The youngest of India’s defence forces, the Indian Air Force (IAF), reached its adolescence around two decades ago. An Air Force Doctrine published in 1995 reflected a distinct resolve to move away from the hitherto status as a tactical air force to a strategic one. This was also evident in subsequent articulations and acquisition plans. Doctrinal strands of roles and missions, objectives, operational and administrative organisations, force employment principles and the exploitation of latest technology, were prominent in the Air Force’s renewed zest for more active participation in the nation’s military projection beyond the limits of territorial air space. The IAF has come a long way from that phase and realising that it is perhaps the most impelled by technology among the three services, has made all efforts to be close to the leading edge of aerospace technology. Slow development of indigenous design and manufacturing capability has been a serious handicap in the fulfilment of this aspiration. Despite being the fourth largest air force in the world, almost all the aircraft it flies are of foreign origin. Its helicopter fleet is no exception.

Roles and Tasks

The IAF’s doctrinal persuasion is to be equally effective and credible during war and peace. This nuance is especially applicable to the helicopter fleet. While the fighter component trains during peace for war, the helicopter fleet is constantly involved in peacetime tasks which are an aid to civil administration, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, etc. As an illustration, Operation (Op) Rahat comes to mind wherein the IAF, in perhaps the biggest heli-borne relief operations ever, employed 45 helicopters and rescued 24,000 civilians trapped on account of the devastating floods in Uttarakhand. Men and machines procured, equipped and trained for essentially military tasks were thus pushed into aid to civil administration. Another similar but long drawn task is Op Triveni under which Mi-17 V5 helicopters of the IAF have been supporting civil security forces in antinaxal operations in difficult and inaccessible terrain.

The IAF helicopter fleet’s war time roles and tasks are predicated largely to providing support to the Army in offensive and logistical roles which include attack, anti-tank, armed, suppression of enemy air defences, communication, reconnaissance, search and rescue, casualty evacuation and special heliborne operations. There is also an element of aerial combat by helicopters to cater to situations of helicopter versus helicopter confrontations in the tactical battlefield. When looking into the future, these roles need to be kept in mind so that suitable quantitative and qualitative upgradations are planned to consummate all these roles with mission accomplishment as the ultimate touchstone.

Current Status

According to the official website, the IAF has over 500 helicopters in its fleet. Of these, over 200 are medium-lift helicopters of the Mi-8/Mi-17 family. The latest addition to this family is the Mi-17 V5 which has advanced avionics and weapon systems besides being endowed with a power plant that permits it to fly usefully at high elevation helipads, a necessity realised during the Kargil war. Apart from the armed role, these helicopters are suitable for commando assault tasks, operational and logistic support missions to remote mountain helipads such as in the Siachen Glacier or in the island territories and search and rescue (SAR) operations. Other platforms in the fleet are Chetak/Cheetah/Cheetal light utility helicopters, Dhruv advanced light helicopter and a few Mi-25/35 attack helicopters. The Mi-26 heavy-lift helicopter is on its last legs and is to be replaced by the Boeing CH-47 Chinook. Then the few MI-8s for VVIP travel which are reaching obsolescence and were to be replaced by 12 AgustaWestland AW101 helicopters. Unfortunately, the deal has run aground.

Plans for Upgradation

To augment the medium-lift inventory and replace ageing Mi-8s in 2008, the IAF ordered 80 Mi-17 V5 helicopters, to be delivered between 2011 and 2014. The first Mi-17 V5 was received in February 2012. In August 2010, it was reported that India planned to order another 59 Mi-17 V 5s. IAF’s capability in the medium category would be notably enhanced when all the Mi-17 V5s are inducted.

In the light utility category, the Chetak and the Cheetah have had maintenance problems since the French stopped production in the 1980s. However, Eurocopter has kept the production line open for rotor blades solely for the Indian market as these represent a niche technology. The Chetak/Cheetah fleet was to be replaced by 197 light helicopters to be purchased from international vendors, of which 64 were for the IAF. The request for proposal (RFP) was first floated in 2003 and again in 2008. Eurocopter AS-550 C3 Fennec and Russian Kamov Ka 226 were the final contenders and the arrangement would have involved licence production by HAL. However, that process was put on hold. Meanwhile, HAL is developing the light utility helicopter (LUH) which is a single engine design with a maximum AUW of just over three tonnes. HAL intends to produce 187 of these and expects their date of operationalisation to be 2015. In all probability, these will replace the IAF’s Chetak/Cheetah fleet as the AS-550 C3/Ka-226 decision appears to be stalled. The IAF is also in the process of inducting 54 Dhruvs (38 utility and 16 armed versions). With a maximum AUW of 5.5 tonnes, the Dhruv lies just on the borderline between ‘light’ and ‘medium’. In contrast, the Chetak has an AUW of 2,200 kg and the Cheetah just 1,950 kg. While the Cheetah can carry three passengers, the Chetak can carry five in addition to a two-man crew. The Dhruv on the other hand, can carry 14 passengers besides the crew. Series production of Dhruv started in 2001 and it has a twin-engine safety to offer while the LUH is a single engine design. The Cheetal (Cheetah with a Shakti aero-engine) was introduced to augment the Cheetah fleet for Op Meghdoot and its better load carrying capability and reliability have encouraged the IAF to order a small number (reportedly 20) for its fleet.

The Mi-26 was the IAF’s heavy-lift helicopter since 1986 but served more as a status symbol than a utilitarian platform. Moreover, its serviceability was always problematic, and eventually in 2012, it was decided to order 15 twin-rotor Boeingmanufactured Chinook CH-47 helicopters. The Chinook has a unique design incorporating powerful contra-rotating tandem rotors and is being operated by 20 countries for heavy-lift assault, troop movement, logistics support, aerial battlefield recovery and special operations. Capable of being refuelled mid-air for extended range, a Chinook can carry 55 combat-ready troops or over 11,100 kg of cargo. The Mi-26 was larger with a maximum take-off weight of 56,000 kg and a carriage capacity almost double that of a Chinook whose maximum gross weight is 22,668 kg. However, the Chinook can be transported in the hold of the C-17 Globemaster III. India has ordered ten C-17s and the advantage of being able to transport the Chinook over large distances is obvious.

The IAF got its first attack helicopter, the Mi-25, in 1983 while the Mi-35, an upgraded version, was inducted in 1990. However, a controversial document called the Army Air Force Joint Implementation Instruction 1986 bifurcated the responsibilities of the two services in relation to the attack and anti-tank helicopters of the Air Force. While operations and training were to be overseen by the Army, the administration remained with the IAF. The mutually unsatisfactory arrangement has failed to meet single service demands and kept the attack helicopter ownership debate smouldering. As a replacement for the Mi-25/35 fleet, Boeing’s AH-64D Apache met all Air Staff Requirements while the Russian Mil Mi-28 failed in some. Twenty-two Apaches are planned to be ordered for about $1.4 billion but the final word is yet to be uttered.

The simmering debate about ownership of attack helicopters reached a precipitation point during March last year with the Defence Minister announcing that the ownership of future inductions of attack helicopters will vest with the Army. Meanwhile, HAL’s Rudra has received its initial operational clearance and is projected as the first armed helicopter being produced indigenously in India for a wide range of missions, including reconnaissance, anti-tank warfare and close air support. Development of the Rudra variant was authorised in December 1998 and a prototype made its first flight in August 2007. It completed 20mm turreted gun firing trials in September 2011 as well as Mistral air-to-air missiles and 70mm rockets tests in November 2011. Mistral is an infrared homing missile which is capable of striking targets within a range of 6.5 km. The maximum take-off weight of the helicopter is 5,500 kg and it can carry a payload of 2,600 kg. The Rudra can be fitted with up to eight Helina (Helicopter Launched Nag) anti-tank guided missiles, four MBDA Mistral short-range air-to-air missiles or four rocket pods for 68mm/70mm rockets. HAL was committed to deliver 76 Rudra ALH Mk-IV helicopters for the Indian Army and the IAF, and has handed over the first platform to the Indian Army in February 2013. The IAF is looking forward to the Rudra for high altitude operations, as no country makes attack helicopters for high altitude operations as foreseeable in the Indian context.

The Future

From the foregoing, it is clear that the ongoing acquisitions would definitely bolster the IAF’s helicopter fleet to a capability level higher than what it is today. The numbers are likely to go up to 600 in the next five years. However, for a territorial expanse of more than 30,00,000 sq km and land borders of more than 15,000 km with two hostile neighbours, a total of 600 helicopters would appear to be inadequate. Coming to quality, any discussion about the future of IAF’s helicopter fleet is inextricably linked to the evolution of indigenous capability in the helicopter design and development domain. Common sense would indicate the preference of indigenous military platforms to foreign ones. However, years of unimpressive performance by the public sector has generated cynicism in the IAF. The IAF is now publicly vocal about it. On the other hand, the success of the Dhruv family cannot be ignored. Although its variants may not fully meet the professional aspirations of the IAF, they cannot be brushed aside either. The larger issue here is prediction for the two decades from now. Despite efforts by the IAF, it is unlikely that the aerospace manufacturing industry in India would move substantially to the private sector. So long as the industry is dominated by the public sector, it would be difficult to produce leading edge rotary-wing platforms despite transfer of technology from foreign manufacturers. The path to real indigenous development in aerospace manufacturing lies in levelling the field for private players.

Procurement

Cancellation of the AgustaWestland deal could slow down other helicopter acquisitions, especially to replace the Chetak/Cheetah fleet. Indigenous capability is unlikely to produce an aircraft like the Apache or the Mi-17 V5 in a respectable time frame. Public sector lobbying is unlikely to let private entities get a foothold into the military helicopter sector while its own performance is unlikely to rise to international standards. For the next two decades, therefore, the IAF appears to be looking at a large proportion of its rotary-wing inventory being of foreign origin, the only exception being the Dhruv advanced light helicopter and possibly the light utility helicopter and/or the Rudra.