Reports in the media in the recent past indicate that the aerospace and defence major of the United States — Boeing Defense, Space & Security—has terminated its contract with the Indian aerospace major, the state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), to manufacture components for both civil and military aircraft produced by the former. Boeing’s contract with HAL was a part of the offset obligations the company was obliged to fulfil.

Specifically, one of the military platforms produced by Boeing that is in question is the Boeing P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft ordered for the Indian Navy. As per Boeing, the decision to cancel the contract with HAL was literally forced upon them by the quality of the products delivered by HAL which the company found was consistently below acceptable levels. Last year, Boeing had taken up this issue with HAL, but was rather disappointed with their indifferent response. As HAL failed to meet with the laid down quality standards, Boeing opted to switch over to Indian aerospace companies in the private sector. The companies that now manufacture components for the US aerospace major are the Tata Group, Bengaluru-based Dynamatic Technologies, Rossell Techsys as well as others.

But Boeing is not the only one to be disenchanted with HAL as recent reports in the media suggest that the Indian Air Force (IAF) has asked HAL to discontinue with the project to build the intermediate jet trainer (IJT) Sitara. Launched 15 years ago, the IJT project had a promising start, but tragically, it floundered soon after for a variety of reasons. The aircraft has already missed three deadlines for initial operational clearance (IOC) and the time frame for its availability to replace the ageing fleet of HJT-16 Kiran jet trainers, continues to be uncertain. And now it transpires that the airframe of the IJT has serious design deficiencies and would need to be redesigned. As to how long this process would take cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. For the IAF, the non-availability of the IJT is perhaps as serious a dilemma if not greater than that of the fading dream of procuring the medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). It should not be surprising that the IAF has decided that it would prefer not to squander both time and money any more waiting for the elusive Sitara from HAL. The IAF seems to have lost all confidence in the ability of HAL to produce even a basic jet trainer and as it cannot wait indefinitely for HAL to oblige, it is exploring other options to procure the IJT from abroad. Similarly, even after 32 years of effort, the indigenous light combat aircraft Tejas Mk I is not yet fully operational. In fact the government is considering handing over the Tejas Mk II project to the private industry.

The story of the basic trainer aircraft for the IAF is not any different. The HPT-32 piston engine basic trainer aircraft was grounded, albeit somewhat prematurely, by the IAF in July 2009. There were far too many cases of engine failure in flight on the HPT-32 reportedly on account of a design flaw in the routeing of the fuel pipelines leading to the engine. Unfortunately, despite all effort, the HAL could not solve the problem. Six years have passed since the grounding of the HPT-32 fleet, but there is no sign of its replacement dubbed by HAL as the HTT-40, being a reality. Having given up hope, the IAF had no option but to procure the Pilatus PC-7 Mk II from Switzerland. More recently, even the fleet of Hawk 132 advanced jet trainer manufactured under licence by HAL has come under the scanner following engine failure in flight during a training sortie that resulted in the loss of a relatively new aircraft. But it is not only trainer aircraft from HAL that have been plagued with problems, the fleets of licence-built combat jets such as the MiG-21, MiG-27 and even the most modern fourthgeneration plus Su-MKI have also been afflicted with quality issues resulting in loss of a large number of expensive platforms and precious lives.

But perhaps the most telling commentary on the quality standards at HAL has been the disastrous end to tender for 126 Rafale medium multi-role combat aircraft that hit a wall primarily on account of an inflexible position adopted by the OEM Dassault Aviation of France. The OEM refused to stand guarantee for quality of product and delivery schedule if the French aerospace major was compelled to partner with HAL. After eight years since the request for proposal (RFP) was issued, the tender has formally been called off.

Unless issues related to quality standards are addressed seriously, effectively and in a respectable time frame by HAL, an asset created by the Indian Government with humongous investment will turn into a liability.