With long combat reach, extended radar cover and large numbers of air supremacy fighters, the IAF must fight its next war deep inside Pakistani territory.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has acquitted itself outstandingly well in the last eight decades. The timely induction of troops by air was the real saviour of the Kashmir valley in 1948. The fledgling service opened air routes to remote high altitude areas of Ladakh to reinforce and support forward positions. Sparingly used in Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, IAF provided crucial inter-valley logistic support and also undertook limited close air support missions.

The 1965 war was forced upon the nation by an over-confident Pakistani leadership. Undoubtedly, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fought well but the IAF not only won in the air, it also supported a decisive victory on the ground. Complete air supremacy over East Pakistan in the Indo-Pak War of 1971 facilitated speedy conclusion of the liberation war. The famous airborne assault operations carried out at Tangail, the heli-lift supported river crossings, and the final strike by MiG-21 fighters on the Governor’s house that forced the surrender of one of the largest standing armies, are operations taught in military academies around the world. Indian Gnat aircraft also earned the sobriquet ‘Sabre Slayers’. The air strikes that came to the rescue of Indian ground forces in Longewala and Chammb are part of history. The back-stabbing incursion by Pakistani forces in Kargil in 1999 forced another war upon India. In spite of serious political restrictions, the IAF used innovative means and precision-guided munitions (PGM) to destroy matchbox-sized bunkers and logistic nodes to achieve a quick and decisive victory.

The IAF has had a quantum jump in capability since the war in Kargil. Induction of Su-30MKI in large numbers, upgradation of practically all fighter fleets along with in-flight refuelling capability, have given the IAF a significant reach and muscle power. The AWACS and aerostats enable the IAF to monitor most air activity over Pakistan. The inductions of ground radars provide seamless cover over the entire subcontinent. There has been a quantum jump in the IAF’s airlift capability, both fixed-wing and rotarywing. A large number of ground-based air defence missile systems are under procurement or are being developed indigenously.

Comparative Strength: Need for Edge

Traditionally, the IAF has maintained a 3:1 superiority over PAF. In the recent past, this has been diluted somewhat and now stands at under 2:1. Unlike Pakistan where the military can enforce quick decisions, India’s weapon acquisition processes have been somewhat tardy. Also the aircraft and systems under development and production with the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Indian defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs), have suffered inordinate delay. The IAF needs to quickly attain the authorised level of 39.5 squadrons for the combat aircraft fleet and then increase to the required level of 45 squadrons. In view of the two powerful, nuclear, not so friendly neighbours, there is a need to rethink the final numbers. Think tanks are suggesting a 55 squadron air force to take on a two-front war. The already selected medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) needs to be procured quickly. The indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA) and Indo-Russian fifth-generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) programmes need to be driven with ‘stick-in-the-hand’ at the Ministry of Defence level. We may have no choice but to make repeat orders for Su-30MKI and Rafale (MMRCA) to build numbers. Decision to develop or procure weapon systems may be taken based on ground realities but not at the cost of security preparedness. Undoubtedly, India’s defence industry needs strengthening. Other indigenous programmes that require taskforce level attention are HS-748 replacement, UAV and UCAV development, light combat helicopter, advanced medium combat aircraft, multi-role transport aircraft and newer variants of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

Combat Operations

Former Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal A.Y. Tipnis feels, “Air power is the dominant instrument of all forms of war today. Any use of power against Pakistan cannot be constrained by nuclear blackmail on their part but by our own national objectives. Imperative that to maintain our force structure, the acquisitions be hastened. Low serviceability of weapon systems seriously depletes combat potential and so the need to stock adequate spares. A strong air power will also act as a deterrent to China. India needs to adopt the Israeli model of quick use of air power. Targeting Command and Communication Centres and armament logistics nodes would pay quick dividends.” Defence analyst and former Vice Chief of the Air Staff Air Marshal Vinod Patney says, “Air balance is not merely a bean count of equipment. Although quality and quantity do matter, far more important is strategic culture and coherent interplay of national agencies to achieve national goals.” Pakistani Air Chief, Air Chief Marshal Tahir Rafique Butt says, “I am very satisfied with the performance of the JF-17 and along with China, we are looking for export markets. Ultimately we will have just two types of fighters, F-16 and JF-17. PAF must prepare for a two-front situation in view of its combat role in the anti-terrorism campaign and being India’s neighbour.”

“Airpower can achieve much more in a short span of time,” he added. PAF’s heavy reliance on short-range SAMs needs to be factored in. Being a smaller force, PAF chose to remain air defence centric. For the IAF, adequate stocks of air armaments, especially PGMs, are very crucial to sustain operations. IAF’s beyond visual range missile advantage has of late been neutralised by PAF acquiring sizeable numbers and needs urgent attention. Special Force Garuds will have to take on a multitude of missions including against the frontier radars. They will have to work closely with attack helicopters—Mi-25/35 and Boeing AH-64E Apache Longbow—under acquisition. The IAF needs a clear edge over PAF and hopefully it will start rebuilding the superiority index to 3:1 and more.

Force Multipliers

AWACS, air refuellers and added strategic heavy-lift capability, have greatly tilted the balance in IAF’s favour. With long combat reach, extended radar cover and large numbers of air supremacy fighters, the IAF must fight its next war deep inside Pakistani territory. The future is in unmanned platforms. The strength of unmanned units has to more than double. Unmanned combat variants are required most urgently. More refuellers and AWACS are required to cover two-front operations in case China chooses to come in support of a losing Pakistan. Helicopters will become crucial to sustaining operations in the mountains. Boeing CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters that have combat experience over varied terrain, will make a big difference. There are welcome new developments on infrastructure. Many advanced landing grounds have been upgraded and operationalised in the Northeast and Ladakh. More airfields on the eastern sea-board are needed. There is a need to create at least one more major airstrip in the eastern island territories. The ongoing improvements in airfield infrastructure will support safer flying and efficient operations. Since significant part of conflict zone would be in the mountains, radar coverage there has to increase. Space, the new frontier, will be a place of action. Enhancing space surveillance capability, secure satellite communications and indigenous satellite-based navigation system, will be the key result areas. Building a formidable ballistic missile defence is high priority and this could be a game changer in the region. Formation of an Aerospace Command is a necessary first step.

Military Strategy

“Pakistan has perfected a policy of deliberate aggression with tactical appeasement,” noted diplomat Pavan K. Varma in a recent article. Chanakya, the author of treatise Arthashastra spelled out strategic vision as ”Sama, Dama, Danda, Bheda” i.e. reconciliation, inducement, deterrent action and subversion. India often stops at step two. Kargil was a good opportunity to display national intent on use of punitive force. Many more trigger incidents thereafter did not get befitting military response. The fourth largest military force cannot be seen as weak. India needs to run a former US President Ronald Reaganlike peace-through-strength programme. The IAF would have to overwhelm PAF and keep it on the defensive, head down in its own territory.

Every punitive action is not going to trigger a nuclear war. This bluff needs to be exposed. Collusion with China could either be Kashmir-centric or China could concentrate on their area of direct interest, Arunachal Pradesh, and thus split the assets of the IAF. Given the overwhelming impact of technology and changing nature of warfare, air power has taken a dominant position. To enhance influence beyond its frontiers, one needs to have a strong air force. The IAF needs support of a modern aerospace industry and end-product targeted realistic aerospace research. A PAF officer, Air Commodore Zia Ul Haque Shamsi, who wrote a paper on IAF’s modernisation, writes: “China wishes to keep India strictly confined to its periphery in South Asia, whereas Pakistan has kept India militarily embroiled and economically burdened.” Putting himself in the IAF shoes, he says, 55 squadrons could somewhat be justified. India’s slowing economy may put strain on the defence budget, but the most threatened nation in the world cannot but act to defend its sovereignty. Need to put the money where it pays—into the Indian Air Force.