The evolution of flying training in the IAF in the last 30 years has unfortunately been afflicted with inclination to gloss over problems, short-term fixes, delayed decision-making and at times, lack of clarity on the optimum vs the possible. The malaise has affected all stakeholders including the service, the aerospace industry and the bureaucracy.

In the 1960s, flying training in the basic stage or Stage I was carried out on the single-engine HT-2 aircraft designed and built by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). In the intermediate stage or Stage II, training was carried out on the more powerful single-engine North American T6G Texan and its Harvard II variant. Trainees completing Stage II successfully were trifurcated into fighter, transport and helicopter streams and were trained in the advanced stage or Stage III on the De Havilland Vampire T-55 twin-seat jet trainer and F-52 single-seat fighter variants, the Dakota DC-3 twin-engine transport aircraft and the Bell-47G2 light utility helicopter for fighter, transport and helicopter streams respectively, before joining operational squadrons. Subsequently, the Alouette-III Chetak replaced the Bell-47 and the Hawker Hunter was introduced in the applied stage for the fighter stream. On withdrawal from service, the Hunter was replaced by the MiG-21. With the phasing out of the Dakota, the HS-748 twin-engine medium capacity turboprop aircraft and the smaller twin-engine Dornier-228 were introduced for the transport stream. Later on, the AN-32 was inducted to augment the Avro fleet in Stage III.

With the phasing out of the T6G/Harvard, the HJT-16 Mk I Kiran aircraft was inducted for Stage II training. When the Vampire was phased out in the early 1970s, the Polish Iskra was inducted as a replacement. Subsequently, the Kiran Mk 1A and the Mk II were inducted with the latter along with the Iskra, ultimately becoming the training platform for the advanced stage. The HT-2 was replaced by HAL-built HPT-32 in the mid-1980s.

Problem Areas

With the strength of the Hunter fleet diminishing, on completion of Stage III training on Kiran Mk II/Iskra, pilots were sent directly to the Operational Training Unit (OTU) equipped with the MiG-21. The transition presented a steep learning curve. The MiG-21 was not designed to be a transition trainer to take pilots from the docile subsonic jet trainer environment to high performance frontline fighters.

From the mid-1970s, pilot error accidents on the MiG-21 fleet, the majority involving inexperienced pilots, set alarm bells ringing. The urgent need for an advanced jet trainer (AJT) for the applied stage had been projected in the early 1980s by the La Fontain Committee set up to examine all aspects of training and flight safety. These recommendations remained un-implemented for over 25 years till the BAe Hawk-132 finally arrived in 2008. The price for the delay in acquisition of the Hawk AJT was increase in accident rates apart from cost escalation. With the disintegration of the USSR, spares support for the MiG-21 variants also became problematic.

Just when the AJT issue had been settled, albeit after 25 years, the next crisis erupted. The HPT-32 had a history of in-flight engine malfunction, poor power-off glide range and doubtful crashworthiness during forced landings on unprepared surfaces. The Lycoming engine that powered the HPT-32 is widely used in the world on a variety of aircraft and has a respectable safety record. However, on the HPT-32, it was surmised that the aircraft suffered frequent in-flight engine failure on account of a problem of integration of the engine with the airframe, resulting in fuel starvation in certain conditions of flight. Despite concerted effort by HAL and the IAF in consultation with the engine manufacturer, the issue remained unresolved. Finally, on account of persistent engine malfunction leading to accidents, several of them fatal, the HPT-32 fleet was grounded in mid-2009 and subsequently withdrawn from service impinging seriously on Stage I training as no replacement was readily available. A contract was signed by the IAF with HAL to install a parachute recovery system on the HPT-32 fleet. However, wisdom prevailed, and the somewhat bizarre plan and a costly exercise, was thankfully abandoned! The HPT-32 replacement, the tandem-seat turboprop HTT-40 trainer project of HAL, continues to be shrouded in uncertainty. The premature withdrawal of the HPT-32 came as a jolt to the IAF although warning flags were out ten years earlier. After a frantic search, the Swiss Pilatus PC-7 MkII, a de-rated version of the PC-9 trainer, was chosen and finally inducted beginning early this year. The current dilemma is whether to import more Pilatus aircraft or wait for the HTT-40 to take off.

The Kiran fleet is nearing the end of its service life and has already been overtaken by obsolescence. With Stage I training being conducted on Kiran aircraft since mid-2009, life of the Kiran fleet has been reduced further. Replacement of the Kiran by way of the HJT-36 intermediate jet trainer Sitara that has been under development by HAL, is still some years away. There may soon be a crisis situation related to aircraft for Stage II training, for which the IAF would have to find a solution till the IJT is made available.

>With the HS-748 fleet being phased out and replacement for the ageing fleet of An-32 not readily available, aircraft for Stage III transport training may also become an issue. Although, projects for the replacement of the An-32 and Avro fleets have been initiated, these may take several years to materialise. Besides, given the fact that these new aircraft are likely to be sophisticated and would thus have high operating cost, their utilisation for basic transport training may neither be feasible cost-wise nor prudent.

Similar is the case with helicopter training with the Chetak/Cheetah fleet fast approaching the end of its life. Plans for replacement by a light utility helicopter (LUH), procured from abroad as well as manufactured by HAL, has not yet been finalised, but it is reasonably certain that the LUH will cost much more than the machines currently in use. It may be prudent for the IAF to explore low-cost options without further delay.

Possible Options

One option is to outsource basic training for all services and paramilitary operators to a non-military entity using a non aerobatic trainer, as was done for a while in the 1960s. Adequate infrastructure for this option does not exist as of now as also the quality of output may not be up to the mark for military aviation. These issues would have to be addressed with all seriousness. Training abroad is yet another option but will make the IAF appear in a bad light as the fourth largest air force unable to provide basic flying training in-house.

The next option is to use the PC-7 MkII class of aircraft for all three stages of basic flying training, thereafter the Hawk for the applied stage for fighters, light twin-engine aircraft for transport training and light single-engine helicopter for rotarywing training. The manufacturers claim that the w. However, this will have to be evaluated before the final decision as also numbers enhanced suitably, if this option is adopted.

In the past, the IAF has been tardy in using simulators for flying and operational training. Lack of technology for realistic simulation was the problem which has been greatly reduced now. Even now, most of the tasks in the basic, intermediate, advanced and applied stages as well as in type conversion, are being carried out in the air whereas modern simulators can replace actual flying to a large extent with benefits of cost-savings, higher safety and lower infrastructure requirement and noninterference by adverse weather. Enhancement in the quantum of ground-based simulation used in conjunction with actual flying is an option worth considering. Increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) operationally is likely to reduce the number of pilots required to be trained. The US Air Force already trains more UAV operators annually than pilots and prefers to recruit non-fliers. Such trends should also be factored in.

The Malaise

Cost, indigenisation, technology demonstration, etc, are all factors in selecting a trainer aircraft but should not compromise the basic capability of imparting acceptable levels of flying expertise. To be fair to local development aspirations, the IAF has at times set the bar of qualitative requirements too high and changed parameters too often. A trainer aircraft is meant for basic flying training tasks and expecting multi-role capability may result in degraded performance across the board apart from cost escalation and delay.

The evolution of flying training in the IAF in the last 30 years has unfortunately been afflicted with inclination to gloss over problems, short-term fixes, delayed decision-making and at times, lack of clarity on the optimum vs the possible. The malaise has affected all stakeholders including the service, the aerospace industry and the bureaucracy. The ultimate result is the negative impact on the quality of training which will ultimately impact combat effectiveness, the fleet of sophisticated aircraft on the inventory notwithstanding. The subject is indeed appropriate for a case study in the premier management schools of the country.