SP Guide Publications puts forth a well compiled articulation of issues, pursuits and accomplishments of the Indian Army, over the years
"Over the past 60 years, the growth of SP Guide Publications has mirrored the rising stature of Indian Navy. Its well-researched and informative magazines on Defence and Aerospace sector have served to shape an educated opinion of our military personnel, policy makers and the public alike. I wish SP's Publication team continued success, fair winds and following seas in all future endeavour!"
Since, its inception in 1964, SP Guide Publications has consistently demonstrated commitment to high-quality journalism in the aerospace and defence sectors, earning a well-deserved reputation as Asia's largest media house in this domain. I wish SP Guide Publications continued success in its pursuit of excellence.
By 2003, the IAF was to be supplied with the LCA Tejas, to replace the ageing fleet of MiG-21 FL. As there was no certainty of the Tejas being available in the committed time frame, the gap needed to be bridged till the Tejas would be made available with FOC to retain the strength of the combat aircraft fleet and obviate erosion of operational capability.
The requirement of the Indian Air Force (IAF) for a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) as it is known today, was first mooted at the level of Directorate of Air Defence at Air Headquarters (Vayu Bhavan), New Delhi, in the year 1999. As per plans, by 2003, the IAF was to be supplied with the indigenous light weight air defence aircraft, the light combat aircraft (LCA) Tejas, designed, developed and built by the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) to replace the ageing fleet of MiG-21 FL, also known as Type 77. The latter is essentially an aircraft designed for the air defence role and its induction into the IAF had begun in the early 1960s after the Sino-Indian conflict. In fact, the first lot of the aircraft had participated in the war with Pakistan in 1965.
As there was no certainty of the Tejas being available in the committed time frame, the IAF rightly began to explore options from sources abroad to find a replacement for the Type 77 fleet that was nearing the end of its total technical life and would have to be soon retired from service. The gap needed to be bridged till the Tejas would be made available with full operational clearance (FOC) to retain the strength of the combat aircraft fleet at the authorised level of 39.5 squadrons and obviate erosion of operational capability.
It took the IAF almost two years to finalise the proposal and the initial projection to the Ministry of Defence in the year 2001 was for 126 platforms, equivalent to six squadrons with an option for another 74. The specifications spelt out were for primarily an air defence aircraft with a 20-tonne maximum take-off weight limit (MTOW) with some ground attack capability. This case was designated as the multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA) project.
At the point in time that the case for MRCA was initiated, in the perception of the IAF, the gap in air defence capability owing to phasing out of the MiG-21 fleet, would be adequately met with the purchase of 126 Mirage 2000-5, an improved version of the Mirage 2000 from the French aerospace major Dassault Aviation. The Mirage 2000 aircraft has been in service with the IAF since the mid-1980s and the IAF has been quite happy with the performance of the fleet as also with the efficient product support provided by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM).
The French Aerospace Industry
The association of the French aerospace industry with the IAF is around five decades old. During this period, the French aerospace industry has consolidated its position in India though the supply in the 1960s of the Ourgaon, renamed Toofani by the IAF, and the Mystere. The Mirage 2000H fleet was inducted in the mid-1980s. Apart from combat aircraft, French Alouette helicopters were produced in India under licence by HAL in large numbers for the three services. The Mirage 2000H fleet and Alouette helicopters continue in service today in the IAF. The French engine manufacturer Snecma has also been involved in the development of an engine for the ALH in partnership with HAL. With the Airbus and ATR family of airliners, the French aerospace industry has a domineering presence in the Indian civil aviation sector as well. The French are notably independent in the pursuit of their foreign policy and hence their decisions are expected to be immune to external pressures from within the EU or the USA. Defence sales by France are based purely on commercial considerations.
Defence Procurement Procedure
The experience of the IAF with the Mirage 2000 fleet in the brief conflict with Pakistan in Kargil, had served to reinforce the belief that the Mirage 2000-5 would indeed be the right choice. However, on account of the need to set up new production lines for the manufacture of the latest from their stables, the Dassault Rafale, and lack of orders of older platforms, the Mirage 2000 production lines were to be closed down. Dassault was prepared to keep production lines open for the Mirage 2000-5 Mk II, provided the IAF placed firm orders. But the government had other ideas as with the formulation of the newly conceived Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), the Ministry of Defence was focused on the “open tender” system involving multiple vendors as against a single vendor system involving direct transaction with the OEM ostensibly to get the best value for money and to provide the IAF with a wider range of equipment to choose from.
The Tendering Process
As a first step, in 2004, request for information (RFI) was issued to four vendors, namely Dassault Aviation (Mirage 2000-5 Mk II), Lockheed Martin (F16 C&D Block 52+ also referred to as the F 16IN), Saab (JAS 39 Gripen) and Mikoyan (MiG-29 OVT). All the four aircraft are under 20-tonne MTOW and other than the MiG-29, all three are single engine combat aircraft. But soon thereafter, based on re-evaluation of the changing strategic environment in the context of India emerging as a regional power and the expanded zone of economic and security interests, it was felt that the IAF ought to be equipped with a heavier aircraft, preferably with two engines, long-range capability and two-man crew. Besides, apart from the MiG-21, other fleets of strike aircraft such as the Jaguar inducted in the late 1970s and the MiG-27, joining the IAF in the 1980s, were also nearing the end of their total technical life. The MiG-23 fleet was already in the process of being phased out. What was also of concern was that the potential adversaries of India i.e. both China and Pakistan were embarked on an aggressive modernisation plan of their respective air forces. In the evolving security scenario, the IAF badly needed to preserve its operational edge through the induction of a modern fourth-generation multi-role combat fleet with state-ofthe-art avionics and weapon systems.
The specifications for the MRCA were therefore reviewed and revised. The upper limit of weight which was pegged at 20 tonnes was removed and a request for proposal (RFP) was issued enabling heavier twin-engine aircraft such as the F/A 18IN Super Hornet from Boeing and Eurofighter Typhoon from European Aeronautic, Defence and Space (EADS) to enter the race. Russia replaced the MiG-29 OVT by the MiG-35 which was yet under development. Dassault then opted to replace the offer of the Mirage 2000-5 Mk II by the twin engine Rafale. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin offered a customised version of the F16, the F16IN Super Viper which is regarded as equivalent to Block 60, to meet the requirements of the IAF. The project was recategorised from MRCA to medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). While the thrust of the RFP was towards a heavy twin-engine combat aircraft, for some reason, not easy to fathom, the single engine light weight category of aircraft were not automatically excluded. As a result, there was a mix of light-weight single engine and heavy two-seat combat aircraft amongst the six contenders now in the race. For the evaluators in the IAF, it was akin to comparing apples with oranges.
The RFP for 126 aircraft was finally issued on August 28, 2007, six years after the case was projected by the IAF. The first 18 aircraft equivalent to one squadron, would be procured from the OEM in a ‘flyaway’ condition and the remaining 108 would be manufactured in India with full transfer of technology (ToT). The value of the contract was initially estimated at $10.4 billion or Rs. 57,200 crore, at today’s exchange rate. The bidders were permitted six months time from the release of the RFP to submit their formal proposals and the cut off date was specified as March 3, 2008. However, in response to request by some of the bidders primarily on account of the complexity of the RFP, the deadline was extended to April 28, 2008.
After completion of technical evaluation by end May 2009, the IAF carried out comprehensive technical evaluation of all the six contenders. This was followed by rigorous flight evaluation which began at Bengaluru in August 2009. The Rafale completed flight evaluation by end September 2009. At the end of the flight evaluation phase, only two of the six contenders remained in the race, the Dassault Rafale and the Eurofighter Typhoon from EADS. When the commercial bids were opened, the Rafale turned out to be the lowest bidder (L-1). Contract negotiations have been going on for over a year having taken longer than expected. However, the process is believed to be in the final stages.
The IAF in Difficulty
It is noteworthy that over a decade has gone by since the MRCA project was initiated but neither the Tejas nor its alternative is available with the IAF. The Tejas is yet to receive even the initial operational clearance (IOC) and the time frame for FOC cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. While the Minister of Defence A.K. Antony has directed the HAL to deliver the Tejas to the IAF by 2015, the IAF cannot afford to be complacent.
The July issue of SP’s Aviation will deliberate on the developments in the neighbourhood, the deteriorating security scenario in the region and the imperative need for the IAF to be prepared to face the challenges in the future.
Beginning with this issue, the case for MMRCA for the IAF will be reviewed in detail in a five-part series. To be continued in the following issues.