While AFNET will provide the jumbo capability, it would have to be linked with satcom, ODL and HF links to complete the network-centricity loop

Dedicating it to the nation, Defence Minister A.K. Antony formally launched the Air Force Network (AFNET) on September 14, ushering in a new era of a modern, state-of-the-art digital information grid to provide networkcentric combat capabilities to the Indian Air Force (IAF), which had been waiting for it for a long time. AFNET would indeed prove to be an effective force multiplier for intelligence analysis, mission planning and control, postmission feedback and related activities like maintenance, logistics and administration. The system also boasts of a comprehensive design with multi-layer security precautions for ‘defence in depth’ by incorporating encryption technologies, intrusion prevention systems to guard against information manipulation and eavesdropping. But does it mean that the IAF has reached the acme of capabilities as far as its communication requirements are concerned, enabling it to conduct unhindered network-centric operations? The truth is that while AFNET provides a quantum jump in secure communications to the IAF, it has still a long way to go to achieve the desired capabilities in terms of all-round connectivity and multi-spectrum redundancies to provide the necessary survivability in a hostile combat scenario. But it would be equally important to understand as to how it all started and where it is now and to determine what more would be required in the future to make the IAF a true net-centric force.

The communication scenario in the post-independence India was that of operator-assisted or finger-dialing bulky telephones for the elite both in the civil and defence establishments. For the operational elements, there were mostly the good old hand-cranked ‘field’ telephones connected with rolls and rolls of D6 wires laid overground, powered by archaic batteries. Then, there were a sprinkling of rudimentary radars interspersed over locations considered to be the most vital— that too, only in the western sector. The East was almost entirely bereft of any radar capability. The author nostalgically remembers scrambling in the first generation Toofani jet fighters from Gauhati (now Guwahati) on visual sighting of a vapour trail emanating from the Tibetan Plateau in the north, heading towards Dacca in the south. It took more than 25 minutes to reach the trail altitude by which time the so-called intruder would have reached deep inside the airspace of erstwhile East Pakistan, probably in touch with Dacca ATC for the descent clearance. It was only after the Sino-Indian war in 1962 that the United States came forward to help India establish a radar network with a handful of Star Sapphire groundbased radars. To support the AD system, an elaborate communication network called the Troposcatter was planned. The programme was big enough for the IAF to create a separate establishment called the Radar and Communication Project Organisation (RCPO) headed by a two-star Air Vice Marshal (later upgraded to a three-star Air Marshal) appointment. The programme, however, got a severe jolt when the US imposed strict sanctions in the aftermath of Indo-Pak War of 1965. But it was the grit and determination of the IAF pioneers ably supported by Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) that ensured continuation of the programme and the fact that it was regularly monitored by none other than the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. By the end of 1970s, major vital areas throughout the country had been networked into the Troposcatter system. The US supplied Star Sapphire high-powered radars were installed in selected locations in the western, central and eastern sectors to cater to the requirements of the western, northern and eastern borders, respectively. To support the air defence network, Troposcatter hubs were established largely at elevated locations such as Dalhousie, Kasauli, Mount Abu, Kurseong and other places such as Jaipur, Delhi, to name a few. Peripherals were established at bases ranging from Srinagar in the north to Santacruz in the south and from Jamnagar/Naliya in the west to Chabua in the east. Needless to say, that the entire network served the IAF well for many decades. However, it was not only the technology which belonged to the mid-20th century, but the Troposcatter equipment itself was getting too old and difficult to maintain which pushed the planners to look for better alternatives.

At about the same time, India started to witness a revolution in the fields of information technology (IT) and telecommunications. With India riding the wave of communication revolution, frequency spectrum became a very precious commodity. The IAF planners decided to make use of this rare natural resource under their control in a most efficient quid pro quo manner with the Ministry of Telecommunication & Information Technology, which was desperately looking for additional spectrum to fuel the growth of 2G as well as the introduction of 3G services in the country. That is what gave birth to the AFNET, which evolved as network for spectrum (NFS) component of the IAF.