NEWS:
This was coming and now it is official. Pincered in by a combination of pressures, the state-owned Indian aerospace major Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has decided to re-design and weight-optimise its Stage-II jet trainer, the HJT-36 Sitara, officially calling upon global airframers to size up the platform and hammer out a prescribe. After persisting with the line that the aircraft was fine and that it was rapidly piercing through test points towards service status, the new decision to scout assistance is HAL’s first admission that there’s been trouble all along. Intended as a training bridge between the now in-service Pilatus PC-7 MkII basic trainer and BAE Hawk advanced jet trainer, the IJT was to enter service in June 2012.

VIEWS:
After the premature grounding of the HAL-built HPT-32 basic trainer fleet in July 2009 that created a serious crisis, the Indian Air Force (IAF) now finds itself in the throes of another and perhaps more serious. The existing fleet of the HAL-built HJT-16 Kiran aircraft, whose induction had begun in 1968, is dwindling rapidly and the intended replacement, the HJT-36 designed and developed by HAL, does not seem to be anywhere near achieving operational status. The possibility of the IAF being left without a jet trainer for Stage II training of combat pilots is looming large over the horizon.

As early as in 1997, HAL embarked on a project to design the HJT-36. In the year 1999, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) had accorded formal approval and the required funds to the Indian aerospace major for the development of a platform that was dubbed as the Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT). The first prototype PT-1 undertook its maiden flight on March 7, 2003, just 20 months after commencement of construction, a remarkable achievement indeed! On this occasion, the aircraft was christened by the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee as “Sitara”. The second prototype PT-2 flew exactly a year later. However, for some reasons, it appears that the project has gone off the rails thereafter as it missed the first target date of 2007 for entry into service and then even the revised time lines of 2010 and 2012 could not be honoured.

However, a contract stands awarded by the MoD to HAL to build a dozen limited series production aircraft followed by 75 production aircraft. Unfortunately, even seven years after the initially planned date for entry into service, the aircraft is yet to receive initial operational clearance while the date for the final operational clearance has been announced as December 2014 and that for induction of the aircraft into the IAF as 2015. But there are imponderables ahead.

The first stumbling block that HAL encountered was the selection in 2005 of the AL-55I turbofan engine of 16.9 kN thrust rating from NPO Saturn of Russia to replace the originally installed Larzac engine from Snecma Turbomeca of France. As the latter delivered only 14.1 kN of thrust, the aircraft was regarded by the IAF as badly underpowered. The option of the AL-55I definitely appeared more attractive as it provided for licence-production in India by HAL that already had a well developed infrastructure in Koraput, Odisha, where engines for the Su-30MKI are being manufactured.

Acquisition of the new engine proved to be troublesome for the project as the first engine was delivered only in December 2008, two years later than scheduled. Besides, there were three major accidents involving prototypes in February 2007, February 2009 and April 2011 that necessitated grounding of the aircraft for repairs and investigations. All these factors resulted in the project getting delayed inordinately.

All along the HAL had been assuring the IAF that the project was proceeding well and the minor issues would be resolved soon. However, it now transpires that the aircraft is not only overweight but more importantly, is afflicted with serious aerodynamic problems that have implications for air safety. This is not acceptable to the IAF especially as the aircraft would be flown by trainee pilots with low experience. On account of the aerodynamic problems, test pilots themselves have not been able to put the aircraft through stall and spin trials. HAL is now of the view that for the problems to be solved, the airframe would have to be redesigned. As the lone Indian aerospace major finds itself up against a wall, it is seeking collaboration with a reputed original equipment manufacturer (OEM) from abroad to find ways to reduce weight from the present 4,150 kg as also to redesign the airframe to solve the problems of handling at low speeds to enable test pilots verify stall and spin characteristics.

Given the complexities of airframe redesign, it goes without saying that there is no possibility of the Sitara being available to the IAF by 2015. In fact it could well be that the Sitara may not become operational at all. As the IAF has once again been left high and dry, it has adopted the only option that it has i.e. to procure a suitable platform from the global market and soon enough to sustain Stage-II training. To this end, the IAF has already floated a global request for information seeking inputs from OEMs on jet trainers for primary task of Stage-II training of pilots and secondary task of counter-insurgency operations.