In the context of the IAF, acquisition of force multipliers took time but the pace has picked up in the last few years. Force multiplier technologies such as the AWACS and air refuellers are vulnerable and as their presence is a force multiplier, the loss of even one of those can severely degrade combat capability. This needs to be factored in during planning for operations.

Force multiplication in the context of the military is the enhancement of capabilities of a force achieved by a combination of attributes without increase in the size of the force. A fallacy exists that expensive technology and the gadgets it spawns is the only force multiplier option. Training, experience, morale, motivation, strategy, innovative tactics and deception are all force multipliers. Force multipliers have existed long before the term was coined. High levels of training, esprit de corps, experienced leadership and innovative tactics turned armed rabble into the deadly armies of the Greeks, Romans and Mongols. The horse, the wheeled chariot and the elephant, with the mobility plus shock effect they projected, the standoff range of the longbow, the musket and the cannon, all were force multipliers. Air power itself in that sense is a force multiplier.

In the context of the Indian Air Force (IAF), acquisition of force multipliers took time but the pace has picked up in the last few years. The earlier obsession with high performance aircraft, often to the neglect of other systems such as precisionguided munitions (PGMs), night and all-weather operational capability, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) is now history.

Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS)

AWACS are basically radars, sensors and communications equipment, integrated and mounted on airborne platforms. The advantages of elevating the system are increased range with no terrain masking and reduced vulnerability by virtue of being airborne. Mobility of the platform facilitates deployment to distant locations and the position changes dictated by changes in tactical situations. Area air defence, which is critical in this era of long-range standoff air-to-ground weapons of enormous destructive potential, can only be really effective with AWACS. This makes it a prime force multiplier, enhancing the effectiveness of coverage while increasing the effectiveness of the combat aircraft. The AWACS helps fully exploit the capabilities of combat aircraft as it enables them to operate in a stealthier passive radar mode with the AWACS at the rear providing target information and even target tracking for missile guidance. Airborne battlefield management systems such as the US JSTARS are an extension of this concept.

The IAF inducted its first system based on the Russian IL-76 (A50 EI) four-engine jet aircraft in 2009. A smaller system based on the EMB 145 militarised version of the Brazilian Embraer ERJ 145 twin-engine passenger jet has been acquired by the IAF and is in the process of development.

Air-to-Air Refuelling

This range extender is a potent force multiplier. All types of aircraft have the option of getting airborne with maximum load with minimum fuel and refuelling in the air to substantially extend range. Options for launch from secure bases deep inside own territory exist. This reduces the vulnerability of launching combat aircraft from exposed forward bases. Having air defence, strike aircraft and other assets on airborne readiness without fuel state worries, reduces response time significantly.

The IAF first inducted the Russian IL-78 tanker aircraft in 2003. Plans to induct the larger capacity Airbus A330 multi-role tanker transport (MRTT) based on the Airbus A330 wide-body long-range twin-passenger jet are progressing albeit slowly. In accordance with a policy decision, all future aircraft acquisitions will have in-flight refuelling capability.

Precision-Guided Munitions

Weapon delivery accuracy is perhaps the most important ingredient in combat operations. Even a near miss is as good as a mile. Errors are generated by environmental considerations, altitude, variations in release parameters, aiming system inaccuracies and operator induced errors. Unguided weapons cannot correct such errors. Training reduces but does not eliminate operator errors. In combat, ideal release conditions will almost never be met. A classic case was the Thanh Hóa Bridge in North Vietnam that could not be destroyed even after 800 sorties using unguided bombs. Finally, a 12-aircraft mission with eight planes using first-generation laser-guided bombs destroyed one of the spans and another two similarly equipped smaller missions destroyed the bridge completely.

PGMs provide high accuracy and far larger release envelope. In air combat, the primary weapon is the guided missile and the same is the case with surface-to-air weapons. Even surface-to-surface weapons are now PGMs. The IAF received the first-generation infrared guidance air-to-air missile, the K-13, along with the MiG-21 in 1963. The SA-2 Dvina surface-to-air missile system came next. Air-to-ground PGMs came in much later. A guidance kit on an older generation aircraft along with a kit strapped on to an unguided bomb can make it a PGM. The Gulf War demonstrated the effectiveness of PGMs. Faced with more lethal ground-to-air weapons with longer ranges, weapon delivery distances have increased considerably and only PGMs have any chance of hitting targets with high degrees of accuracy. Compared to the cost of aircraft, PGMs are by far cheaper. The PGM thus is a formidable force multiplier.

All-Weather and Night Capability

Till the mid-1990s, the IAF had rather limited night and adverse weather combat capability especially in the air-to-ground role. The MiG-23/27, Jaguar and Mirage had a night capability, but it was constrained till acquisition aids and PGMs arrived on the scene. Night strike with unguided weapons is limited in its effectiveness except against soft-skinned and large targets. With ground forces acquiring night fighting capabilities, combat aircraft also need these capabilities. This holds true for transport and helicopter operations as well. The newer generation aircraft of the IAF now have the ability to operate at night and in adverse weather with target acquisition devices and PGMs along with new-generation electronic navigational aids. This ability is a force multiplier.

Reconnaissance and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

Locating the enemy is a pre-requisite for combat operations. Planning and force allocation are all dependent on reconnaissance to identify targets even before hostilities commence. Reconnaissance in the IAF was earlier undertaken by manned aircraft, some dedicated to the role and others with add-on kits. Reconnaissance kits are now in use giving this capability to most of the newer fighter acquisitions. Satellites and UAVs have largely replaced manned platforms in the dedicated reconnaissance role in the IAF, the former especially for strategic intelligence gathering.

Unmanned systems give a measure of plausible deniability in case the platform is destroyed over hostile or neutral territory and is a vital peacetime tool also. The IAF is now entering this league with satellite-based surveillance capability and a growing UAV fleet. The IAF is likely to induct unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UACVs) as the next step. The IAF already has the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) Harop which is a small “kamikaze” UAV that destroys targets by diving into them. UAVs and UACVs are systems for use in high-threat environment and in situations where use of manned aircraft may escalate a lowintensity situation into all-out war. Reconnaissance platforms and UAVs are force multipliers.

Stealth, Electronic Countermeasures, Camouflage AND Deception

Stealth decreases the vulnerability of a weapon system and so increases its effectiveness. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) degrade the effectiveness of enemy sensors and weapons guidance systems. The IAF has had some ECM capabilities for a few decades with few aircraft modified exclusively for this role. With the induction of the Jaguar and Mirage-2000, add on kits were procured to give ECM capabilities when required to almost any aircraft in these fleets. The Su-30MKI also has this capability.

Deception and camouflage are tools and when properly executed can be a force multiplier. In fact, some of the defensive selfprotection suites on IAF aircraft use decoys. Stealth capability itself is a form of deception. With the fifth-generation fighter aircraft project materialising, the IAF will enter into the stealth arena.

Other Aspects

Training, leadership and experience are great force multipliers that have very often turned ill-equipped forces into lethal entities. Morale is another potent factor. How ever, unlike technological force multipliers, there is a downside to these. The danger is that inadequate training, poor leadership and low morale will rapidly degrade capabilities of a military organisation. No amount of hardware and technology can compensate for it.

Tactics and innovations, including out-of-the-box thinking, have made huge differences to the outcome of military conflicts. A simple innovation of reducing the turnaround time between sorties enhanced the effectiveness of Israeli Air Force fighters and was a critical force multiplier. Military organisations the world over sometimes discourage innovative thinking. One must remember that the birth of the air force as a distinct entity and the development of air power were products of such thinking in the face of stiff opposition.

In the Indian context, the establishment of institutions like the Tactics and Air Combat Development Establishment in the early 1970s brought about qualitative change in combat effectiveness.

Force multiplier technologies such as the AWACS and air refuellers are vulnerable and as their presence is a force multiplier, the loss of even one of those can severely degrade combat capability. This needs to be factored in during planning for operations.