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SP's Military Yearbook 2021-2022
SP's Military Yearbook 2021-2022
       

IAF Modernisation - Immediate Needs

Issue: 08-2009By Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia

To attain a continental stature, it is imperative the Indian Air Force gets adequate ‘capital’ budgetary support of at least $5-7 billion annually in the coming decade and timely clearances for its acquisition programmes

It took more than a decade For the Indian Air Force (IAF) to universally grow out of the four-decadeold dogmatic mindset—that of being just a ‘tactical’ service with a mandate to primarily provide close air support to ground forces in furtherance of the latter’s land campaigns. The turn of the last century witnessed the IAF’s doctrinal perceptions finally going through fundamental and far-reaching changes to propel the air arm of the three services into a new realm—that of being a true strategic air force like other leading air forces in the world. India’s emergence as the new economic power house on the world stage and the changing geo-political and security scenarios also changed the IAF’s perceptions of its new roles and responsibilities. The force began to appreciate the necessity to acquire comprehensive operational capabilities characterised by flexibility, quick response, mobility and transportability of all forms of national power as well as long reach and precision-targeting fire power with minimal collateral damage—all attributes of a modern air force.

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Ironically, while the IAF was beginning to go through metamorphic changes in its thinking, tenets and operational doctrines, it also started to experience cataclysmic reductions in force levels and other combat equipment. The question that looms large is whether the IAF’s current force levels, combat support equipment and infrastructural capabilities do full justice to its enhanced responsibilities and roles? Evidently, there are a large number of deficiencies in the IAF’s arsenal in practically all areas of desired capabilities. For example, while it has strategic airlift capability, so aptly demonstrated during the Maldives crisis in 1985, it was limited in nature and the IAF has not been able to build on it to reach the desired levels.

Similarly, its offensive strike capability is severely restricted. It lacks in all-weather, day and night, precision attack capability. For the defence of vital areas/points, its existing surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons have long crossed the obsolescence thresholds which cannot be stretched much further. The latest reports suggest that almost one third of its Pechora SAM firing units may have actually been phased out. This has caused serious erosion in the ground-based air defence capability. As for network-centricity, so essential for the conduct of modern day warfare, the IAF is still at a nascent stage.

Therefore, while the Indian defence establishment continues to meander through the armed forces’ modernisation projects, it would be worth examining as to what the IAF has planned and what it should be doing to meet its needs in the immediate short term and, in the medium term to cater to the emerging threat scenarios.

Threat Scenarios

India has two major adversaries in its immediate neighbourhood, China and Pakistan. China has a time-bound modernisation plan for its military which it put into operation in the early 1990s when Beijing observed the superiority demonstrated by the coalition forces in the first Iraq war, Operation Desert Storm.

The modernisation drive to replace its antiquated weapon systems saw the rapid transformation of China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which by 2005 had acquired close to 400 Su-27/Su-30 MKK aircraft. In addition, domestic production of JH-7/7A, J-10, J-11 and FC-1 is progressing at a feverish pitch. PLAAF’s aim is to have a predominantly fourth generation air force providing it with all-pervading capabilities of a modern, state-of-the-art, offensive air arm with matching support systems in a network-centric warfare scenario.

With the global war against terror in full swing, Pakistan is reaping the harvest of its alignment with the US owing to Washington’s generous offering of weapon systems, including the latest F-16 aircraft. In addition, with Chinese help, it has started producing the JF-17 (Chinese FC-1) indigenously. The Pakistan Air Force is being given maximum priority to transform itself into a modern fighting force. Soon, India could be confronted with more than 1,500 Fourth Generation fighters along with state-of-the-art force-multipliers at its two borders.

Against the combined strength of its adversaries’ air forces, the IAF finds itself in a highly unenviable position of holding depleted and somewhat obsolete inventories. To redux, in the aftermath of wars against China and Pakistan in the early 1960s, it was planned to equip the IAF with a total of 64 squadrons (including 45 combat squadrons). The IAF at its maximum strength could muster up to 39-and half squadrons which, today, stand depleted to approximately 30 squadrons only due to retirement of a large number of obsolescent aircraft. However, it does not end here as the IAF, despite its efforts, is experiencing downslides in all its inventories of weapon and support systems/equipment. Undoubtedly, the IAF has a robust long-term plan for re-equipment and modernisation. But due to various reasons, it does not seem to be running on track. The need of the hour is to accelerate the various acquisition/modernisation programmes already under way and add on more where required for the IAF to meet its immediate needs in the coming decade.

Programmes & Projects

Fighter Force: Apart from upgrading its existing fighter fleets that have adequate residual life such as Mirage 2000, MiG-29 and Jaguars, the IAF is progressively inducting additional Su-30 MKI aircraft to arrest any further downslide in its Combat squadrons’ strength. It is also eagerly waiting for the culmination of the 126-aircraft Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract for it to start filling the existing deficiencies. In addition, the indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA) is also due for induction into the IAF.

However, even if everything goes according to the plan, the IAF would still have only 34 to 35 squadrons by 2020 whereas it must aim to regain its original strength of 39-and-half squadrons. This could be achieved by ordering more Su-30MKIs with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited over and above the 140 that are being built by it. (See table “Likely Fighter Force By 2020”.) In addition, India could also exercise the option of acquiring greater number of aircraft in the MMRCA deal at a later date, if it is felt that the IAF’s combat strength be beefed up to the originally recommended figure of 45 squadrons.

Transport Force: The IAF’s order for six C-130J Super Hercules aircraft from the US will be able to fill, but only to a small extent, the gap created long ago in the 20-tonne payload class of transport aircraft with the retirement of the An-12s in the early 1990s. The IAF could certainly do with more of these aircraft to operate a full-fledged squadron to perform a variety of roles. In addition, IAF’s interest in acquiring 10 C-17 Globe Master IIIs is most timely as, if fructified; it would give a much needed boost to the IAF’s strategic heavy-lift capability which presently is restricted to about 14 of the older IL-76 aircraft.

Helicopter Force: The IAF is actively seeking to enhance its rotary wing capabilities in different categories. It is in the process of acquiring 80 Russian-built Mi-17 1V helicopters to gradually phase out its ageing Mi-8 fleet. Its order for 12 VVIP AgustaWestland AW101 helicopters has reportedly run into rough weather with the Finance Ministry because of high costs but, it is hoped the matter will be resolved soon. RFPs have also been issued/in the process of being issued to acquire 15 heavy category helicopters, 22 attack helicopters and 115 light utility helicopters out of a joint Army-Air Force requirement of 312 machines. All these need to be pursued on fast track to enable the IAF to beat the deficiencies occurring due to obsolescence of older types. Induction of the indigenous ALH Dhruv helicopter is also continuing in a phased manner.

Force-Multipliers: The IAF appears to have taken timely decisions to acquire force-multipliers with inductions of different types having already commenced. These include Flight Refueller Aircraft (FRA), Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Aerostats. The only drawback is that so far, these have not been ordered in sufficient numbers to achieve desired levels of capabilities. The IAF urgently needs to order at least six more FRA, three more AWACS, four more Aerostats and greater number of Heron UAVs. It also needs to add to its precision attack weapons capabilities.