NEWS
In a contemptuous challenge to the Indian government’s reconciliatory strategy and four days after Congress President Sonia Gandhi said that an integrated development-oriented approach was needed to tackle the Maoist problem, Naxals blew up a bus in Sukma in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district on May 17, killing 31 people on board including 18 civilians and 13 special police officers (SPOs). Government sources said that this was the first big Maoist attack on civilians and that they were shocked at its scale and precision considering that it was within a week of the Congress having sent conciliatory messages of peace and development.

VIEWS
It was yet another case of showing two fingers to the state and Central government with a barbaric act of violence by the Maoist high command while the former were oscillating between militarist and reconciliatory strategies for adoption against the Naxals. The often changing and conflicting statements emanating from the highest quarters of the government have, if anything, boosted further the Maoist resolve of propagating an alternative system of governance through revolutionary opposition. In September 2009, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh said, “Dealing with left-wing extremism requires a nuanced strategy—a holistic approach. It cannot be treated simply as a law and order problem.” However, this perception received a jolt when less than a month later, in a brazen ambush on October 8, in Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli district, close to the border with Chhattisgarh, left-wing extremists not only killed 17 policemen, but also raised the bar of brutality a notch higher by beheading a man in a Taliban-style execution before launching the attack on the police.

Responding to the mindless Maoist violence, the Home Ministry under P. Chidambaram laid out an offensive plan named Operation Green Hunt, with the employment of paramilitary forces comprising the Border Security Force (BSF), Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), and so on. However, even though a staggering 100,000 security personnel were involved in the operation, earlier doubts on its effectiveness, because of poor training, lack of command and control, directionless and indifferent leadership, poor tactics and low morale were proved right in more ways than one. The year 2010 has so far belonged to the Maoists alone who launched their counter-offensive, diabolically named—Operation Peace Hunt—in February, by slaying 24 paramilitary men of the Eastern Frontier Rifles in the Silda camp attack. The most brutal attack took place on April 6, when Naxal rebels gunned down 76 CRPF personnel in cold blood. The May 17 incident was not only another Maoists’ blow for the police forces, it also involved mindless killing of innocent civilians. And now, while the political buck is being thrown around with a blurring haste, the Maoist carnage continues.

The consistent inability of the state and Central Police Forces to deal with the Naxal menace has once again thrown up the debate on whether—or not—to use the armed forces in an offensive role against the Maoists. For now, the Centre’s earlier decision not to offensively involve the armed forces still stands. It is felt that this decision should continue to be upheld as long as the nation and its public opinion remains split on the status and nature of the Naxal threat. A large section of the Indian civil society is still engaged in romanticising the Maoist movement. Till the nation’s public opinion turns around to unanimously declare the Maoists’ as a terrorist outfit, the armed forces should continue to be used only in support roles, as it is being done now.