After a prolonged period of inexplicable slumber, the IAF has apparently got the ‘wake-up’ call and initiated a slew of measures to modernise and augment different categories of its helicopter fleets

Sino-Indian Conflict, November 1962—The Chinese declare a unilateral ceasefire after occupying large tracts of territory in the North East Frontier Agency. But in withdrawal, they leave a large number of wounded Indian soldiers who have to be heli-lifted from Tawang to Tezpur. Air Force Station Tezpur has newly inducted Mi-4s but hardly any trained pilots. The lone Flight Commander is down with raging fever but his is a life saving mission. He takes with him a brand new pilot officer (Plt Offr) posted to the collocated Toofani fighter squadron who has not even touched the flying controls of a helicopter, leave alone fly it. With super-Herculean effort he lifts the chopper past the ‘transition’, hands over the controls to the young Plt Offr, “Fly it like a conventional fixed wing aircraft and take me to Tawang”. “Yes sir. But where is Tawang?” queries the Plt Offr. Looking at his now half-conscious captain, he knows there will be no answer. Gingerly picking up a million-map from the floor of the cockpit, he orientates himself and map-reads his way to Tawang. The 45-minute journey in a state of feverish slumber rejuvenates the ailing captain to a degree that he manages to land without any mishap at the high-altitude helipad. Mi-4 can take only nine passengers. But the line is long and time-criticality for evacuation is such that 18 seriously wounded soldiers come aboard. The overloaded Mi-4 is incapable of a hover take-off from that altitude. The captain lines up at the far end of the helipad, opens full power and sprints down the slope, flinging the heavily laden chopper into the yawning gap below. The plunge helps the chopper quickly pick up safe flying speed, preventing it from crashing into the valley floor (a ski-jump in reverse!). Evacuation is successful.

The MI-4 used in the mission—with its in¬credible, unprecedented overload—belonged to No. 109 HU (Helicopter Unit) of the Indian Air Force (IAF) which had been thrust into ac¬tion right from the moment of its birth, when in 1962 the Sino-Indian war broke out. The helicopter in question was one of the two-aircraft detach¬ment that the unit maintained at Tezpur under Eastern Air Command, which served extensively in casualty evacua¬tion and logistics missions in and around Tawang, Sela and Bomdila areas of North-East Frontier Agency, later Arunachal Pradesh. As is evident from the above narration, the fledgling unit had received the helicopters ex-USSR and it was still trying to build up its pilots’ strength.

But that was almost half a century ago. Post 1962 conflict against China, the IAF clearly understood the importance of having a sizable rotary wing force to meet the ever-increasing and multifarious requirements of not only the armed forces but other governmental agencies as well. The induction of the Mi-4 helicopter was to have a profound effect on IAF capability as, with the delivery of these helicopters, major expansion of the IAF rotorcraft inventory began. After the formation of No.109 HU, more units were formed with repeat orders and eventually, by 1966, 120 Mi-4 helicopters were procured. At about the same time, the French Alouette III light helicopters were inducted into the IAF which were later produced in much greater numbers by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under the name ‘Chetak’ and ‘Cheetah’—a derivative of the Allouette III. The IAF helicopter force increased steadily in numbers and in the next two decades it was built to over 500 French and Soviet types. The IAF built its helicopter force with different types flaunting varied capacity and capability and included lightweight utility, medium-lift, heavy-lift as also, attack helicopters.

Undoubtedly, the pride of the force has been the Mi-26 heavy-lift helicopter, which has been operated by N0.126 HU, with outstanding results in the mountains of Northern India. It achieved a major milestone when during OP ‘Meghdoot’ it soft-landed an Army one-tonne truck and a Jonga at Daulat Beg Auldi (DBO) post located at a height of 16,500 ft in the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh in 1986. The IAF also inducted Mi-8 medium-lift followed by a stronger version Mi-17 in large numbers to serve in its helicopter units throughout the country, playing a vital logistic support role in all its dimensions. Mi-8/Mi-17s are operated for commando assault tasks, for ferrying supplies and personnel to remote mountain helipads and jungle clearings, for search and rescue (SAR) operations and myriad other tasks which include disaster relief – even electioneering duties. In May 1984, the IAF’s helicopter force acquired another dimension with the induction of Mi-25 attack helicopters, used to much effect in Sri Lanka during Op ‘Pawan’. The upgraded Mi-35 followed suit in 1990.

In the recent years, the IAF has been inducting the indigenous HAL-developed Advance Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv, having received close to two dozen of these by now out of a total initial order of 54, to be completed by 2016.

Modernisation Drive

The much touted helicopter force of the IAF like its most other assets, however, is on the decline; having been hit by mass-scale obsolescence in a major portion of its helicopter fleets. The IAF currently operates 300+ helicopters in 28-30 units. But for the recently inducted Dhruv helicopters and some Mi-17 1Vs inducted during the past decade all other types are struggling with the problems of old age and inadequate spares/maintenance support. For example, its more than 100 strong Mi-8 fleet is in dire need of replacement including the VIP version operating in the IAF’s Communication Squadron. Some of the older versions of Mi-17s are also nearing the end of their service life and need to be replaced. The light utility helicopters Chetak and its lighter and more agile Cheetah version also need to be replaced by more modern and more capable helicopters to do justice to their assigned duties, especially in the high mountainous regions of Ladakh and the Northeast. The Attack helicopter fleets are faring no better and need replacement in a phased manner. But has the IAF taken any steps to rejuvenate its helicopter force to the desired levels of modernisation and capabilities?