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SP's Military Yearbook 2021-2022
SP's Military Yearbook 2021-2022
       

Threat from People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAF)

Issue: 01-2015By Air Marshal B.K. Pandey (Retd)Photo(s): By Defense.gov

NEWS:
Intelligence reports available with the Indian Air Force raises alarm over the buildup of PLAAF fighters in Tibet. The report says that the number of sorties flown by the PLAAF fighter aircraft is the highest for 2014 and stands at more than 1,200. Sortie rate of PLAAF over last three years has been steadily rising and in 2014 it was 1,200 compared to under 500 in 2013 indicating airfields are now fully operational for all-weather operations and pilots are carrying out higher number of sorties to familiarise themselves to terrain and weather conditions. China has deployed Su-27 fighters at Gonkar airfield, which is an all-weather airfield located at an altitude of 16,000 feet near the Tibetan capital Lhasa.

VIEWS:
Although intelligence reports with the Indian Air Force (IAF) on the significantly enhanced activity by combat aircraft of the PLAAF along the line of actual control (LAC) may be somewhat disconcerting, in actual fact it ought not to be surprising. In 2004, India had been advised by the global strategic community, led by the US, about the strong possibility of China becoming far more aggressive militarily against India after 2010 and that there was a need to settle the border dispute between the two nations before this date. However, despite around 20 meetings between the representatives of the two nations at different levels, there has been practically no progress towards resolution of the long-standing border dispute. Perhaps the most serious impediment is that there is no document or map ratified by both India and China showing demarcation of the international border. So the dispute lingers on with both sides inflexible on their respective perception of the international border. And China takes full advantage of the stalemate.

No one should be in any doubt about China’s strategic plan that she would implement in the event of a large-scale conflict or a full-scale war with India. By all indications, at the start of a conflict, China would launch wide-ranging pre-emptive strike to deliver a crippling blow to airfield infrastructure and other vital operational assets of the IAF along the LAC. It goes without saying that the infrastructure and vital installations of the Indian Army will also be a part of the target system for strike by the combat aircraft fleet of the PLAAF.

Over the last decade or so, China has been embarked on building up its strategic assets in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) with the aim of developing a quick reaction capability of the PLAAF in the case of a war with India. China has apparently taken note of India’s efforts to reactivate old and abandoned airstrips along the LAC in the Northeast region. In response to action by India, the last few years, the PLAAF has enhanced its efforts at reactivating old and abandoned airstrips of 1962 vintage to strengthen its air operations capability. In the pursuit of this objective, China has already made five airfields in TAR operational. These are at Gonggar, Pangta, Linchi, Hoping and Gar Gunsa. China is in the process of operationalising six more airstrips along the LAC by March this year taking the total number to 11.

China is also building a number of new radar monitoring stations along the LAC in Arunachal and Sikkim sectors. The Chinese military is also developing air surveillance infrastructure along the LAC in TAR to monitor military activities on the Indian side of the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Ladakh sectors. Chinese drive at upgrading military infrastructure on a large scale in the TAR includes even nuclear missile deployments. The PLAAF in coordination with the Chinese Airborne Corps have also been undertaking regular exercises in the proximity of the LAC. Strategically, the TAR is crucial for China’s security as it constitutes approximately 25 per cent of the nation’s land area. It is only natural that on account of her strategic concerns, China should focus on this region for aggressive military deployments. China has also been concerned about India’s effort to reactivate Daulat Beg Oldi, which is in the vicinity of the Karakoram just eight km south of the Sino-Indian border and a similar distance north-west of the LAC in Aksai Chin.

For India, Daulat Beg Oldi would serve as a second military airbase in the region. The Chinese in all probability would have factored in the landing by a C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft of the IAF at Daulat Beg Oldi in August 2013. The IAF has also deployed the Su-30MKI air dominance fighters in Chabua and Tezpur in Assam. From these bases, IAF aircraft can threaten the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which runs between Xining in Western China’s Qinghai province and Lhasa in Tibet. This railway link would be vital for logistic support in the event of a conflict with India, to Chinese forces deployed in along the LAC.

While there is a perception amongst the Indian leadership that under the new leader Xi Jinping, China is unlikely to engage in a war with India as she has far greater aspirations of emerging as a superpower and competing with the US, it would be prudent on the part of India to keep her powder dry and be prepared for any contingency.