Operational capability of the IAF is being adversely affected due to depleting force levels, obsolescence and lack of essential support systems

In a seminar held recently in Delhi, when Air Marshal P.K. Barbora, Vice Chief of Air Staff (VCAS), Indian Air Force (IAF) expressed grave concern on deteriorating force levels vis-à-vis growing hostility in the region and tardy decision making at the level of the government in respect of procurement of weapon systems, he perhaps let the cat amongst the pigeons. Instead of highlighting steps taken by government to address problems of national security, some ill informed commentators criticised Barbora for voicing his opinion in public while in uniform. As the occupant of the number two slot in the IAF hierarchy, the VCAS is in a position to appreciate the current situation and the serious problems faced by the organisation in its drive towards modernisation.

Unfortunately, we find more sound bytes in the media about scams in defence deals rather than success stories related to induction of major weapon systems, especially, when force levels are dipping to alarming levels. Currently, the Indian Army has inadequate fire power due to inordinate delay in the procurement of the required mix of artillery guns to meet specific threats. The Indian Navy has grave deficiencies in the strength of its submarine fleet. Recent breaches of security have revealed short falls in coastal security. Operational capability of the IAF is being adversely affected due to depleting force levels, obsolescence and lack of essential support systems. It is no surprise that many knowledgeable commentators on defence matters seriously ask “Quo Vadis? Where are we heading?”

Rhetoric Vs Reality

While addressing the last Combined Commanders’ Conference, Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh is reported to have said, “The armed forces must be fully equipped to deal with all threat scenarios, trained to fight anywhere, anytime and under any condition. Their ability to deal with non-traditional threats must receive greater attention.” Despite such categorical and authoritative statement by the top functionary of the government, we find that the reality on the ground is vastly different and, in the recent past, the record of re-equipping the armed forces dismal.

During the last seven years, contracts concluded relate to government-to-government deals with no contract on procurement of a major weapon system executed through the open tender system. There appears to be a state of paralysis prevailing at decision making levels of the government, perhaps on account of apprehensions created by allegations of irregularities and overt media interest in scams that have usually followed large defence deals. Much of it however is speculative in nature. Vendors are hassled by the cumbersome, convoluted and intimidating procedures evolved out of mistrust and poor understanding of the procurement processes. Some vendors have even been blacklisted in the past, creating a general scare. Prolonged inaction at the decision-making level could in due course undermine the operational capability and readiness state of the armed forces and consequently national security.

Some changes in Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2008 have been incorporated based on the results of investigations into and lessons learnt from the many controversies over procurement in the past. However, policy changes effected piece-meal serve as mere patch work. What is needed is a revision of policy in a holistic manner with complete understanding of processes involved in the development, production, procurement and induction of weapon systems that employ multiple and complex technologies.

Dropped Deadlines

DPP 2008 stipulates time frame for various activities. Despite such a stipulation, it is ironical that no major weapon system has been contracted and inducted within the prescribed time limit. Obviously, there have been difficulties in complying with the laid down time frames. Time limits will be realistic in operations that are routine, deterministic and sequential, but do not work where there are uncertainties, lack of complete information and associated risks in taking decisions in complex situations. High value defence procurements have all these impediments. It is not surprising that decisions are either delayed inordinately or are not taken at all. Complex and elaborate administrative procedures also contribute to delay.

Complex decisions involve procedures that are often cyclic and sometimes iterative to facilitate information exchange and there is often the need to obtain clarifications. Obviously, face-to-face meetings and discussions facilitate speedy, transparent information exchange and help mitigate associated risks due to uncertainties. Minutes are prepared immediately for record and accepted by all participants. For this methodology to be successful, the participants should not only be knowledgeable but also have requisite authority to take important decisions wherever required.