It must be clearly understood that as the major practitioner of aerospace power in India’s context, it is the IAF which should be in the driver’s seat to steer such projects. Going a step further, it would be most desirable for the IAF to emulate the Indian Navy and gradually establish its own design bureaus for aircraft and systems development.

Has the reported request by the Indian Air Force (IAF) to the government to appoint a three-star Air Force officer as the next Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) stirred a hornet’s nest? While there is little doubt that it will generate considerable controversy, the IAF’s proposal is not at all revolutionary as it is being made out to be in some quarters. But the bigger question is, will the mere appointment of a three-star Air Force officer as its CMD transform HAL into a world-class aeronautics company capable of providing an effective source for meeting the aviation needs of the IAF and other defence forces? On the face of it, reviving the earlier practice of appointing IAF officers to head the HAL is not only desirable but eminently sensible too. But this alone would not help matters much unless major reforms are simultaneously carried out – not only the way HAL and all other public sector enterprises are run in this country, but also to effectively integrate design, development and production activities; closely knitted together in an almost seamless fashion—if, meaningful capability accretion is the ultimate goal.

To redux, after India’s independence for 10 years till 1957, HAL was headed by bureaucrats. But from 1958 onwards till 1997, its Managing Directors (MDs) and later the CMDs have all been IAF officers in an unbroken chain. The importance of the post could be gauged from the fact that at least four of them; Aspy Engineer, P.C. Lal, O.P. Mehra and L.M. Katre, subsequently went on to head the IAF itself. However, three officers including the last two of these had come up from within HAL itself having retired from the IAF for permanent absorption in the company. This may have provided the precedence for the selection of the CMD from the HAL cadre, except that they ceased to be from the Air Force. This, though never brought out in the open, might have further dented the level of cooperation and interaction which existed between the two organisations.

The present imbroglio with regard to finding a suitable replacement to the outgoing CMD, if anything, could worsen the matters further. A question that looms large is why is it that the panel drawn up by the government does not include any name from the HAL cadre? Does it mean that HAL has failed to find a suitable replacement from within its own cadre? On the other hand, the government shortlist, mostly of civil servants, also does not inspire much confidence in their ability to oversee an aerospace giant that is so vital for the country. Opinions vary, as would be normal in any vibrant democracy, but generally they lean towards non-inclusion of bureaucrats in running the show at HAL. Reacting to the panel of short-listed candidates for HAL’s top post, Kapil Bhargava, a retired ex-Air Force test pilot of eminence, who served in HAL for a long time opines, “My personal view is that first of all, bureaucrats and financial experts must be totally banned from being considered for this appointment. The best man from IAF or having come up from within HAL should head it.” Manoj Joshi is of the view that if there is no internal candidate (within HAL) of the right calibre then, “this is a particularly opportune moment for the government to push for an IAF man to head the outfit.”

But based on his long association as a test pilot with HAL and deep knowledge of its working, Kapil Bhargava strongly feels that even the best man from the IAF will not be able to improve matters because of the inherent multi-fold ills of HAL. “If improvement is considered essential, HAL must be taken out of the control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), including control by the Secretary Defence Production,” he contends, to allow it to run as an autonomous organisation with no bureaucratic remote control. Even though in the defence sector and notwithstanding the fact that it has been conferred the title of ‘Navaratna’, afflictions associated with public sector undertakings, such as overstaffing, indifferent work culture, mediocrity, low productivity, lack of operational efficiency and unionism pose debilitating challenges to HAL as well. These are the corporate ills which can only be addressed by the political top brass through sweeping industrial reforms. It is to be hoped that ultimately these will form part and parcel of the overall economic reforms being adopted to shore up the country’s economic progress. That said, a senior service (Air Force) officer, with an inherent sense of discipline, commitment and leadership, could at least bring about positivity in the areas of work culture and productivity. In addition, being intimately au fait with HAL’s prime customer IAF’s requirements, he would be in a better position to steer and synergise HAL’s activities.

It would perhaps be in order to understand what HAL stands for and what are its objectives? H.K.L. Anand, a retired Managing Director of eminence from HAL opines about his former company: “Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is much more than just a public sector undertaking. It is an aerospace industry of unique embodiment of the country’s aspirations for attaining self-sufficiency in development and production of highly sophisticated aircraft and allied equipment in the defence aerospace sector.” Its aim should therefore be to serve as a tool to translate the national policy of achieving self-reliance in the design, development and production of aircraft and aeronautical equipment to meet the country’s growing needs. Post-independence, HAL was actually entrusted with these tasks but somehow lost its way midstream for a variety of reasons, especially in the field of design and development of new products and essentially became a facility for licence-production of aircraft and allied equipment procured from abroad. It was after many wasted decades, a push was finally given to revive indigenous design and development capabilities with the launching of the LCA programme. Here again, adoption of piece-meal policy formulations and formation of ad hoc establishments led to many difficulties preventing smooth and time-efficient progression of the overall effort as HAL had literally lost its design expertise. But the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), which was created exclusively for the LCA project, proved to be a topsy-turvy solution as it failed to provide a seamless connect between the user, design, and development agencies—in that order. Air Marshal (Retd) Philip Rajkumar, who once headed the ADA is of the firm view that “it is the user service which should be managing such projects.”