As the IAF stands poised on the threshold of significant modernisation, the need of the hour is for the government to offer meaningful and timely support to accelerate the modernisation programme

Throughout its long and mostly turbulent history, the IAF has sometimes super-cruised and, at other times, literally stalled in its quest to create operational capabilities to meet the multifarious challenges. This has by and large been due to the knee-jerk policies of the government which is known to respond only in a reactive mode as far as the country’s defence needs are concerned. In the past, after each war it was forced to fight with its neighbouring countries, India embarked on a soul-searching mission to rationalise its defence needs. In the 1960s, post two quick conflicts against China and Pakistan, respectively, various studies were conducted to strengthen the armed forces and, as far as the IAF was concerned, a recommended force level of up to 64 (with 45 combat squadrons) was reinforced to effectively fight against its belligerent western neighbour while maintaining a defensive posture against its northern neighbour. The closest that the IAF has been able to come to this was the officially declared figure of 39 1/2 squadrons achieved during the golden era of late 1970s/80s. This was made possible with the massive induction of a variety of aircraft such as Jaguars, MiG-29s, MiG-23 variants, MiG-25s and the Mirage 2000 multi-role combat aircraft.

These were truly happier times for the IAF but, unfortunately, the golden period did not last for too long. The beginning of 1990s witnessed the then unimaginable and sudden disintegration of the Soviet Union as also the dire financial state that India found itself in. While the former had a crippling effect on the flow of spares and equipment of Soviet origin, which still formed the backbone of the IAF’s operational inventory, the latter made it impossible to acquire new equipment due to the then prevailing financial constraints. At the turn of the century and as the time passed, gaping deficiencies began to surface in the IAF’s inventory, brought on by obsolescence and retirement of aircraft, especially the older MiG variants. Even though some transfusion in the form of the new Su-30K and later Su-30MKI air dominance fighters took place and a third squadron of Mirage 2000 was squeezed out from limited fresh inductions and available resources, the net result was not good enough to stem the downslide in the number of fighter squadrons. The IAF which had maintained a 39 1/2 squadron combat aircraft strength till 2001, was last year down to 29 squadrons having lost more than a quarter of its combat potential.

IAF Under Transformation
While the new millennium saw the quick reduction in the IAF’s force levels, its doctrinal perceptions went through fundamental and far-reaching changes to propel the IAF into a new realm. For instance, the IAF fully shed the notion of being called a mere tactical air force meant primarily for the support of the surface forces. It strongly reinforced its case for being a strategic air force in conformity with all other leading aerospace powers in the world. With India emerging as the new economic power house, the resultant geo-political and security scenarios require it to possess comprehensive military capability characterised by flexibility, quick response, mobility and transportability of all forms of national power as well as long reach and precision-targeting fire power with minimal collateral damage—all the attributes of a modern air force.

Present Capabilities
How do the IAF’s current force levels, support equipment and infrastructure measure up to do full justice to its enhanced roles? One doesn’t have to look too deep to realize that there are a large number of deficiencies in the IAF’s arsenal in practically all areas of desired capabilities. For example, it has the strategic airlift capability, so aptly demonstrated during the Maldives crisis, but it is limited in nature. Similarly, its strategic offensive capability is also restricted. The IAF lacks adequate precision attack capability, both by day and by night. For terminal defences, its existing Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) squadrons have already crossed the threshold of obsolescence and cannot be stretched much further. This has caused serious erosion in the SAM defence capability. As far as the Network Enabled Operations (NEO) or the more advanced infrastructure for Network Centric Warfare (NCW) is concerned, the IAF is still at a nascent stage.

Modernisation of IAF
The IAF—it has been stated at several forums—is now poised on the threshold of significant modernisation. The Air Chief in his recent message on the eve of IAF’s 76th anniversary stated, The IAF is in the process of transformation. A large number of aircraft, sensors, weapons, communication equipment and infrastructure are in varying stages of induction. However, while he is hopeful of the IAF leapfrogging a generation ahead shortly, he succinctly admits that the process will actually be slow and laborious. The need of the hour is adequate budgetary support for meaningful and timely modernisation. In the present scenario, if the government commits to spending around 3 per cent of GDP on defence as it had done in the 1980s; sufficient resources would be available for meaningful modernisation. Major weapon systems, equipment and capabilities are required for the IAF to attain the status of a balanced modern air force of a continental stature.