Given the huge cost of space weaponry, it is unlikely that India can afford programmes aimed primarily at military uses of space, at least for now. Therefore, it makes sense for the IAF to concentrate on improving its conventional capabilities.

Is outer spa ce already militarised? Satellites have been employed to support military operations on land, sea and air, practically since the dawn of the space age. Several nations across the globe routinely use space-based systems for navigation and communications as well as for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). The United States is top dog in this field and its capability gives it a huge advantage over its adversaries. The US military operations worldwide would probably be seriously impaired by any sudden non-availability of satellite systems for ISR, navigation, guidance, targeting, and command and control. However, weaponisation of space is a different matter. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 bans the deployment of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in space. But it is silent on conventional weaponry. Although most major nations publicly express disapproval of weapons in space, at least three—the US, Russia and China—are known to have anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities. Some weapons of this type have even been flight tested. So where does that leave India and the Indian Air Force (IAF)?

When the Indian space programme started, it was geared towards the peaceful civilian uses of space; any strategic or military spin-offs were incidental. More recently, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has begun to focus on military possibilities as well. Consequently, the IAF already has the capability to use space in support of its operations in three ways. First, the IAF and the other two services make extensive use of indigenous satellites. The April 20, 2009 launch of RISAT-2, an all-weather microwave imaging satellite (eminently suitable for military surveillance) is considered a strategically significant milestone. This sophisticated satellite was produced by ISRO in conjunction with Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI). But not much has been revealed about its capabilities, which tells its own tale. CARTOSAT-2B launched on July 12, 2010, also boosted India’s military reconnaissance capability. It carries a panchromatic camera capable of imaging a swathe of 9.6 km with a resolution of better than one metre. Its scene-specific spot imagery is useful for cartographic and other applications. ISRO also has plans to deploy satellites for the exclusive use of each of the three services—the Indian Navy is likely to be the first, followed by the IAF. However, these launches are well behind schedule. Second, combat aircraft and surface craft routinely use the satellite-based global positioning system (GPS) for navigation. Since the country would not wish to be dependent on a foreign GPS forever, a home-grown one is planned. An autonomous navigation system called the Indian Regional Navigational Satellite System (IRNSS), comprising seven satellites, is scheduled to be functional by 2014-15. IRNSS-1, the first of the constellation, will carry a navigation payload and a C-band ranging transponder and is due to be launched in 2012-13. Lastly, the IAF has enthusiastically embraced the emerging doctrine of network-centric warfare. This type of warfare relies heavily on high-speed communications, which in turn are based on communications satellites. It allows various branches of the military to view the battlefield in real-time, and greatly improves the situational awareness of commanders at various levels. However, the IAF is still in the first stage of net-centricity and it will take some years to become a truly networked force.

But is all this enough? What if a hostile power were to attempt to disable key Indian satellites? Such an attack, even if not entirely successful, might seriously affect the nation’s communications, transport and economic infrastructure and disturb normal life. The vulnerability of space assets came into sharp focus on January 11, 2007, when China (which ostensibly favours a proposal to keep outer space a zone of peace) stunned the world by launching a ground-based, medium-range ballistic missile and destroying one of its own aging metrological satellites in polar orbit at an altitude of about 850 km. The test, incidentally, created the largest single space debris hazard in history in terms of new objects. According to security analysts the ASAT weapon launch was part of a well-conceived strategic programme. China seems clear in its assessment that the battlefield of the future will extend to outer space and may indeed be taking covert steps to further its space warfare ambitions. Moreover, China and Pakistan share a long history of space cooperation. Is it time therefore for India to acquire defensive as well as offensive capabilities in space?

Only the United States, Russia and China are known to have developed ASAT weapons. Indian military planners need to carefully assess whether or not weaponisation of space is inevitable. If the answer is ‘yes’, time is of essence. In January 2010, V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Advisor to the Defence Minister, said, “India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralise enemy satellites,” but added, “These are deterrence technologies and quite certainly many of these technologies will not be used.” Later he said, “India will validate anti-satellite capability on the ground through simulation,” but clarified, “There is no programme to do a direct hit to a satellite.” However, such claims notwithstanding, credible space capabilities cannot be acquired overnight—they would take many years to build. Other countries can neither be depended upon to supply ASAT weapons nor to transfer vital technologies that may be necessary to indigenously develop such weaponry.