including some of S-330/S-400 class. The induction and operationalisation of mountain radars needs acceleration. Based on the experience in Iraq, it was estimated that 50 AWACS aircraft would be required to cater to India’s much larger border. A realistic figure that the IAF should aim for at the outset however should be in the region of 20. Noted American author Edward Luce in his book In Spite of the Gods: The Rise of Modern India had commented adversely on the slow pace of mobilisation of the Indian armed forces after the attack on the Parliament. The IAF’s transport and helicopter fleets need major boosting in numbers. Focus of satellite and aircraft-based surveillance has to shift to North and East. Military exploitation of space will be possible fully only after the aerospace command is in place. In the network-centric environment and with China’s aggressive offensive and defensive cyber operations, India would need to match up with more focused training and additional manning. An independent cyber command is mandatory. On being placed in command of the retreating 4 Corps during the 1962 Sino-Indian War, Sam Manekshaw had said, “There will be no withdrawal without written orders and these orders shall never be issued.” That is the only way for the Indian armed forces to defend the border.

National Priority

India has been under foreign rule for nearly a thousand years before independence. National security has to get the priority it deserves. Many committees have suggested major changes in higher defence management and civil-military integration. For some reason this has been given it a go-by. Air power is acknowledged as the main instrument of modern warfare. It has to have the primacy of attention. No country can aspire to even be a regional power without the backing of a well developed and capable aircraft industry. Public sector defence undertakings shackled by generalist bureaucratic control is not the best model. On all this and many other counts, we have role models including in China. The nuclear triad and anti-ballistic missile must get in place quickly to act as a deterrent. Defence budget has to go up to at least 3.5 per cent. Ultimately, control of the air will decide the outcome of the war and hence deserves primacy.