As operational capability is founded on the attributes of the trainer fleet, it is imperative that the IAF allocate due priority to this segment of infrastructure

Not long ago, the comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India had in a report observed that the Indian Air Force (IAF) lacked adequate numbers of state-of-the-art training aircraft which had an adverse effect on the quality of training imparted to budding military pilots. In the long term, this situation would lower proficiency levels and ultimately erode the operational potential of the IAF.

The malaise observed by the CAG afflicts the fleet of aircraft currently employed in the basic, intermediate and advanced stages (Stage I, II & III) of flying training. Preoccupation with the acquisition of the latest generation of combat platforms and an array of force multipliers must not detract the imperative need to revamp the fleet of trainer aircraft in the IAF.

Basic Trainer Aircraft

The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) built piston engine Hindustan Trainer-2, employed for Stage I in the IAF for nearly four decades, was replaced by the Hindustan Piston Trainer 32 (HPT-32) in the late 1980s. Inducted after a long and arduous history of development and only after the parameters stipulated in the Air Staff Requirements were watered down by Air Headquarters, the fleet of over 120 HPT-32 aircraft has had a dubious record of service as the primary trainer spanning the last two decades. The problem has centered primarily around an unidentified flaw in the integration of the proven Avco Lycoming AEIO-540-D4B5 engine with the indigenously designed airframe.

Despite a number of studies, modifications and alterations in maintenance/operating procedures, instances of engine stoppage in flight continued to occur with disturbing regularity. Finally, in August 2009, after losing 17 aircraft, 19 pilots and Rs 16 crore on account of recurrent engine failure and in deference to opinion of the CAG that “the HPT-32 was technologically outdated and beset by flight safety hazards”, the two-decade-old fleet was abruptly grounded, leaving the IAF without a piston engine aircraft for Stage I and a training schedule in complete disarray. The Kiran fleet is not large enough to take on Stage-I training task on a regular basis. Clearly the IAF has a major crisis on its hands with no easy or quick solutions.

In response to the crisis, HAL has floated a Request For Information (RFI) to Raytheon for T-6 Texan, Finmeccanica for M-311, Pilatus for the PC-21, Grob for the G-120 TP, Korea Aerospace Industries for KT-1 and Embraer for the famous and widely used Tucano turboprop trainer aircraft. In collaboration with the selected partner, HAL will design and manufacture a replacement for the HPT-32 and make available the aircraft for induction into the IAF in a few years after the project is accorded government sanction. HAL hopes to finalise collaboration arrangements and design of the new trainer by March this year. The qualitative requirements spelt out by the IAF include a trainer with good spin characteristics, a proven turboprop engine, an ejection seat, a glass cockpit, retractable undercarriage, modern navigational equipment including global positioning system.

As the time frame of a few years linked with the offer by HAL would not help the IAF to tide over the current crisis, the Indian Ministry of Defence has approved off-the-shelf purchase of up to 80 trainer aircraft as an immediate and ready solution to extricate the IAF from the largely self created morass. However, if the HAL adopts a design which is different from the one acquired off-the-shelf, the IAF could find itself saddled with two different types of aircraft for Stage I training. Altogether this would be an undesirable situation as the cure could be worse than the disease and hence such a situation is best avoided. Besides, a totally indigenous effort by HAL could be fraught with uncertainties leading to delays and thus aggravating the plight of the IAF.