It is clear that despite periodic refinements, the DPP continues to be flawed as it has failed to meet the demands of national security. Perhaps it is time for the government to consider more efficient alternatives for the sake of preservation of national security interests that ought to be paramount.

It appears that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is once again inexorably hurtling towards a controversy over procurement of urgently required hardware by way of basic trainer aircraft, the Pilatus PC-7 Mk II for which the first lot of 75 have been ordered. This controversy has the potential of being probably uglier, more discomforting and somewhat debilitating for the IAF than the one currently under scrutiny by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) involving the purchase of 12 AW101 helicopters for VVIP travel from the Anglo-Italian helicopter manufacturer AgustaWestland. The supreme irony is that even though the fleet of VVIP helicopters are meant only for the transportation of VVIPs and have no relevance to national security tasks per se, the alleged irregularities in the transaction with the foreign company AgustaWestland, has been labelled as a “defence scam”. What is more tragic is that courtesy the media, the reputation of a former Chief of the Air Staff was so callously demolished even before the investigation began.

The fleet of HPT-32 basic trainer aircraft of the IAF was grounded prematurely in July 2009 after a series of fatal accidents. This sudden decision left the IAF without a basic trainer as the Indian aerospace major the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) not having been specifically tasked till then, had no ready solution to offer. Given the track record of development and production of original designs by HAL, an initiative at this belated stage to produce an indigenous aircraft could be expected to bear fruit not earlier than a decade-and-a-half at the very least based even on the most optimistic estimates. The intermediate jet trainer (IJT) programme that began over 12 years ago and is still far from becoming a reality is a case in point. The only viable option before the IAF and in fact an imperative was to explore options to procure a proven basic trainer from the global market and in the shortest possible time. The lack of a fleet of basic trainer aircraft in the IAF is akin to having a massive edifice devoid of a “foundation”. The implications of the predicament the IAF was in without a “foundation” are much too obvious and need no elaboration. Thus it was that the IAF aggressively pursued the case to procure a basic trainer aircraft from abroad in accordance with the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP). However, given the elaborate procedures involved, it still took three years for the contract to be signed with the vendor selected through an open tender system. The first Pilatus PC-7Mk II aircraft was delivered within nine months of signing of the contract.

Meanwhile, the HAL embarked on a project to produce a turboprop basic trainer of indigenous design dubbed as the HTT-40. However, as per the initial offer, the HTT-40 was substantially more expensive than the Pilatus PC-7 Mk II. The IAF could hardly be expected to accept an indigenous product that is more expensive than the imported version. Besides, there was and continues to be a lingering doubt about the capability of HAL to deliver the product within a committed time frame. Not prepared to bargain for uncertainty, the IAF thus initiated a case for the second lot of Pilatus PC-7 Mk II, a proposal that is not quite palatable to the indigenous aerospace industry.

Whatever be the merits of this particular case related to the procurement of the basic trainer fleet, the fact that issues of national security are flouted so brazenly and sensationalised by the media is an unhealthy trend. Such controversies are generally motivated (and so it may be in this case too), tend to undermine the role of institutions and clearly militate against the longterm security interests of the nation. What is noteworthy is that such controversies have generally been associated with cases of procurement of defence equipment through the DPP and are unheard of in cases of transactions between the two governments such as through the foreign military sales programme of the US Government. Even in the past where bulk of military hardware for all the three services was procured from the Soviet Union though transactions directly with the Soviet Government, there were no such aberrations or impediments. One only shudders to imagine the controversies that could well plague the impending mega deal for the 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) that has already suffered interminable delays.

It is clear that despite periodic refinements, the DPP continues to be flawed as it has failed to meet the demands of national security. Perhaps it is time for the government to consider more efficient alternatives for the sake of preservation of national security interests that ought to be paramount.