NEWS:
“The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2013 aims to balance the competing requirements of speedy procurement, developing indigenous defence industry and conforming to the highest standards of transparency, probity and public accountability,” the Defence Ministry said in a release. To promote indigenisation, the new policy aims to create a level playing field for the Indian industry. In the foreword of the new policy document, Defence Minister A.K. Antony expressed hope that “the defence industry and the procurement agencies will find the DPP 2013 to be a ‘progressive step’ aimed at giving impetus to indigenisation, creating level playing field and expediting the procurement process as a whole”.

VIEWS
While laying the foundation stone of the newly established Indian National Defence University (INDU) in Gurgaon, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that India was “well positioned to become a net provider of security in the South Asian region and beyond”. He went on to say that India now had “unprecedented access to high technology, capital and partnerships”, and that the nation needs to assume the responsibility for stability in the Indian Ocean region. He further stated that the government was conscious of the fact that adequate defence preparedness was critically dependent on sound defence acquisition policies. The government, therefore, has continually reformed those policies to ensure that the armed forces have the best equipment.

Despite assertion to the contrary from the top echelons of national leadership, the fact that India’s defence preparedness today is not what it should be is no longer a closely guarded secret. Also, the Prime Minister’s statement leaves none in doubt that the critical linkage between “Defence Preparedness of the Nation” and “Defence Acquisition Policy” is appreciated by those responsible to ensure that the nation is secure. Yet judging from the state of equipment held on the inventory of the armed forces today, one cannot but conclude that all is not well with the system of procurement of military hardware, 70 per cent of which comes from foreign sources. Despite the oft repeated lofty pronouncements on the government’s intent to ensure that the Indian armed forces have the best of equipment, the DPP has fallen well short of expectations since its formalisation nearly a decade ago.

On account of geopolitical compulsions during the Cold War era, India was tethered to a single source, the Soviet Union and later Russia, for sourcing military hardware. All transactions for the procurement of defence equipment were conducted between the two governments and the armed forces were privileged to receive the latest technologies available with the USSR on favourable rupee-rouble equation. While the technology available with the USSR, and later with Russia, might not have matched the best in the world, the armed forces were reasonably well-equipped as the required equipment was available without delay. The large contracts also included manufacture in India under licence albeit without transfer of technology (ToT). An eminently successful project under the system followed in those days was the procurement of the Su-30MKI, the latest fourth-generation combat aircraft available with Russia. Delivery of the first batch of the aircraft began within a year of signing of the contract. Compare this with the project initiated by the IAF in 2001 under the newly introduced open-tender system to acquire the urgently needed medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) for which the French Rafale has been selected. Twelve years have gone by since projection of the requirement by the IAF but the contract is yet to be concluded. Meanwhile, with the phasing out of obsolete aircraft, the combat potential of the IAF continues to be eroded further. What is rather disconcerting is that there appears to be no time frame stipulated for the finalisation of the MMRCA contract, so vital to national security. This issue needs to be addressed to strengthen the DPP.

Undoubtedly, a number of refinements have been introduced in DPP 2013 in pursuit of the twin-objective of making the procurement system more efficient as also to strengthen the indigenous defence industry. The thrust of the latest revision is clearly on indigenisatione. The armed forces have been advised to first explore indigenous sources for their requirements of military hardware. The new edition of the DPP has also been deeply influenced by scams that appear to have become a part of the defence procurement process, invariably resulting in delay in finalisation or cancellation of tenders. The most recent of these has been the contract with AgustaWestland for 12 AW101 helicopters for VVIP travel, which mired in controversy, is on hold. This scam has not only demolished the reputation of a former senior functionary of the service but more importantly, has rattled the government. At the INDU function, the Prime Minister echoed these sentiments thus: “We have also been guided by the objective of making our defence acquisition transparent, smooth, efficient and less vulnerable to unethical practices. We will continue to seek the highest standards of probity in defence acquisition.”

In the final analysis, the most striking deficiency that continues to persist in the DPP is the notable absence of adequate focus on the imperatives of national security. This must necessarily be the overriding consideration.