Gaddafi’s forces have not only regained lost ground but have also increased pressure on the rebel-held western port city of Misrata and reinvested on Ajdabiya in the east

Does the lat est situation report (Sitrep) emanating from the Libyan war zone suggest that the civil war between the rebel forces and Colonel Gaddafi’s forces is degenerating into an ugly stalemate? After a series of see-saw battles between the rebels and forces loyal to Gaddafi, the latest situation on the ground appears to be very similar to what it had been before the Western air power was unleashed in response to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973. Armed with the UNSC Resolution and aided further by the 2005 UN Doctrine Responsibility to Protect (R2P), coalition forces drummed up sufficient air assets and stand-off cruise missiles to initiate the air campaign. Within three days of the commencement of the air strikes, Libyan airspace had been secured and a ‘no fly zone’ created in favour of the rebel forces. But if the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military commanders thought that imposition of the ‘no fly zone’ with a smattering of precision strikes against the loyalist forces’ ground targets would be sufficient to turn the tide of war in favour of the rebels, they were soon to be proved wrong. To be fair, Western air power did turn advancing Libyan Government forces back from Benghazi at the outset of the campaign; a quick success story, hailed by participating countries as justification for the decision to intervene. Unfortunately, the initial momentum slackened soon after the first aim of creating the ‘no fly zone’ over Libyan airspace was achieved.

With more than 150 frontline warplanes of as many as 18 participating nations available for the NATO-led Operation Unified Protector, one would have expected the number of daily sorties flown in direct support of the rebel ground forces to grow exponentially after the creation of the ‘no fly zone’ to help them wrest full control of the ground situation and bring about a quick defeat of Gaddafi’s forces. Instead, what was actually flown was just a handful of sorties by mostly the British and French warplanes alone. Other countries seemed quite content in only continuing to enforce the ‘no fly zone’ with a sprinkling of logistic support sorties. Little wonder then, a month on into the air campaign, only about 70 vehicles of the loyalists’ forces have been destroyed on ground by the allied air action, which include no more than 14 tanks and 20 APCs.

It is a well-known fact that even though filled with all the zeal and enthusiasm, the rebel forces are nothing but a ragtag army, bereft of good leadership, proper command and control, and lack professional expertise. On their own, they would be no match to Gaddafi’s forces specially the ‘crack’ offensive brigades commanded by his sons. After the initial reverses, the loyalists have quickly learned the art of hiding their fighting vehicles so that they are not easily visible from the air. Also, there are reports that the loyalist forces may have used human shields to prevent NATO pilots attacking their armoured vehicles for fear of causing civilian casualties. Another big factor is the lack of Forward Air Controllers (FACs) on the ground—an essential component of ‘close air support’ strike missions—who not only help the pilots find the right targets but also designate these with ground lasers, etc to facilitate precision attacks. Their absence has resulted in avoidable cases of fratricide, as at least on two occasions, NATO pilots have bombed the rebel forces by mistake, causing fatalities and huge embarrassment to the establishment.