The US companies may be lamenting having lost the MMRCA deal, but they would do well to remember that many more are coming their way. The IAF is seriously thinking in terms of placing orders on Lockheed Martin for additional C-130J aircraft. Similarly, the order for the acquisition of C-17 is being revised upwards.

The initial industrial and diplomatic reaction in the US circles to the non-inclusion in the shortlist of US jet fighters contending for India’s medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) has been nothing short of utter dismay and deep disappointment. Though not openly acknowledged, it is generally believed that India discarding the US airplanes to favour their European competitors may have led to Timothy Roemer resigning from his Ambassadorial post. It may be recalled that after the US Administration under President George W. Bush had gone out of its way to see the extraordinary Indo-US civilian nuclear deal through despite strong dissensions—both internal and international—the two countries, after signing the New Framework for Defence Relationship (NFDR), embarked upon rapidly building a strong longterm defence relationship. Of great significance was the fact that earlier taboos had been cast aside and the US floodgates opened up with almost the entire range of advanced military equipment including the latest versions of F-16 and F-18 on offer to India. In the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement (also known as the Indo-US 123 Agreement), a question had openly started to do the rounds whether as a quid-pro-quo, 123 would equal 126? In other words, would the nuclear deal give the US fighters a definitive edge over other contenders in the fiercely competitive Indian Air Force (IAF) project to acquire 126 multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA)? At the time, the US was so sure of clinching the deal that it started dangling the bait of spinoffs from it’s under-development fifth generation fighter (F-35) if either F-16 Fighting Falcons or F/A-18 Super Hornets bag India’s 126 MRCA project, valued at $11 billion ( Rs. 49,500 crore approximately). In this context, a presentation was also made to the IAF at Air HQ on the ongoing F-35 Joint Strike Fighter indicating it could fulfill India’s future needs as a follow up to the slated induction of 126 MRCA. The IAF was indeed on the lookout for a fifth generation fighter with a lethal mix of stealth, beyond visual range (BVR) combat capabilities, superb manoeuvrability and super-cruise capability. The US thinking was that if India moved on fast track in its favour on the 126 MRCA project, then the fifth generation fighter needs of the IAF could also be factored into the overall scheme of things.

But it did not happen that way. First, it was too much of an expectation that the languorous bureaucratic system involving acquisition of defence equipment could actually move on a fast track. Second, were the three ‘guiding principles’ which had been outlined by A.K. Antony, the meticulous Defence Minister of India with a squeaky-clean honest image. These were: IAF’s operational requirements should be fully met; the selection process should be competitive, fair and transparent to ensure best value for money; and Indian defence industries should get an opportunity to grow to global scales due to the mega size of the project.

The roaring skies of Bengaluru during as many as three biennial Aero India air shows (2007, 2009 and 2011) stand testimony to the fact that the selection process though long has been fiercely competitive. Exhaustive and detailed technical and field evaluations too indicate that the process has been fair and transparent and short-listing of the European fighters suggests that the selection has been done based purely on technical and performance parameters. It may be noted that from the initial issuance of the request for information (RFI) in 2003, the India’s MRCA project continued to move up the ‘role accretion’ scale as bigger and more advanced jet fighters started to join the lucrative programme. With the numbers of vendors eventually swelling up to six, it soon became evident that the competition was getting divided between two blocs of light-weights (Lockheed Martin F-16 IN Super Viper, Saab JAS-39 Gripen NG, Mikoyan MiG-35) and the heavy-weights (Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet, Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale). As a matter of fact another ‘M’ was added to the MRCA nomenclature and it came to be known as medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) project.

With the IAF gradually moving into ‘mission-creep mode’, it was getting clear that there were greater chances of the heavy-weights getting the nod for short-listing. Lockheed Martin’s F-16 IN Super Viper, though a superb fighter in its own right, apart from being bracketed in the light-weight category, also had to contend with the psychological disadvantage of the F-16s being in service with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF).

In the end, selection of the Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale amply proved the point of the heavy-weights being short-listed. However, what has baffled many defence experts and industry watchers is that Boeing’s Super Hornet did not make the cut. But perhaps, even this should not come as a surprise, because even with the excellent addition of latest avionics and weapons capabilities, there was a great possibility that the aircraft’s older airframe design (sans the fore canards and other aerodynamic refinements) would be found wanting in the department of aerodynamic manoeuvring vis-à-vis its more recently designed fourth generation+ competitors.

As is known, both the shortlisted companies have been asked to extend their commercial bids till December 31. With both aircraft having met the technical and performance specifications, the L1 issue could have a decisive impact on the outcome of final selection. On the other hand, political considerations could also weigh heavily in awarding the contract which brings to the fore the often-quoted statement of the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that “maximum possible geopolitical/diplomatic mileage should be derived from military deals of such nature”. Therefore, is there a possibility that selection of the European companies though ostensibly merit-based, has also resulted in introducing a geopolitical angle, either inadvertently or in a subtle manner?