It is evident that a lot remains to be done to make the processing of cases related to procurement of defence equipment, not only smart, efficient and credible, but also responsive to the demands of national security

As the new year dawned, the medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) tender for the Indian Air Force (IAF) was back in the news with a bang; but this time with an incredibly shocking piece of news that a file related to the subject marked as “secret” submitted by Air Headquarters to the Ministry of Defence (MoD), was found by a private security guard, lying on the road side in the Khel Gaon housing complex in Delhi. Apparently, the file had gone missing after it was received at the MoD. In an effort to mitigate sensationalism and unwarranted media hype associated with a serious security lapse such as this, the IAF Chief attempted to play down the importance of the file in question describing it as being a part file with only three or four enclosures dealing with some comments on the offsets proposal and had nothing to do with the aircraft tender as such. While the CAS was dismissive, the Ministry of Defence remained reticent. But the Defence Minister A.K. Antony took a more serious view of the security lapse expressing his concerns publicly. As expected, both Air Headquarters and the MoD ordered separate investigations into the incident.

Whatever the differing shades of opinion on the issue or the results of the investigations, the callousness evident in the handling of sensitive documents by the bureaucracy per se, is a sad commentary on the manner in which procurement of defence equipment is handled at the national level. It is also symbolic of the malaise that plagues specifically the $10 billion (Rs. 45,000 crore) MMRCA tender. Request for information for procurement of 126 combat aircraft was initiated by Air Headquarters in 2001. The requirement was urgent as the MiG-21 fleet was obsolescent and the light combat aircraft Tejas, expected to replace the MiG-21, was nowhere near achieving operational status. However, despite the urgency generated by the depleting combat potential of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the critical importance of the proposal to national security, it took six years for the Ministry of Defence to take the next step and issue a formal request for proposal (RFP). While the delay would have been frustrating for the IAF, the MoD had a convenient precedent in the Hawk deal which took over two decades to fructify. The pace at which such “urgent” cases for the procurement of defence equipment are processed, reflects priorities in respect of national security. However, no amount of explanation to justify the inordinate delay can ever be convincing.

It took another two years before the MoD cleared the IAF to commence flight evaluation. Despite the six types of aircraft to be evaluated, the range of weapon systems and the different environments in which performance of the aircraft and its weapon systems had to be assessed; the IAF took just a year to complete the infinitely complex task. However, on account of the tardy progress in the procurement process, by this time, the validity of the commercial bids submitted initially by the vendors would have expired, necessitating submission of revised bids.