In the beginning of the last decade, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was confronted with a serious dilemma over the impact on its operational potential as a sizeable part of its fleet of combat aircraft was going to be overtaken by obsolescence in not too distant a future. What was of concern was that there was no ready solution in sight to replace the fleets that were heading for retirement from service. Bulk of the fleets of MiG-21 and the MiG-27 family of fighter aircraft were approaching the end of their total technical life after which these would have to be phased out. Also, the Indian aerospace industry in the public sector was maintaining remarkable consistency in missing deadlines in respect of the indigenously designed and developed light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas Mk I which was meant to be a replacement for the MiG-21 fleet.

Case for MMRCA

In the year 2000, the IAF initiated a case for the procurement of 126 light-weight combat platforms weighing around 15 tonnes. These were intended to be employed primarily in the air defence role and were required to possess limited strike capability. A request for information for this platform which was designated as multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) was issued in 2001. However, the initial proposal was soon modified at Air Headquarters (Air HQ) and the Staff Qualitative Requirements were revised to increase the upper limit of weight to 25 tonnes. The required platform was defined as medium multirole combat aircraft (MMRCA). However, it took six years of interaction between Air HQ and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for the request for proposal (RFP) for the MMRCA to be finally issued in August 2007.

After an elaborate technical and flight evaluation of the six contenders who had responded to the RFP, as also taking into account the commercial bids submitted by the two vendors shortlisted, on January 31, 2012, the Rafale from the French aerospace major Dassault Aviation was declared as the preferred platform with the Eurofighter Typhoon as the second option. The plan was for the selected original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to deliver the first 18 aircraft in a flyaway condition and build in India the remaining 108 in collaboration with the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) supposedly with transfer of technology. As per the RFP, HAL was designated as the Indian partner and the lead integrator. However, the contract negotiations remained deadlocked over disagreements on several issues between the two parties concerned, the primary bone of contention being reluctance on the part of Dassault Aviation to accept responsibility with regard to quality and delivery schedule of the aircraft manufactured by HAL. Even after nearly eight years of effort by the IAF and Dassault Aviation, the contract for the MMRCA could not be finalised as the negotiations had hit a seemingly insurmountable roadblock.

Breaking the Logjam

In the meantime in April this year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was able to find a way to break the logjam when on a formal visit to France, he personally engineered a $4.3-billion deal directly with the Government of France for the purchase of 36 Rafale jets in a flyaway condition. Soon after this came the announcement by the MoD that the tender for 126 Rafale MMRCA was cancelled. The trauma the IAF suffered on account of the failed tender for 126 aircraft was only partially alleviated by the government-to-government deal for 36 aircraft. Against the projected requirement for six squadrons of the Rafale MMRCA, the IAF may now have to settle for just two squadrons and that too if the fresh round of negotiations are successful. Reports appearing in the media do not justify any optimism in this regard as yet.

Combat Platforms in the IAF

Currently, the mainstay of the combat fleet in the IAF is the Su-30MKI fleet, the strength of which at this point in time stands at 10 squadrons. As per the existing orders, another five squadrons are expected to be inducted by 2019 if the rate of production by HAL is sustained, bringing the total to 15. Unfortunately, the Su-30MKI fleet is plagued with serious maintenance issues on account of which the fleet serviceability is pitifully low. The MiG-29, Mirage 2000 and the Jaguar altogether constitute 12 squadrons in the IAF. These are essentially third generation aircraft and are currently undergoing upgrade on completion of which, these will continue in service at the most till around 2030. The MiG-21 and MiG-27 fleets will be retired from service by 2020 and even if retained in service thereafter, these platforms will not be fit to be employed as frontline combat platforms. Effectively therefore, in the early next decade, the IAF will be down to 27 combat squadrons which will be just 64 per cent of the newly authorised strength of 42 squadrons up from the existing level of 39.5. As per assessments, the IAF would need a force level of 45 combat squadrons to fight a war concurrently on two fronts. The IAF will indeed be confronted with a difficult situation especially with the growing belligerence of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) located in Tibet and a hostile posture by Pakistan on the Western borders. The oft quoted philosophy of “We will fight with what we have” may not be relevant for the IAF in a confrontation with the PLAAF and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) either individually or with both simultaneously.

The trauma the IAF suffered on account of the failed tender for 126 Rafale MMRCA was partially alleviated by the deal for 36 aircraft

It should be abundantly clear from the above that the IAF needed the 126 fourth-generation Rafale or any other MMRCA also of the fourth-generation urgently. In fact, the proposal for the MMRCA had a provision to even go up to a total acquisition of 200 aircraft equivalent of 9.5 squadrons. But as all this regrettably has turned out to be only a shattered dream. At this point in time, the negotiations for 36 Rafale jets if successful, will provide the vitally needed oxygen for the IAF’s combat fleet.

Fishing in Troubled Waters

Currently, contract negotiations with Dassault Aviation for the supply of 36 Rafale jets is underway and is expected to be concluded by the end of this year. Reportedly, there have been disagreements between the two parties on two major issues. Firstly, the MoD is insistent on an offset obligation of 50 per cent of the value of the contract. Secondly, the IAF requires that the platform be modified to carry Indian and Israeli avionics as well as weapon systems. While Dassault Aviation would probably accept offset obligation limited to 30 per cent, both these requirements especially that to customise the platform for the IAF would however imply substantial cost escalation that could be to the tune of 100 per cent. This is expected to enhance the value of the contract to $9 billion, in effect doubling the price. Both these requirements will also entail delay in the commencement of delivery of the aircraft thus impeding efforts of the IAF to improve its operational potential, though marginally, in a respectable time frame.

Consequences of Delay

Delay in finalisation of deals and award of contracts for military hardware appears to have become endemic in the Indian context. In the case of the 36 Rafale jets, in the last five months since the deal was brokered between the Governments of India and France, negotiations have been frequently hitting roadblocks. However, it is hoped that the negotiations will be completed and the contract signed by the end of this year. Any further delay will have implications for the IAF as Dassault would accord priority to delivery against orders of 24 aircraft each by Egypt and Qatar that has been placed without the burden of offsets or customisation. With a rate of production at 11 aircraft per year, Dassault Aviation can only be in a position to commence delivery against a possible Indian order for 36 aircraft after a minimum of five years after the order is placed.

In case of continued uncertainty over the award of contract for 36 Rafale jets, the IAF will once again fall squarely into the Russian lap. The IAF may be compelled to place orders for additional Su-30MKI aircraft as well as speed up the development of the fifth-generation fighter aircraft, a joint effort between HAL and Sukhoi of Russia. In a bipolar world, the IAF was tethered largely to a single source for combat aircraft, i.e. initially to the Soviet Union and then to Russia. However, since the emergence of a unipolar world, the IAF has been desirous of accessing new technologies from the Western markets. As the IAF has been operating first-, second- and third-generation French combat aircraft since the 1950s, it was particularly hopeful of inducting the fourth-generation Rafale. However, endless delay in the finalisation of the Rafale deal could well undermine the efforts of the IAF to modernise its combat fleet.