The most befitting tribute to the IAF’s role in the 1971 Indo-Pak War came from none other than Lt General A.A.K. Niazi, who when asked as to why he had surrendered his command when his Army was still intact, had pointed at the flying wing on the uniform of an IAF officer and said, “Because of this, you—the Indian Air Force.” Read through the concluding part of the article to get a closer picture of the war.

PAF’s War Strategy

In consonance with Pakistan’s grand strategy based on the principle that “Defence of East Pakistan rests in West Pakistan”, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) had worked out its own war strategy in terms of deployment of forces and their employment. The PAF therefore stuck to deploying only one squadron (No. 14) of F-86 Sabre aircraft (though with somewhat bigger than normal strength and further beefed it up with a few RT-33s) in the east, with rest of the force deployed in the west. Taking note of the changed ground environment on all Indian Air Force (IAF) bases with aircraft mostly kept in hardened protective shelters (as indeed was the case at PAF bases), it was felt that the PAF would not be able to repeat the success in destroying the IAF aircraft on the ground as it did so remarkably in 1965. It was feared that if attempted, the attackers would be forced to make precision attacks with front guns and rockets which would expose them to the inferno of anti-aircraft weapons, causing unacceptable losses. The PAF therefore, swung to the idea of mainly bombing the IAF airfields to make the air complexes and runways untenable for certain periods of time, to deny the enemy air interference with Pak Army’s land assaults into Indian territory. In many ways, it turned out to be a flawed idea, as would become clear a little later. The IAF on the other hand adopted a two-pronged strategy for conducting counter air operations. Only fighter aircraft were employed for daylight precision attacks mainly against enemy aircraft on the ground causing as much attrition as possible. During night strikes, Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment (TACDE) fighters (MiG-21s and Su-7s) and Canberra light bombers were used to mainly cater to the enemy runways and parallel taxi-tracks. Even though the IAF did suffer some losses during daylight attacks, on the whole, this dual strategy paid handsome dividends by turning the tables on the PAF vis-à-vis 1965 in terms of destruction of aircraft on the ground.

Conduct of Air War

In a pre-planned move, the PAF carried out near simultaneous attacks late in the evening on December 3 against the IAF airfields in the western theatre, trying to achieve the kind of surprise the Israeli Air Force had achieved against its Arab adversaries during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. But here, two things were missing, one: the IAF was well prepared for such an attack with most of its aircraft dispersed and protected in camouflaged blast pens; two: the PAF by and large, targeted only the runways in hurriedly executed bombing attacks. This resulted in only superficial damage being caused to runways at some places such as Amritsar, which were repaired in just a few hours with next to nil attrition to aircraft on the ground. As a matter of fact, the IAF lost just three aircraft on the ground during the entire war. These aircraft were temporarily exposed on the ground while taking-off or taxiing in after their respective missions, when unfortunately the attack came. The PAF attempted no pre-emptive strikes worth the name in the east.

How ineffective was the PAF’s brilliantly planned but poorly executed pre-emptive strikes is evident from the fact that the IAF’s retaliatory strikes could be launched the same night from its respective bases. But the real onslaught came the next day, on December 4, with the IAF carrying out daring daylight precision attacks against many PAF bases in the west. The next three days saw a lot of counter-air attacks in both theatres with the PAF bearing the brunt of losses on the ground; and in the air. An independent post-war compiling of losses by a foreign analyst pegs the losses to the PAF as 26 aircraft destroyed on the ground with 16 as ‘probables’. And, this does not take into account 11 Sabres which were machine-gunned on the ground by the PAF itself in Dhaka.

In response to the PAF strikes, the Western Air Command struck PAF bases at Sargodha, Mianwali, Shorkot Road, Murid, Peshawar, Chander, Risalewala, Chak Jhumra, Karachi, Drigh Road and the radar stations at Lahore, Sakesar and Badin. In addition, the IAF carried out interdiction to prevent concentration of troops in the forward areas. The aircraft used for these attacks were the HF-24 Maruts, Su-7s, Hunters, Mysteres and the B-57 Canberras. The IAF had done its homework well with each squadron having been given specified tasks in furtherance of the air campaign in both theatres of war. For example, TACDE, the specialist unit had been given specific enemy airfields in the west for night attacks. However, No. 32 Squadron to which I belonged at the time of the war had been given myriad tasks such as counter-air, photo-reconnaissance and interdiction. The squadron was assigned the army close air support task as well as its secondary mission. Counter-air targets included Sargodha and the PAF’s brand new secret airfield at Shorkot Road. I led three strikes on Shorkot Road on December 4-5 with considerable success carrying out precision low level 57mm rocket attacks against aircraft and installations on the ground (see box for excerpts of my personal account of the first strike on December 4, a narrative written soon after the war).

As mentioned earlier, two more strikes were carried out against Shorkot. Our suggestion for a repeat aircraft as soon as possible after the aircraft were refuelled and rearmed was turned down by the planners at Command HQ. Instead, we were given the ‘dusk’ TOT. The sortie was once again uneventful but only till we reached the IP, located about 20 km short of the target. As we commenced the turn for the final run in, I could see a large umbrella of exploding ack-ack shells lighting up the sky in the gathering dusk. The enemy was indeed expecting us because of the copybook (Staff College style) TOT selected. During the initial pull up and roll in itself, we were engulfed by heavy ack-ack barrage. The attack was however carried out against Sabres in pens as planned. Sathaye had targeted another B-57 he saw in his designated area and engaged it successfully. The second attack was also pressed home, but this time, with only three aircraft as Mally was shot down by ack-ack during the first attack itself. Our troubles, didn’t appear to end there, as during the getaway, we were intercepted by the PAF’s patrolling Sabres. The bogey was spotted, but as we took the evasive action, we saw a sidewinder missile hurtling towards the now depleted formation. What saved us, however, was the pre-briefed ultra low height at which we were getting away, seducing the missiles to streak through the broad-frontage formation and exploding harmlessly on the ground in front of us. After successfully extricating ourselves from the attacking Sabres (there was no question of engaging them as by now, we were precariously low on fuel), we did a safe night recovery at Amritsar.

The interception by Sabres had forced the formation to jettison the drop tanks. This meant that the next morning we could launch only two aircraft because of the restricted availability of 900 litre long-range drop tanks. The third and final mission was flown by me and Tambey where he was claimed by enemy ack-ack guns during the pull up for second attack. It was a lonely journey indeed getting back home. But in the final analysis we had destroyed six of the enemy Sabres, two Canberras and a hangar with related paraphernalia; the dusk attack claims of three Sabres and a Canberra were converted into ‘Probables’ due to the ineffectiveness of gun camera film in the fading light of the dusk attack and strict requirement of physically irrefutable corroborative proofs for the award of ‘confirmed’ kills. Even then, the tally was firmly in our favour.

In pursuance to its other missions, No. 32 Squadron was also tasked to carry out large-scale interdiction of the enemy’s rail system in Lahore sector and in the ‘bulge’ to prevent reinforcements reaching the enemy ground forces in these sectors. In addition, some daring single-aircraft photo missions were flown against the enemy airfields such as Chaklala and Murid which were converted into target folders for the Intelligence sections at the concerned bases for decades to come.

Overall, it is clear that despite the handicap of a Pakistan initiative, within the first few days, the IAF had gained a favourable air situation over West Pakistan which it exploited to the full. In the Battle for Bangladesh, the effective employment of air power in breaking the enemy’s will to fight was proved beyond any doubt. It was a classic case of total air supremacy by the end of the second day of operations, which finally paved the way for the capitulation of Dhaka.