All ASEAN and Asia-Pacific rim countries are individually trying to improve the combat potential of their respective air forces to collectively meet the leapfrogging challenges of the Chinese aerospace power. India which also faces the gravest of security threats has done well by adopting a ‘Look East’ policy.

On January 23, Beijing literally exploded in a riot of colourful street dancers, joyfully marching with their ‘dragons’ collectively held high over their heads; amidst cacophonous din of impressive fireworks, to mark the beginning of the Chinese lunar New Year. But while the street dragons generally bore joyously playful looks, to usher in 2012 as the ‘Year of the Dragon’; it is the Chinese symbolic ‘Dragon’ with a barely hidden menacing face and ever-increasing assertiveness, that is causing ripples of concerns among the global security fraternity. Worst affected are a large number of China’s neighbours in South-East and the Asia-Pacific region—not to speak of India, with whom China continues to have a festering border dispute.

Flashback: In the November-December 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs, an article entitled ‘The Rise of China’ appeared, written by Nicholas D. Kristol, the former New York Times columnist. He said that China’s economy would surpass that of the US to become the world’s largest by the middle of the 21st century. He predicted that the growing economic clout would see China expanding its regional sphere of influence not only in economic terms but also in strategic/military terms, especially if there was a power vacuum in the Asia-Pacific region. His observations have turned out close to being prophetic, given the emerging security scenario.

In fact, the process had started in the 1980s with China embarking on a revolutionary four-point modernisation programme under the dynamic leadership of Deng Xiaoping, which included beefing up its economy and military prowess. Three decades of single-minded and dedicated effort has brought about metamorphic changes in China with its economy still galloping at annual double-digit growth rate and its military power growing by leaps and bounds. This has also resulted in a major shift in China’s national security and military strategies.

Security analysts around the world often use the term ‘national security strategy’ or simply ‘security strategy’ in the context of the nation’s military concerns or military related issues. But ideally, National Security Strategy should refer to the development, application and coordination of all the elements of national power such as political/diplomatic, economic, informational, military, sociological/cultural, etc, to achieve a nation’s objectives in domestic and international affairs in peace as well as in war. Therefore, logically, it transpires that in pursuit of a nation’s objectives, multiple strategies such as an economic strategy, a political strategy, a diplomatic strategy, a social strategy et al—and of course a military strategy—must coexist. In the present global scenario, no other nation seems to have understood this point better than China, which has been resolutely and relentlessly pursuing its national objective to become a leading global power in not too distant a future.

China’s national military strategy seeks to achieve three sets of national military objectives; one, protect the party and safeguard stability; two, defend sovereignty and; three, defeat aggression, modernise the military and build the nation. As per a RAND assessment, Chinese military strategists seem to view the world as a place basically hostile to Beijing’s national interests, especially China’s sovereignty. It is a world where dangers to national security lurk everywhere. The strategists view competition between nations for advantage as the norm and as a zero-sum equation. Change in the global and regional security environment is viewed as constant and usually dangerous. The absence of war does not mean the absence of hostility towards China. And, over the horizon, today’s much-needed trade partners can slowly transform into serious economic, political and military rivals. In other words, China perceives most of the rest of the world as inimical to its national interests. Second, while China’s military strategists place the utmost importance to protection of the ‘party’, their concerns about defending the nation’s sovereignty literally borders on being paranoiac.

Geography continues to be a critical factor for Chinese military planners. China shares land borders with 14 other nations and has border /territorial disputes with practically all of them. All told, the Chinese claim more than 20,000 kilometres of land boundaries and 18,000 kilometres of maritime boundaries in the Asia-Pacific region, which it considers being sacrosanct irrespective of the historical facts or the concerns/interests of other nations. While its land border disputes with India and other neighbours are well-known to be chronicled here, even in the maritime domain, China has staked large claims causing great apprehensions, disquiet and discomfiture among its maritime neighbours. For example, in the South China Sea (SCS), China has claimed a “U-shaped line” of demarcation for its EEZ and continental shelf for decades (see Map).

In 1992, China’s National People’s Congress passed the Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. This law specified that the SCS and East China Sea (ECS) islands fell under China’s geographic scope as well as authorised the PLA to evict intruders, such other states’ naval vessels, from the territory. China has continued to reiterate its sovereignty claims to the SCS and ECS islands, stressing that they are “indisputable.” Therefore, not only the Paracels and the Spartley islands in the SCS which are claimed by China, but even in the ECS, it has sovereignty issues over islands such as Senkaku islands with Japan—also claimed by Taiwan—which itself is claimed to be part and parcel of People’s Republic of China (PRC). As a matter of fact, unification of Taiwan with mainland China is considered to be a sacred duty of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the PRC.

Although China’s military capabilities lag far behind those of the United States, but it is fast narrowing the technological gap. As stated earlier, China is in the midst of a major military buildup that is driven by the belief that the United States will be its primary detractor, not only in its quest to realise its territorial dreams but also in becoming a leading global power. Asia-Pacific nations such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, etc continue to enjoy protection under the US nuclear/conventional security umbrella through respective bilateral/collective security pacts. But China’s growing military prowess, both in the nuclear and conventional military domains, has started to ring warning bells amongst these nations as to whether USA will be able to fight for them when faced with an actual military showdown with China. On its part, while US continues to be committed to its bilateral/collective security pacts in the region, especially in the nuclear arena, it is also urging the concerned nations to beef up their own conventional arsenals to help safeguard their national interests vis-à-vis an increasingly aggressive China.

While China’s military modernisation programmes are all-inclusive, it is the aerospace sector which has been given the greatest impetus. China has realised the importance of air dominance and aerial/missile precision strike capabilities as a prerequisite to achieving its national/military objectives. Consequently, it has with its own resources and Russian help continued to build and modernise PLAAF and PLAN with state-of-the-art combat aircraft and aircraft carrier programmes to improve its aerospace and maritime air capabilities. With the acquisition of Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft from Russia and mass production of its indigenous J-11 fighter aircraft, China is moving ahead at a furious pace to modernise the PLAAF. In addition, China is churning out large number of J-10 and FC-1 (PAF JF-17 Thunder) aircraft to replace its older combat fighter fleets. Last year, China surprised the global military aviation fraternity by unveiling its indigenous J-20 fifth generation stealth aircraft. Shortly, the PLAAF would have a large combat force of more than 1,500 fourth and fifth generation aircraft on its inventory.

How are the US Pacific allies and the countries in the ASEAN region responding to the enhanced Chinese aerial threats and security challenges? The US allies; Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have traditionally depended on the US supplied airplanes such as the F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-15 Eagles and F-4 Phantoms, etc, to man their respective air forces and have comprehensive plans to modernise them. Japan has been so concerned by China’s rising air power and increased number of Chinese intrusions into its airspace that it had at one stage requested US for the supply of F-22 Raptor aircraft. However, having failed to get the Raptor because of a US Congress’ ban on its export, Japan has recently elected to buy 42 F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter (JSF) fifth generation stealth aircraft to counter the ever increasing threat from China. The selection of the aircraft came about in an open competition which also involved the Boeing F-18 Super Hornet and Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft. The Japanese F-35 deal has also come as a much needed shot in the arm for the US Lockheed Martin, having won the first open-ended commercial contract for the JSF. The Chinese scare has also galvanised South Korea to induct the F-35 into its Air Force with the likely signing of the contract for up to 60 aircraft by October this year. Next in the line could be Taiwan which is also looking at buying additional aircraft from the US. Even Singapore which had recently opted for the latest F-15SG Strike Eagle aircraft has joined the F-35 programme for its future acquisitions.