Reports in the media in the recent past indicate that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has revived its efforts to enhance its operational reach and capability in the North East region. In fact this process had been initiated in 2009 with the induction at the airbase in Tezpur in Assam, of the first Su-30MKI combat squadron, its latest frontline fighter aircraft. However, the process of building up of fresh combat potential to match the growing capability of the potential adversary has been somewhat slow as the second Su-30MKI squadron was inducted only two years later in Chabua in Assam. More recently, on November 17 this year, two Su-30MKI aircraft of the IAF landed at Imphal International Airport generating much excitement and speculation amongst the local population. Sources confirmed to the media that sorties by combat aircraft in the region bordering China and Myanmar had been intensified and the first combat aircraft of the IAF had landed at the Imphal airport was last year after it was upgraded to the status of an international airport. The landing on November 17 by the two Su-30MKI aircraft was apparently part of an air exercise being conducted in the region.

As part of capability upgrade programme, the IAF is in the process of upgrading seven advanced landing grounds (ALGs) in Arunachal Pradesh to fully operational status with the capability to operate both by day and night. Deployment of combat aircraft by the IAF in the recent past in the North East region reflects a shift in from its traditional Pakistan- centric threat perception to what can be regarded as a more potent threat from India’s Northern neighbour China especially in view of the significant build up of offensive capability in Tibet and the massive development of military infrastructure on the Chinese side of the 1,080-kmlong and disputed border.

While the IAF has been making attempts, though somewhat feeble, to enhance capability to cope with the challenges of a war simultaneously on both the Western and Eastern fronts, the effort in the domain of the land forces also seems to lack focus and determination. It was for the first time in the mid-1980s that threat from China was seen to be more potent than that from Pakistan. As wars cannot be won through only a defensive posture, the Indian Army projected the requirement for the acquisition of offensive capability in the mountainous region of the North East. However, despite efforts by the leadership of the Indian Army at that time, no steps were taken by the government to prepare the land forces to take on the emerging challenges.

It was only in July 2013 that the UPA Government finally cleared the proposal from the Indian Army for raising of a Mountain Strike Corps, it’s very first since inception, for deployment in the North East along the border with China. The financial burden for raising the Mountain Strike Corps, which would have a strength of 80,000 troops, was estimated at Rs. 65,000 crore. While the Indian Army went ahead with plans to raise the number of divisions that would constitute the Mountain Strike Corps, came the rather shocking news that the NDA Government had decided to scale down the size of the new Corps that was expected to make the land forces on the Eastern front formidable and a force to reckon with. The argument advanced by the new government to justify this decision was paucity of resources on account of which a Mountain Strike Corps of the size approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security was simply not affordable. Downsizing the Mountain Strike Corps was therefore and inescapable necessity.

Even after the Mountain Strike Corps is raised, the major impediment to its speedy and effective deployment would be the lack of proper road and rail infrastructure on the Indian side along the border with China. Unfortunately, once again, in this segment, the progress is rather tardy. China, on the other hand, has developed elaborate infrastructure to facilitate speedy deployment of the elements of the People’s Liberation Army. While there is undoubtedly the need for the IAF to build up with enhanced pace, not only its combat fleet in the North East region, but it must also improve the capability to provide efficient logistic support through an upgraded fleet of transport aircraft and rotary-wing platforms. However, India cannot hope to win a war on Eastern front unless there is simultaneous and coordinated build up of air and land forces duly supported by the required ground infrastructure. Without these, hope for victory against the Chinese forces on the Eastern front will remain a pipe dream!