Why is HAL unable to produce a basic, intermediate or advanced trainer aircraft? China and Korea have gone far ahead of India in this field. Is there some deficiency in the indigenous design capability or is there excessive interference from the omnipresent bureaucracy?

The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is the largest aerospace facility in South Asia. It has entered into collaboration with several international companies to produce under licence or co-produce a range of military aircraft. HAL also has its own indigenous design and production divisions along with a captive market comprising the Indian Air Force (IAF), Indian Army, the Indian Navy and a host of other Indian security agencies. Despite having such credentials, a military aviation student would be curious and puzzled to learn that HAL is unable to meet even the trainer aircraft requirements of the Indian military, especially when such has not been the case earlier. In 1953, HAL produced the HT-2, a piston-engine basic trainer that remained in service for over three decades, though some problems were encountered during its last few years. Its replacement, the HPT-32 powered by Lycoming piston engine, which first flew in 1977 and became operational in 1984, served the IAF till 2009. The HPT-32 has had a chequered flight as a basic trainer and on many occasions had to be temporarily grounded due to accidents resulting from recurring engine failure in flight. The IAF had advised the government and HAL that the HPT-32 would have to be phased out earlier than planned, and that the induction of a new basic trainer had become an urgent necessity. Neither the government nor the HAL took any concrete action to address this specific requirement.

In July 2009, subsequent to a fatal crash involving two pilots in an HPT-32, the IAF grounded the entire fleet of 116 aircraft as being unsafe to fly. The originally planned phase-out of HPT-32 was to be 2014, by which time HAL’s new basic trainer-the HTT-40 was to be available. HAL tried to come up with alternative plans to revive the HPT-32, including a rather bizarre one of fitting a ballistic recovery system for a safe recovery in case of engine malfunction. The IAF rejected this idea and rightly so. The HTT-40 was nowhere in sight and the IAF was forced to look within to generate options. The upshot was that despite the IAF having flagged this looming problem well on time, the inability of the government to take timely decisions and the lack of capability of indigenous public sector undertakings (PSUs) in the aviation sector to provide alternatives, led to a situation with serious short- and long-term consequences for military aviation.

Basic flying training is divided into three stages. At each stage the trainee is introduced to increasingly demanding exercises to build up his confidence and skill levels. Stage-I comprising 65 hours of flying was conducted on the HPT-32 till its grounding in 2009. Non-availability of a basic trainer has forced the IAF to slash the syllabus from 65 hours on HPT-32 to a mere 25 hours on the HJT-16 Kiran aircraft which is also utilised for Stage-II training. A flying instructor now has to assess an ab initio student’s motor skills, reactions to emergencies, air-mindedness and other parameters in one third the flying time available earlier. The student pilot hardly gets enough flying hours under his belt to consolidate the ‘feel of flying’ before being pushed into a more difficult regime in Stage-II training.

Hundred and ninety HJT-16 Mk I (and later Mk IA—both with Rolls-Royce Viper engines) were inducted for training, beginning 1968. In 1985, 61 more powerful Mk II Kiran trainer aircraft equipped with Orpheus engine, entered service. Utilising the Kiran for basic training presents a potential problem. The numbers of a particular type of aircraft inducted into the IAF and their projected phase-out year are calculated based on the planned utilisation rate (UR) which is the number of hours an aircraft is planned to fly in a year. If the actual UR is higher than the originally planned UR, then calculations go awry and the phase out will be earlier than planned. Development of the HJT-36, HAL’s interimediate jet trainer (IJT) that is to replace the Kiran, has suffered serious roadblocks, especially as regards its engine. A prototype crashed in April 2011 and the possibilities of early induction of the IJT into the IAF, appears rather bleak at this stage. Transport and helicopter trainees also fly 85 hours during Stage-II. Pilot trainees who successfully complete Stage-II are awarded the President’s Commission. Trainees who do not make the grade but are medically fit can opt for commission in the Navigation Branch. Today there are openings as Weapon Systems Operator in the Sukhoi-30 aircraft and UAV crew in the IAF.

In Stage III, fighter trainees move to Bidar to fly 140 hours on the British Aerospace Hawk. The Hawk is an advanced jet trainer (AJT) with a cockpit that mimics modern fighters to enable the pilots to transit easily into the combat force of the IAF. Pilots are initiated into air combat and live weapons training. Pilots of the transport stream fly 85 hours divided between the Dornier and the An-32 at Yelahanka, Bengaluru. Helicopter pilots also move to Yelahanka to fly 85 hours on the Mi-8. The degree of difficulty is gradually raised during Stage-III training. The quantum of flying for a transport and helicopter pilot is less in Stage-III because even after joining an operational unit, the young pilot will fly as a co-pilot to a more experienced and senior pilot till the new pilot is considered fit to don a ‘Captains’ mantle. All IAF transport and helicopter aircraft are twin-pilot platforms. The bulk of the fighter force aircraft are single-seat platforms. On completion of Stage-III training, fighter pilots move to frontline squadrons to commence operational flying training.