The Indian government’s response to 26/11 was embarrassingly defensive and devoid of the slightest hint of capability or intention of resolute action beyond a bland all options open syndrome.

Bomb blasts and terrorist attacks appear to have become a routine feature in India. Almost as soon as the debris is cleared and the blood stains washed off the streets, the carnage recedes from public memory into oblivion. In the last three years, there have been over 16 incidents in which hundreds of innocent lives have been lost apart from damage to property and disruption of livelihood. Such incidents are regarded as problems related to internal security and statistical records are updated accordingly. Instead of bringing the real culprits to book, investigations and subsequent actions often degenerate into motivated and petty political controversies detracting from the core issues involved.

The 26/11 episode, however, was different in character from the routine though somewhat similar to the attack on Parliament in 2001. A blatant and brutal assault on the sovereignty of the nation, the Mumbai episode was, in essence, a military operation exceptionally well planned and executed with incredible audacity without concern for reprisal or escalation. The impact of the mission was magnified as the targets were distinctly high profile. The victims included many from the affluent segments of society as also eminent citizens from abroad. Reeling under the impact of global economic meltdown, the financial capital of India lay traumatised by this rape and the intelligence/security apparatus of the nation stranded without the proverbial fig leaf.

What is more disconcerting is the response to the crisis. Isolated acts of bravery notwithstanding, the absence of a coherent counter terrorist strategy and the lack of capability of the civil police to handle the situation were glaring. There was also tragic lack of professionalism in the encounter in which three highly rated senior police officials of the Anti-Terrorist Squad, a specialised outfit created to tackle such incidents, totally misread the situation and fell victim to terrorist bullets without a fight. Deployment of the Indian Navy Commandos was delayed on account of bureaucratic hassles that exist in any effort at coordination between the state and central agencies. There was inordinate delay in the arrival of the National Security Guard perhaps for the same reason. The infantry battalion of the Indian Army located in Mumbai which is experienced in combating terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir was conspicuous by its absence—perhaps not requisitioned at all. Evidently, not only were the intelligence agencies defeated in their own homeland, response from the security agencies lacked speed, centralised control/direction, cohesion and coordination. Besides, operating at a low level of technology in respect of weapons and other systems, security forces were clearly handicapped vis-à-vis the intruders.