In the coming years, the biggest worry for the IAF would be how to hold on to at least the now achieved figure of 34 combat squadrons. What strategy would the IAF follow to not only fill the void created by the outgoing MiG-21s but also build up the ‘force’ further to a stipulated 42-squadron level by 2022?

Speaking on the status of his force to the media in June this year, after the passing out parade (POP) at the Dundigal Air Force Academy, Hyderabad, Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne said that the key year for the IAF would be 2022. “All the contracts which were signed during the Eleventh Five Year Plan… will be executed till 2017. At least 65 to 70 per cent of force build-up will be accomplished by 2017, and the rest by 2022,” he informed the media. A key aspect of the IAF’s force build up programme is to not only regain its erstwhile combat jet fighters’ strength of 39½ squadrons but also to augment it further to 42 squadrons by 2022 (end of Thirteenth Five Year Plan). But how will the IAF meet its stated goal?

The combat fleet which constitutes the spearhead of the IAF needs to be constantly revamped and restructured in conformity with the growing status of the nation in the region as well as in the global arena. As a rising economic power, India has the responsibility to ensure peace and stability in the region. It is vital that the combat fleet of the IAF is capable of coping with the threat posed not only by Pakistan but more importantly by its other traditional adversary China as well, which is steadily moving towards becoming a global superpower.

The Threat

China’s military modernisation progressing purposefully for more than two decades now is steadily shifting the military balance in its favour. It is not only the Soviet/Russian military technology which provided the leap forward; the Chinese aerospace scientists themselves are carving big successes in indigenous design and development. The J-10 and the latest J-20 fifth generation stealth combat jet fighters amply prove the point. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of China is rapidly progressing to be essentially a fourth generation plus combat force, fielding as many as 1,500 frontline fighter aircraft, supported by a plethora of force-multipliers such as airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), aerial refuelling systems, modern air defence systems, space-based command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure and a large variety of ballistic and cruise missiles in offensive roles.

Riding on the status of a ‘frontline state’ and a partner in the global war on terror (GWOT), the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has continued to reap a rich harvest in terms of military grants from the US. Pakistan has also made copious use of its ‘special’ relationship with China to procure state-of-the-art fourth generation fighters for the PAF in large numbers. Out of these, JF-17 Thunder is being produced indigenously, with the PAF already having received around 34 aircraft. Eventually, the PAF is looking at inducting 250-300 aircraft into service. In addition, it has placed an initial order for 36 J-10 (FC-20) out of a total order of estimated 150 aircraft to be acquired from China. Its present holding of around 65 F-16 upgraded and new aircraft could finally swell up to 100 aircraft, if it continues to receive the US military largesse. By 2020, the PAF is estimated to have 500-550 modern fighters alone. On the other hand, it’s ballistic and cruise missiles programmes are also moving forward with added momentum, once again thanks to its all-weather friend China and North Korea.

It is against such formidable threats, the IAF has to modernise and augment its forces to provide the necessary deterrence and if required, war winning capabilities. While some defence analysts in India feel that the possibility of a full-fledged two-front war against it by China and Pakistan is remote; the deep strategic nexus between the two—both at the nuclear and conventional levels—cannot be ignored and must be factored into our thinking and consequent operational preparedness.

IAF: Present Status

It is a common knowledge that till recently the IAF was facing a deep abyss of capability erosion having lost more than a quarter of its combat jet fighter force. It is incredible but with some faulty planning and premature retiring of the MiG-23 fleets, and the inevitable phasing out of the MiG-21 fleets, the early years of the last decade began to witness rapid decline in the number of jet fighter squadrons. The IAF, which had laboriously built up to a combat squadron strength of 39½ by the late 1980s, slid down to a mere 29 squadrons by about the middle of last decade. Faced with the precarious situation, the IAF leadership had to take some quick decisions to stem the slide. With the LCA programme still teetering, the IAF decided to go in for additional Su-30 MKI aircraft which had begun to be produced under licence by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The order book swelled up to 272 aircraft out of which about 170 have been delivered to the IAF. In a recent interview, Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne stated that a force level of 34 squadrons had been achieved (see Table 1 for an estimate of the present strength of various jet fighter fleets).

What Lies Ahead

In the coming years, the biggest worry for the IAF would be how to hold on to at least the now achieved figure of 34 combat squadrons. As per the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the remaining 10 squadrons of MiG-21 fleets would be phased out by 2017, with ‘Bisons’ exiting the last. What strategy would the IAF follow to not only fill the void created by the outgoing MiG-21s but also build up the ‘force’ further to a stipulated 42-squadron level by 2022?

Currently, the only aircraft available to the IAF is the under-production Su-30 MKI. However, even though HAL has stepped up production to around 18 units per annum, this may not be sufficient to match the numbers of MiG-21s being phased out annually. There is real apprehension that, in the near future, the number of squadrons may show a downward trend again before the augmentation plans in the pipeline starts to fructify.