The IAF has seriously embarked upon acquiring new doctrinal perceptions by going through fundamental and far-reaching changes and propelling itself into a new realm—of being a true strategic force like other leading air forces in the world

Having unshackled itself from the decade old mindset prevailing in the mid-1990s of being just a ‘tactical force’ with a mandate to primarily provide support to the other two Services, the Indian Air Force (IAF) seriously embarked upon acquiring new doctrinal perceptions by going through fundamental and far-reaching changes and propelling itself into a new realm—that of being a true strategic force like other leading air forces in the world. Coinciding with the above, India’s emergence as the new economic power house on the world stage and the ever-evolving geo-political and security scenarios also influenced the IAF’s perceptions of its new roles and responsibilities. The force today accepts the necessity to acquire comprehensive capabilities characterised by flexibility, quick response, mobility and transportability of all forms of national power as well as long reach and all-weather precision strike with minimal collateral damage—all attributes of a modern air force.

Tragically, however, while the IAF stands metamorphosed in its thinking, in its force levels and other combat equipment it is staring at cataclysmic reductions which has seriously eroded its capability to discharge its ever-increasing responsibilities. For example, contrary to its official position on the subject, it is generally known that the IAF’s jet fighter strength has shrunk to less than 30 squadrons and may have reached a low of 27 squadrons. Similarly, for the defence of vital areas/points, its existing surface-to-air missile (SAM) squadrons have long crossed the obsolescence thresholds and cannot be stretched much further. The latest reports indicate that almost one-third of Pechora SAM squadrons may have actually been number-plated. This has caused serious erosion in the IAF’s ground-based air defence capability. While not in dire straits, in other fleets too, the IAF is facing moderate to heavy deficiencies.

Stung by such largescale deficiencies and riding on much greater budgetary support from the government, the IAF has embarked on a series of modernisation programmes to restore and improve its operational capabilities. Some major ongoing acquisition programmes, upgradation and future acquisition programmes of the winged fleets are discussed below.

Fighter Force

Ongoing Programmes
Su-30 MKI: Leading the pack, the Su-30 programme which commenced in 1996 has truly matured into a full-fledged Su-30 MKI project with the IAF progressively inducting more of these aircraft in an attempt to arrest any further downslide in its combat squadrons’ strength. Evolved from the earlier model Su-30K, the development of the variant started after India signed a deal with Russia in 2000 to manufacture 140 Su-30 fighter jets. The first Russian-made Su-30MKI variant was integrated into the IAF in 2002, while the first indigenous Su-30MKI entered service with the IAF in 2004. In 2007, the IAF ordered 40 additional MKIs. As of March 2010, the IAF has 130 MKIs under active service and may be planning to have an operational fleet of 280 MKIs by 2015 with an additional order for 50 aircraft. As the aircraft is now being produced indigenously by HAL, the numbers could go up further as required.

Light combat aircraft: The much touted but painfully delayed indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas is continuing on its tortuous path of development with IAF having ordered the first lot of 20 to be fitted with the US GE F-404 engine and in all probability the Israeli EL/M-2052 Multi-mode Radar (MMR). The delivery schedule into the already assigned No.45 Squadron is reported to be–four aircraft in 2011, eight in 2012 and balance eight in 2013. Reports suggest another IAF order for 20 more aircraft with the same power plant configuration. An upgraded Mk2 version of the Tejas is to be developed with either F-414 or Eurojet engine with the IAF eventually acquiring 200 plus units to replace its remaining MiG-21s and MiG-27 aircraft.

Medium multi-role combat aircraft: The flight evaluation trials of the $10 billion+ (Rs 50,000 crore), 126-aircraft medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) programme dragged on to such an extent as to call for rebidding as per the contract rules. The vendors were expected to complete the flight trials by early April for the Indian defence ministry to complete its evaluation by the end of the month. However, that did not happen with the flight trials extending to May. This has forced the ministry to act under its own 2006 procurement procedures in extending bids by a year, which in turn, allows the vendors to revise the bids up or down. While a year’s delay should normally drive the costs up by 5-7 per cent, the volatility factor is a cause of concern for the vendors. In view of the present-day global economic uncertainties and the resulting fluctuations in inter-currency relationships, the volatility factor can take ominous proportions. While the IAF does not seem to be unduly worried, as at present, it is more focused on the competing aircrafts’ operational capabilities, it needs to be appreciated that in the long run, delays are inevitably going to raise the programme’s costs and prevent in service induction of the winning aircraft on schedule.