If there is one achievement that the former Defence Minister A.K. Antony ought to be credited with, it is the change in the Defence Procurement Procedure of 2011 aimed at indigenisation in the defence industry. The changes introduced in 2013 had multiple objectives of strengthening the defence manufacturing base in both the Indian public and private sectors, infusing greater efficiency in the process of procurement of military hardware and significantly encourage indigenous research and development (R&D) in the defence industry.

Antony, who chaired the meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council in April 2013, said that the only way forward was rapid indigenisation in the defence industry with both public and private sectors playing pivotal role in the endeavour. He went on to state that the government would spare no effort to create genuine level playing field for Indian manufacturers vis-à-vis global players. The primary thrust of defence procurement would henceforth be ‘Buy Indian’. Increased indigenisation was important for the Indian armed forces to ensure that they have access to reliable supply chain in times of urgent need and not be vulnerable to being held hostage by foreign suppliers who could readily succumb to pressure from their own governments. This move is all the more significant as India is today the largest importer of military hardware with 70 per cent of the nation’s requirement being met with from foreign sources for which there is outflow of precious foreign exchange worth billions of dollars. Besides, the process of procurement of military hardware appears to be afflicted with the malaise of scams that has led to the blacklisting of several global aerospace and defence companies, cancellation of tenders just before award of contract or even while the contracts were halfway through execution such as in the case of AgustaWestland. It is generally believed that procurement of defence equipment from indigenous sources will help substantially mitigate, if not completely eliminate, this menace.

But indigenisation has its own challenges especially in the regime of the aeronautical industry which operates at levels of technological sophistication that are higher than those of weapon systems employed by the surface forces. Besides, the nation’s efforts at achieving self-reliance in the production of modern defence hardware, especially military aircraft and aerial weapon systems, will have to be adequately supported by the scientific and technological base in the country that would include institutions of higher learning such as the Indian Institute of Science, the Defence Research and Development Organisation as well as the nation’s industrial capability.

Since the mid-1960s when the first lot of third-generation combat aircraft the MiG-21 FL was procured from the Soviet Union, the nation adopted the relatively easy option of ‘Licensed Production’. The Indian aerospace industry has since then been basking in the comfort of this arrangement having produced even fourth-generation combat aircraft such as the Su-30MKI and is aspiring to transit into the fifth-generation in the near future. However, licensed production provided no opportunity or incentive for the R&D establishment to develop meaningful capability and thereby contribute effectively to the attainment of self-reliance. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was thus left with no alternative but to continue to seek aerial platforms and weapon systems from foreign sources. In fact, the support from the indigenous industry has, if at all, been declining over the years. Having produced a combat aircraft such as the HF-24 that did become operational in a reasonable time frame, the Tejas light combat aircraft programme continues to be plagued with uncertainty despite three decades of effort and huge investment. Similarly, after the eminently successful basic trainer aircraft such as the HT-2 and HJT-16 Kiran, the Indian aerospace industry has not been able to improve upon their performance and provide suitable replacements for these in time compelling the IAF to explore options abroad.

The story in the rotary-wing regime is no different. Despite the success of the advanced light helicopter Dhruv, the Indian armed forces are now confronted with a dilemma in the wake of the cancellation of the tender for 197 light utility helicopter (LUH). The indigenous aerospace industry that was tasked by the government several years ago to produce an equivalent platform has not yet moved beyond producing a mock-up. There is no certainty as to when the armed forces can hope to receive the 400 odd LUH that the indigenous industry is expected to deliver.

Indigenisation and self-reliance in the defence industry are laudable concepts and undoubtedly in the national interest; but the inability of the Indian aerospace and defence industry to deliver quality products in the required time frame, will only undermine the operational capability of the armed forces and seriously impinge on national security.