Over the years, the IAF has been consciously making efforts to upscale its electronic warfare capability. It is now equally important to pay attention to the aspects of cyber war, as it could be a ‘game changer’ in future conflicts.

“No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed from the enemy until it is ripe for execution”
—Niccolo Machiavelli

The batt lespa ce to day is increasingly dependent on the use of electro-magnetic (EM) spectrum. While network-centric warfare (NCW) has become an essential form of operations, protecting such a capability is becoming equally challenging. Apart from radar emissions and various types of IT-enabled communications; the increasing dependence on cyberspace for the command and control functions makes EM spectrum vulnerable to the emerging integrated domains of electronic and cyber warfare. Defending newer disruptive technologies fielded to disable or degrade both the hardware as well as the software, is therefore a daunting task. This was amply demonstrated during ‘Operation Orchid’, the successful attack by Israeli Air Force on a nuclear reactor under construction in Northern Syria, on September 6, 2007. A specially programmed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), similar to the US Suter airborne network attack system, had apparently sent an embedded bug as part of the reflected radar echo to one of the Syrian air defence radars. This false echo had in turn disabled the entire air defence (AD) network for a considerable period of time, allowing the Israeli F-15 and F-16 aircraft to destroy the site without any resistance from the Syrian air defence missiles or interceptors.

While Marconi invented the wireless radio communication in 1896, the first known use of interception and spoofing of a radio message was reported in the Russo-Japanese Naval Battle of 1905. An initial form of electronic warfare had taken birth. Later, it was in Second World War that the techniques of jamming adversary’s radars gathered momentum. Suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) operations by F-4G Phantom aircraft became a necessity in the Vietnam War, with wild weasel aircraft of the United States Air Force (USAF) used extensively to jam the Vietcong radar and missile systems. It is reported that due to their contribution, the USAF aircraft losses came down by nearly 70 per cent. In the 1967 war, Israel had used communication jamming extensively. But it was in the midst of Yom Kippur war of 1973 that the need for a robust yet agile EW capability came to the fore, to minimise initial heavy Israeli aircraft losses to different varieties of Egyptian AD missiles.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) started building electronic warfare (EW) capability only after the 1971 war. Till then both India and Pakistan were yet to acquire low level radar coverage and surface-to-air missile defences. As such, low level attacks were reported mainly by visual observers or MOP. In both the 1965 and 1971 wars, the IAF had resorted to few aerial attacks against Pakistani radar located at Badin. However, in these wars, there was lack of a specific IAF strategy for neutralising the command and control capability of Pakistan.

With Pakistani deployment in the 1970s of low-level chain of minimum power distortionless response (MPDR) sensors, terminal AD missiles like the Crotale and an integrated airborne interception capability, the IAF had to embark on rapid build up of EW resources. In 1978, a dedicated EW squadron, with a mix of Canberra and MiG-21 aircraft was formed, fitted with standoff and escort pods respectively; to provide a suppressive shield to the embedded strike force. Strike tactics were evolved based on ‘burn through’ ranges for the terminal attacks. Gathering of electronic intelligence (ELINT) and communications intelligence (COMMINT) became essential, but accuracies in locating and in particular ‘fingerprinting’ the Pakistani sensors needed much better technology for the interception equipment.

In the Bekaa Valley war of 1982, the Israeli Air Force had aptly demonstrated the need for accurate ELINT and effective use of EW, which had neutralised the Syrian air defence network, along with partial incapacitation of their command, control and communication (C3) system. Since the Syrians were using similar Soviet sensors and interceptors, the lessons were somewhat worrisome for the Indian Air Force. The inbuilt Soviet EW equipment lacked versatility as well as adequate power output. As such, the IAF had to import EW pods from countries such as Italy and France. That is when IAF mastered the art of configuring Western equipment on varied Soviet platforms. Due to limited radii of MiG-21 EW escort aircraft, emphasis was also laid on acquiring airborne self-protection jamming (ASPJ) pods.

The USAF doctrine of ‘aerial dominance’ displayed in the Gulf Wars highlighted the need to attack and disable enemy’s C3 system, in the initial stages of war. Destroying the radar network along with communication grid makes the enemy not only ‘deaf and dumb’ but also ‘blind’. For the past few years, the IAF has been on the path to acquire similar capability. Acquisition of better signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability, both ground based and airborne, provides the IAF with a more accurate electronic order of battle (EW ORBAT). The IAF inventory also possesses anti-radiation missiles (ARM) on manned and unmanned platforms, as well as improved ASPJ for protection against the terminal defences. However, most of this capacity build-up has taken place mainly against Pakistan, with not much information on the Chinese EW ORBAT.

Since EW systems are highly classified in nature, efforts for indigenous development were given priority from the very beginning. A specialist lab, Defence Avionics Research Establishment (DARE), was set up by the Defence Research and development Organisation (DRDO) in 2001 by renaming the Advanced Systems Integration Organisation (ASIEO) established in 1986, to develop specific electronic as well as avionics projects. DARE followed a collaborative approach with private industry partners such as CMC and Tata Power, as also with select international companies. Over the years, DRDO has become a ‘single window’ supplier of EW systems for the IAF and other two Services. It has developed a static as well as mobile ESM system Divya Drishti (divine eye), capable of ‘fingerprinting’ sensors. It is also upgrading ESM capability of the ground based as well as airborne platforms of the IAF. The airborne early-warning and control (AEW&C) Embraer aircraft will also have such capability. In order to cater to the Service specific requirements, DRDO has also developed a comprehensive EW system known as Samyukta for the Army, which can also give useful inputs to the IAF. Along with UAV and aerostat based ELINT and COMMINT payloads, IAF should shortly be in a much better position to glean requisite information on the adversary’s EW ORBAT.