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SP's Military Yearbook 2021-2022
SP's Military Yearbook 2021-2022
       

Fighter Force - Rebuild & Rejuvenate

Issue: 02-2010By Air Marshal (Retd) V. K. Bhatia

While the IAF is on the path of decline in numbers of fighter aircraft, China and Pakistan are on an upswing of force accretion and modernisation

Has the massive downslide in the number of jet fighter squadrons in the Indian Air Force (IAF) which started in 2002 and quickly rose to an alarming rate finally been halted? Is the World’s so-called fourth largest air force now poised for a resurrection from the ‘rock bottom’, or, the downslide is likely to continue for some more time? Has the IAF got a workable rebuild programme for its fighter force? Which way is it heading to rejuvenate itself to reach the required numbers? These are a few of the many tough questions facing the IAF. In short, is the IAF on track for its much needed modernisation/augmentation?

To redux, throughout its long and tortuous history, the IAF has generally fumbled through the processes of creating the necessary capabilities to meet multifarious and ever changing security challenges. This has also been due to the ‘knee-jerk’ policies of the democratically elected governments which are known to respond only in reactive modes where the country’s defence needs are concerned. In the past, after each war it was forced to fight with its adversaries in the neighbourhood, India proceeded on a soul-searching mission to optimise its defence capabilities. In the 1960s, post two conflicts against China and Pakistan, respectively; various studies were conducted and as far as the IAF was concerned, a recommended force level of 64 squadrons (including 45 fighter squadrons) to effectively meet the challenges of fighting a war against its belligerent western neighbour while maintaining a defensive posture against its northern communist neighbour was accepted at the highest political level. The IAF however, could reach a maximum of only 39 1/2 fighter squadrons, which was achieved during the golden era spanning late 1970s to 80s. This was made possible with the induction of a large variety of aircraft types such as the Jaguars, MiG-23s, MiG-29s, MiG-25s and the Mirage 2000 multi-role fighter jets.

The party did not last for long. The 1990s first witnessed the almost unimaginable and sudden dismemberment of the Soviet Empire at the international front and drying up of financial resources on the domestic front. While the former had a crippling effect on the flow of spares and equipment of the erstwhile Soviet origin, the latter made acquisitions from other sources well nigh impossible. The lethal combination of the two began to be felt at the turn of the century when the older combat squadrons of the IAF started to fold up like discarded playing cards. And, even though the new millennium witnessed new heights in India’s economic growth, the IAF went on a reverse curve of decline. Between 2002 and 2008, the IAF lost almost a quarter of its jet fighter squadrons in numerical terms. Currently, the IAF is struggling hard to prevent a further reduction from its lowest level so far, of around 29 squadrons before it can start building it up again to the desired levels.

Threat Scenarios

While the IAF is on the path of decline in numbers of fighter aircraft, its two major adversaries namely, China and Pakistan are on an upswing of force accretion and modernisation. China’s modernisation drive to replace its antiquated weapon systems with the help of Russian technology and expertise led to rapid transformation of its Air Force (PLAAF) which, by 2005, had acquired close to 400 Su-27/Su-30 aircraft. The numbers continue to increase with China’s home production of J-11 aircraft. In addition, indigenous production of other types such as JH-7/7A, FC-1 and J-10 is progressing at a feverish pitch. PLAAF is close to realising its aim of having a predominantly fourth generation air force providing it with all-pervasive capabilities of a modern, state-of-the-art, offensive air arm with matching support systems in a network-centric warfare scenario.

Pakistan on the other hand, has been supplied with more than $11 billion (Rs 52,860 crore) worth of modern weapon systems, including the latest version of F-16 aircraft by the US as its partner in ‘GWOT’ (Global War on Terror). In addition, Pakistan with help from China has started domestic production of the JF-17 (Chinese FC-1) with the PAF (Pakistan Air Force) being given maximum priority to transform itself into a modern fighting force. Soon, India could be confronted with 1,500 to 2,000 modern generation fighters at its two borders. It is against this backdrop, the IAF has to build itself to successfully face the emerging threats and future challenges.

Augmentation of Force Levels

Till recently, more than two-thirds of the IAF combat squadrons had MiG-21 variants. When these and the other older models such as the MiG-23 variants began to wind up, the situation started to take a grim turn for the service. The saving grace was the gradual induction of Su-30K and later, the Su-30 MKI aircraft into the IAF which helped stem the downslide to some extent. In addition, with fresh induction of a few more Mirage 2000 aircraft, the IAF was able to squeeze out a third squadron from the available resources. The IAF has also been able to reequip one more squadron with fresh induction of HAL-produced Jaguars. But they prove to be the proverbial ‘drops in the ocean’. It is not that the IAF did nothing about the impending erosion in the number of its fighter squadrons. The IAF floated an RFI (Request for Information) as early as 2001 for a 126-aircraft medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for a global tender, but because of the painfully slow governmental acquisition processes, it has only recently crossed the hurdle of RFP and moved on to the Flight Evaluation stage, after an agonising wait of nine years. Even if all the remaining stages of the procurement process are dealt with most expeditiously, there is little possibility of an in-service induction of the selected aircraft before 2014-15. The global competition for the mega-billion dollar deal includes the US Boeing F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and Lockheed Martin F-16IN Super Viper, the French Dassault Rafale, the European Eurofighter Typhoon, the Swedish SAAB Gripen NG and the Russian Mikoyan MiG-35.

India’s own jet fighter programme, the LCA, is running way behind schedule and induction of even the IOC (Initial Operational Clearance) aircraft are likely to miss the revised deadline of 2011 to enter restricted operational service in the IAF. With the indigenous ‘Kaveri’ having failed the muster, the question of selecting an appropriate engine for the ‘Tejas’ is yet to be addressed. Till then, the IAF will have to do with the under-powered GE F404 version (<80 kN thrust) being installed in the first 20 aircraft on order with the HAL.