The choices made now and in the near future will decide if India would ever become a country capable of producing her own high-tech weapons and aircraft or remain a power with an uncertain future

By the 1990s, the Indian Air Force (IAF) had begun the process of looking for a replacement for its MiG-21 fleet. The Hunter, Canberra and Gnat fleets were already phased out. The mid-life upgrade of some 125 MiG-21bis to ‘Bison’ standard was an attempt in that direction. By the turn of the century, the MiG-23 fleet was also showing signs of ageing and replacements were nowhere on the horizon. The Jaguar deep penetration strike aircraft (DPSA) acquired in 1979 was also getting old.

Money crunch and technology denials meant that the only possible source of replacements would be Russia. By a stroke of luck and some deft diplomacy, India had managed to obtain a sizeable number of Su-30MKI multirole fighters by 1996-97. Although this induction also took time as the first few of these were returned to Russia and a newer and more advanced version with thrust vector control (TVC) bought, in overall terms, it was the best thing that the IAF could have hoped for.

Let us not forget that at the time there was no possibility of any country selling F-15 class fighters to India. It was only after India carried out the Shakti series of nuclear tests in May 1998 and maintained the pace of her economic progress despite global sanctions that the world took notice of its legitimate security needs. That, however, did not mean an automatic supply of advanced aircraft and weapons. Meanwhile, 9/11 shook the world and unit costs of fighter aircraft began to rise exponentially. India was now faced with a doubleedged challenge; prohibitively high costs together with technology denials.

The indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA) programme originally designed as replacement for the MiG-21 fleet was so inordinately delayed that the options were slowly getting closed. It is in this setting that the IAF formulated the Air Staff Qualitative Requirements (ASQR) for the so-called medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA).

After much effort, the government finally released the request for proposal (RFP) in August 2007. But by that time the competition had become wider with as many as six types, three heavy and three relatively light weight fighters, entering the fray. Then began the long and laborious process of field testing the six contenders and it took nearly four years for the government to declare the names of two shortlisted competitors.

At present the report of the Technical Offset Evaluation Committee (TOEC) is awaited before the next and perhaps the most important step of opening of commercial bids and price negotiation can get under way.

While the former Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik was optimistic about a decision being taken by the end of the year, there is a general feeling that it would again be delayed as most such decisions are. When the ‘50 per cent offset’ clause under which the winning foreign vendor is required to invest a huge amount of up to $5 billion ( Rs. 22,500 crore) in India is successfully negotiated, then and only then, can we expect the first squadron of the MMRCA coming to India by 2015-16. This is possible only if there are no further glitches.

Eventually India would probably decide to buy the additional 63 aircraft at nearly twice the overall cost but it would still not be possible to accelerate the process of induction. Given the current economic trends and a possible general slow-down, this deal will always remain under the watchful eye of the Finance Ministry, but ad hoc cuts would be disastrous. India would have to stay its course if the acquisition of the 189 fighters at a price tag of around $100 million ( Rs. 445 crore) a piece is to be accomplished.

According to the IISS Military Balance, at the last count, there were around 290 MiG-21, still operating with the IAF. Of these around 100 are of Bison variety which means that the IAF has no option but to replace at least 200 of the older fighters by 2017-18.

The MiG-27 fleet would be next in line for a phase out. The PAK-FA or T-50 fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) in India is also not expected to be inducted before 2020.

This clearly means that whatever India does in the next few years, it cannot hope to restore the IAF’s combat aircraft strength to anywhere near the authorised level.