The Chinese Dragon may appear to be acquiring dinosaurian dimensions, but with the IAF spearheading the operations, there is great possibility of not only deterring but also effectively taming it in an actual conventional conflict

At the heart of the Sino-Indian strategic relationship lie the boundary issue between the two countries. It all started with the Chinese non-acceptance of the McMahon Line (ML) soon after the communists came to power in mainland China in 1949 and the forcible takeover of Tibet in 1950 by Maoist China. The Chinese occupation of Tibet removed the ever existing political and geographical buffer between China and India, so dextrously created by the British during the 1914 ‘Simla Agreement’, by establishing the ML to delineate the Indo-Tibetan border.

To redux, McMahon, a former Army engineer and a specialist in geographical surveys, was the Foreign Secretary of India during that period. In 1913-14, he convened the Simla Conference to delineate a China-Tibet-India border. During the conference, McMahon and Lonchen Shatra Dorje, the Tibetan representative, negotiated an agreement to delineate a boundary between Tibet and India. While McMahon put his seal and Lonchen signed, the Chinese representative, Ivan Chen, showing differences over the China-Tibet border, was non-committal on the Indo-Tibetan border issue. The ML therefore, while not subsequently ratified by the respective governments came to be accepted as the boundary between India and Tibet.

In the absence of a formally demarcated border between India and Tibet, the removal of all-important buffer by China’s occupation of Tibet in one stroke of force should have warned India of the dangers ahead. Instead, India—under the unquestioned and charismatic leadership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of independent India, bent over backwards to accommodate the communist regime bilaterally and regionally; whether by immediately recognising it, supporting its rightful entry into the United Nations, recognising Tibet as an autonomous region of China or holding China’s hands at Bandung to alleviate the fears of the South East Asian countries of the communist takeover of this large country.

India made a series of strategically crucial mistakes which finally led to its humiliating defeat in the Sino-Indian military conflict in 1962. First was the signing of the 1954 Trade Agreement with the Tibet region of China that in effect, accepted China’s sovereignty over Tibet, without linking this generous concession—as a quid pro quo—to the settlement of the boundary with Tibet. India failed to foresee the Chinese extraterritorial designs in not only physically occupying Tibet, but also extending Tibet’s geographical frontiers to suit its strategic needs. China’s unilateral action in altering the then accepted ground situation by constructing the Aksai Chin road in Ladakh was a case in point. India’s second crucial mistake was to go headlong in extending its presence and authority in remote areas, hitherto left unoccupied, without adequate planning and sufficient preparations in terms of resources and training. This flawed strategy coupled with hollow sloganeering to throw the Chinese out of every square inch of India’s sacred soil failed with the Chinese decision to “teach India a lesson” in the 1962 border conflict; which not only resulted in a military debacle but also scarred India politically and psychologically.

Though in hindsight, one of the major causes of India’s military defeat in its border conflict with China has been attributable to the non-use of the combat arm of Indian Air Force (IAF). It was a political decision. But why the decision was taken would remain in the realm of uncertainty, in spite of a never-ending debate on the issue. The fact of the matter is that the Chinese airpower card was overplayed compared to that of the IAF while the ground realities were quite different. It is well known that the Chinese offensive air capabilities in the Tibetan region were practically non-existent because of the design/operational limitations of their fighter fleets. Also, China’s capability to strike Indian cities with its bomber fleets was also limited owing to severe constraints of range when operating from the mainland airfields. The IAF, on the other hand, had acquired jet fighters like Hunters and Mysteres, not to speak of their smaller siblings like Vampires and Ouragons (Toofanis) which could be gainfully used in the interdiction and close air support roles to cause havoc to the Chinese ground forces. It is strongly believed and so articulated in different forums for some years now that had the IAF been used purposefully in its above-stated combat roles, the outcome of the 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict could have been vastly different.

Fifty years on, in 2012, the situation is far different as far as the technological prowess and operational capabilities of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) are concerned. The 1991 Gulf War was the wake-up call for China when the supremacy of the allied aerospace power was revealed in no uncertain terms. What followed was the doctrine of ‘active defence’ that implicitly allowed even a pre-emptive strike and a vigorous search for modern aerospace capabilities. Belying western forecasts, the PLAAF in the last two decades has upgraded itself with state-ofthe-art third/fourth generation aircraft such as the Su-27and its local version J-11, the J-10 based on the Israeli Lavi design, Su-30MKK/Su-30MK2, etc. The PLAAF has also acquired all-weather precision attack and network-centric warfare capabilities, matched with a vigorous space-based intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) programme. In 2011, China stunned the global aviation community by test-flying the J-20—its fifth generation stealth jet fighter. This was followed by the unveiling of the J-21 in 2012, another fifth generation Chinese design. China has utilised its economic and diplomatic clout to transform the PLAAF into a modern air arm.