During a media briefing a few days ago, Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne, Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) and Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, stated that contract negotiations between the representatives of Dassault Aviation and the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) over the deal to procure 126 Rafale medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA) from the French company were progressing satisfactorily. He went on to express hope that the contract negotiations would be completed in the next few months.

Continued Uncertainty

In the last week of July this year, the French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian visited Delhi during which high amongst the engagements of the diplomatic itinerary of his tour was interaction with the MoD on the inordinate delay in the finalisation of the $20 billion MMRCA contract for the Indian Air Force (IAF) that Dassault Aviation of France had won in January 2012, in a gruelling and lengthy contest against five other contenders of global repute. The contract negotiations with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) Dassault Aviation began thereafter; but even after 21 months having gone by, there appears to be little certainty of the time frame in which the deal would be inked, repeated assurance from the highest echelons in the defence establishment notwithstanding. When questioned during a media briefing on the occasion of the high profile visit, the Minister of Defence A.K. Antony in fact had stated that the process of contract negotiations was extremely complex and it was not possible for him to lay down a time frame in which the issue is to be finalised. He added that even after the contract negotiations are over, there are many other steps that have to be gone through and all this would take time. Sources in the MoD have described the acquisition process for the MMRCA based on the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) as extremely complex owing to the plethora of technical and legal issues that the Contract Negotiations Committee must address while interacting with the OEM as also a host of smaller and medium enterprises for subcontracts under transfer of technology (ToT) and offset obligations. That leaves the issue of finalisation of the contract for the MMRCA still open-ended.

Erosion of Operational Capability of the IAF

With the fleets of vintage aircraft already overtaken by obsolescence and ought to have either been replaced years ago or now rapidly approaching the end of their total technical life, the size of the combat element of the IAF is shrinking at an alarming rate with consequent and inevitable blunting of its operational edge. As against the authorised strength of 39.5 squadrons, the IAF now has 34 squadrons and in another three to four years, with some of the aircraft from the fleets of the MiG-21 and MiG-27 being progressively phased out, the strength of thecombat fleet could reduce to fewer than 30. By the year 2019, the MiG-21 and the MiG-27 fleets are slated to be retired from service altogether following which the strength of the fleet could well come down to 20 or so if no fighter aircraft are inducted by then. This figure is disconcertingly low especially when consequent to a re-evaluation of the geostrategic and security scenario in the region and the government having already approved enhancement in the size of the combat fleet of the IAF to 42.

Induction of Combat Platforms into the IAF

The IAF expects to receive another 100 (equivalent of five squadrons) of the Su-30MKI in the next two years thus completing the induction of the currently ordered total of 272 aircraft. However, induction of these five squadrons would enhance the strength of the combat fleet only to 25 providing only a partial relief to the IAF. The Tejas Mk I light combat aircraft (LCA), the indigenously designed, developed and produced light-weight multi-role jet fighter is expected to receive its initial operational clearance (IOC) by the end of this year as mandated by the Minister of Defence. Soon after the grant of IOC, the IAF should begin the process of induction. However, as stated by the CAS during the recent media briefing, the IAF expects to induct the first squadron of the Tejas LCA only by the end of 2015. Time frame for the final operational clearance (FOC) has been estimated to be achieved by the end of the same year i.e. 2015. However, there continues to be lingering uncertainty.

Presuming that the Tejas project moves forward as planned, the IAF can begin in 2016 the induction of the two squadrons of this aircraft already ordered from HAL. However, being a new induction, it may take a few years for this fleet to get over the usual teething problems and reach full strength as also become operationally effective. The numbers being small, even timely induction of the Tejas Mk I will add just two more squadrons taking the strength of the combat fleet to 27. This will make only a marginal difference in the overall combat potential of the IAF.

The IAF has made considerable investment in its effort to leap into the fifth-generation through the joint development with the Russian aerospace giant Sukhoi of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA), a twin-seat variant of the Russian T-50 PAK FA that is in the flight test phase. As stated publicly, the IAF expects that this aircraft will be available for induction by 2020 i.e. seven years from now; but there may be some difficulty in this regard. The project for the Indian FGFA is still in the design stage and as an elaborate infrastructure for the manufacture of this new generation aircraft in India is to be set up from scratch by HAL and as the technology for this platform is expected to be much advanced, going by the most optimistic estimates based on innumerable imponderables, it may take up to a decade and a half from now if not more to operationalise the fleet i.e. by 2028, if the IAF is lucky. It is also understood that the numbers initially planned that was pitched at 214 aircraft (11 squadrons) has been revised downwards drastically to 144 aircraft (eight squadrons). This implies that even after the induction of the FGFA, the strength of the combat fleet will not exceed 35, well below the newly sanctioned figure of 42. It should also be borne in mind that with each passing year, the refurbished fleets of the MiG-29, Jaguar and the Mirage 2000 are also hurtling towards obsolescence.

Despite all the optimistic pronouncements from different quarters and levels, the future of the combat fleet of the IAF does not appear as bright as it ought to be. With this size and vintage of the combat fleet, the IAF will be ill-equipped to meet the challenges effectively even on a single front. The rapidly dwindling fleet of fighter aircraft should leave no one in doubt that not only is the deal for the 126 Rafale MMRCA becoming increasingly urgent and vital for the IAF even if it has to just arrest the degradation of combat capability, the IAF must quickly decide to exercise the option built into the RFP for another 63 aircraft (three squadrons) and if possible even more to attain full sanctioned strength and the desired level of operational capability.

General Elections— A Possible Impediment

A major stumbling block that could lead to further delay in the finalisation of the contract could be on account of the general elections that are expected to be held nationwide in May 2014. Firm dates are likely to be announced in the near future after which the model code of conduct would become effective. Once this happens, the government will be debarred from taking further steps towards finalisation of the contract. This means that the deal will go into limbo for some time till a new government at the Centre takes charge. What view the new government takes of the deal is anybody’s guess. In any case, change of government at the Centre holds the possibility of pushing the whole procurement process into a state of paralysis at least for some time, adding to the delay.

The Final Word

If the deal is crucial for the IAF, its success is equally important for the OEM Dassault Aviation. The Indian MMRCA contract would be the first and perhaps the only sale of the Rafale outside France. Besides, the French Government has already ordered a significant reduction in the orders of this aircraft for the French Air Force. Continuing delay in finalisation of the contract or its cancellation could create serious difficulties for the French Government and the OEM to the point of being compelled to discontinue production. Should this happen, it will leave the IAF literally high and dry. The tardy approach of the establishment in processing the case for the MMRCA could ultimately prove to be a disastrous blow for the IAF.