If the IAF has to avoid a humiliation in the air reminiscent of the 1962 debacle on land, it needs to concentrate single-mindedly on the PLAAF. More importantly, the government needs to accept the fact that recent Chinese actions represent a threat which could assume menacing proportions at a time of China’s choosing.

Strategic vision with long-term perspective planning has not been a strength that the Indian defence establishment can boast of. Defence research and development (R&D) has been mediocre, defence production meagre and defence procurement clouded by considerations other than operational imperatives. As a result, the Indian military has never really experienced the confidence of being equipped to a level that permits full exploitation of its highly professional, motivated and patriotic human resources. The Indian Air Force (IAF), the defence arm that is most dependent on new, cutting-edge technologies, is the worst affected. The fourth largest air force in the world is now on the back foot in the face of the confrontational and aggressive stance adopted by China in the territorial dispute with India. Formulated in 2007, the IAF’s Vision 2020 is an interesting document but its functional content may not be the answer to China’s irrational and unpredictable behaviour. The time has come for the IAF to direct attention to an imminent threat from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). But the question is whether the IAF is ready for such a confrontation now or will be so even by 2020.

Revitalisation of the PLAF

China’s Defence White Paper 2013 entitled Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces’ sets out the role of the PLAAF in China’s overall strategy of security with development. Disseminated in April this year, it defines PLAAF’s role as the mainstay for air operations, responsible for China’s territorial air security and for maintaining a stable air defence posture nationwide. The document gives the PLAAF a total strength of 3,98,000 personnel organised into seven air commands located one each in the seven Military Area Commands (MACs) situated at Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. Recent development of several airfields in Tibet and adjoining Lanzhou and Chengdu MACs ought to be of special concern to the IAF. The PLAAF also has one airborne corps for strategic tasks. To meet the requirements of offensive and defensive operations, the PLAAF has been modernising to develop a combat force structure that focuses on reconnaissance, strategic early warning, air strike, air and missile defence and strategic power projection. It is developing such advanced weaponry and equipment as new generation fighters, ground-to-air missiles and radar systems, improving its early warning, command and communications networks, strategic deterrence and long-range air strike capabilities. Given the high probability of confrontation, these aspects of modernisation impinge on India’s security.

PLAF Composition

Starting from 3,500 largely vintage combat aircraft at the beginning of this century, the PLAAF is well on its way to having a smaller but a fourth-generation air force with the J-10/J-11 in air superiority roles complementing its Su-27/Su-30 fleets, JF-17 in interceptor role and the J-20/J-31 as fifth-generation, stealth multi-role fighters. The J-20 was first test-flown in January 2011 while the J-31, a second fighter prototype the size of an F-35 with design characteristics similar to the J-20, first flew in October 2012. What texture of fifth-generation characteristics these two types would finally manifest, is for time to reveal as the power plant and leading-edge stealth technology currently appear to be out of China’s reach. The power plant problem may be solved through the stratagem of buying more Su-35s from Russia with additional 117S engines forming part of the deal. Deliveries of 24 Su-35s and an unknown number of spare engines are expected to start in 2015, while the J-20 is slated to be operational in 2017. The J-20 prototype flew with 117S engines and if this engine is finally selected, the J20 would be a formidable aircraft.

To lend further potency to its offensive capability, in 2005, China ordered 30 IL-78 in-flight refuellers. Additionally, China continues to upgrade its H-6 bomber fleet, adapted from the Soviet Tu-16 design of 1950s vintage, with a new variant that possesses greater range and is armed with a long-range cruise missile. China has converted some of its old H-6 bombers as aerial tankers for some of its indigenous aircraft, increasing their combat radius. China is also developing AWACS capability on the IL-76 airframe while the Y-8 is being modified for airborne early warning (AEW) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) roles. China’s aviation industry is developing a large transport aircraft, the Y-20, to supplement China’s small fleet of strategic airlift assets, which currently consists of a limited number of Russian-made IL-76 aircraft. These heavy-lift transports are needed to support airborne command and control (C2), logistics, paradropping, aerial refuelling, reconnaissance operations and disaster relief.

Ongoing development of long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including the BZK-005, and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) will provide the capability of long-range reconnaissance and strike missions. In the area of air defence, the PLAAF is focusing on long-range systems designed against aircraft and cruise missiles. Currently it holds the Russian S-400 surface-toair missile (SAM) system (400 km range) and is developing indigenously the HQ-9 SAM (200 km plus range). Thus, by 2020, the PLAAF would be a large force with advanced aircraft and missiles representing formidable offensive and defensive capability.

IAF’s Disquiet

According to a 2012 Pentagon report, the PLAAF has 1,570 fighters, 550 bombers, 300 transport aircraft plus another 1,450 older aircraft in its inventory. More than 400 fighters are in the fourth-generation class and by 2020, this number is expected to increase to 1,000 which would be around half the combat aircraft holding. The PLAAF has always had more aircraft than the IAF; it is now well on its way to acquire a qualitative edge as well. India has depended on Russian and Western manufactures without any technological benefits through the several ‘licensed production’ contracts. The HF-24 was not exactly a successful aircraft and the Tejas programme is yet to materialise. The joint development of a fifth-generation aircraft with Russia is still in an embryonic stage and its future only imprecisely predictable. Thus the problem of equipping the IAF with fifth-generation aircraft continues to be a distant dream.

On the other hand, a bureaucratic approach to defence procurement has led to inordinate delays in giving to the IAF even what has been accepted by the Ministry of Defence as an operational requirement. HAL has been designated as the primary licensed production organisation for Rafale in India. However, even if the contract is concluded for the Rafale in the near future, the earliest HAL will manufacture the first aircraft would be 2018 followed by an annual output of six aircraft in the initial years. Harking back to the 2020 timeline, the IAF would have a maximum of 30-36 Rafales i.e. two squadrons on its inventory by then. Considering the fact that some older aircraft are going to breathe their last from now to 2020, the IAF’s dream of 39.5 operational squadrons in that year appears unachievable.

Concluding Remarks

Space does not permit us to play scenarios involving the PLAAF and the IAF nor to compare their capabilities. Although IAF’s Vision 2020 document alludes to a nuclear role for the IAF, a nuclear war with China may be discounted for obvious reasons. Even a full-scale conventional war is unlikely. The most likely scenario is a territorial intrusion blowing up into a conflagration involving modest volumes of ground and air forces in a limited area of operations. The possibility of Pakistan exploiting such a situation to open a second front cannot be ruled out altogether.

Air power is not gladiatorial by nature; that is to say that aircraft of opposing air forces do not duel in the air to decide wins and losses. The air elements of contending forces may also be pitted against ground and naval forces of the adversary, used to defend territorial integrity of their own national expanse inclusive of oceanic exclusive economic zones and sea lanes of communication as also used for strategic strike against targets deep into enemy territory. This clearly highlights the limitations of the IAF in comparison to PLAAF in all these areas. If the IAF has to avoid a humiliation in the air reminiscent of the 1962 debacle on land, it needs to concentrate single-mindedly on the PLAAF. More importantly, the government needs to accept the fact that recent Chinese actions represent a threat which could assume menacing proportions at a time of China’s choosing. The tremulous lack of resolve displayed by the government in recent months in the face of Chinese intrusions and transgressions is depressing, the landing of our C-130J at Daulat Beg Oldie notwithstanding.