Lack of co-operation and coordination among India’s government departments has been commented upon frequently and the Kargil Review Committee was scathing in its indictment of intelligence agencies. Such a situation does not bode well for strategic reach mission.

As the crow flies, the distance from Israel to Entebbe in Uganda is 4,000 km. On the night of July 3, 1976, four Israeli Air Force C- 130 Hercules transport aircraft carrying about 100 Israeli commandos took off from near Tel Aviv and flew a deception route to Entebbe covering a distance of nearly 5,400 km. The C-130s were followed by two Boeing 707 jets carrying a small ground operations command group and a medical team. The mission was to rescue the remaining 130 crew and passengers, mostly Israeli, of Air France Flight 139, an Airbus 300, which had originated from Lod in Israel and was on its way to Paris via Athens when it was hijacked. The hijackers were supported by Ugandan military which was sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Meticulously planned and executed, the mission’s completion saw 256 of the total of 260 passengers and crew either released or rescued, even as all seven hijackers were eliminated.

Another instance of Israel’s judicious employment of strategic reach to protect its perceived national interest was the destruction of the Tammuz 1 (also known as Osiraq) nuclear reactor, located 18 km southeast of Baghdad. On June 7, 1981, the Israeli Air Force launched a strike with eight F-16 Fighting Falcons escorted by six F-15 Eagle aircraft. The mission flew 1,100 km through Jordan and Saudi Arabia before reaching the target. In a swift and devastating attack, the reactor was destroyed, crippling Iraq’s nuclear ambitions.

Indian operation in male

India showcased its strategic reach in 1985 when a group of terrorists besieged the island of Male, the capital of Maldives, in the Indian Ocean. Hulule, the island with the runway, is adjacent to Male and at a distance of 800 km from Thiruvananthapuram (TVM). On the morning of November 3, 1988, the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) heavy lift Il-76 squadron at Agra was put on alert as was a collocated para unit of the Indian Army. Finally, it was decided that two Il-76 aircraft carrying 400 para-commandos would land at Hulule. The plan was to fly from Agra to TVM and then to Hulule.

At 1800 hours on November 3, the two Il-76 aircraft took off from Agra and landed at Hulule at 2150 hours, covering nearly 3,000 km. The para-commandos then got into action and secured the island of Hulule. After commandeering boats, the commandos set course for Male which, too, was secured. Many terrorists were captured; others attempting to flee on a ship along with some hostages were captured by the Indian Navy. Three more Il-76 aircraft landed at Hulule, the last one at first light on November 4. Fighter escort plans had to be shelved and Mirages that had flown into TVM the night before returned to their base in Gwalior. Speed, executed with an element of surprise, had clinched victory for the Indian armed forces. As in any operation, the post-mission debrief revealed procedures and actions that required improvement and resulted in refinements in the joint out of area contingency plans.