While security arrangements at the metros are visibly and oppressively stringent, smaller airports have comparatively lax structures and setups for security. A determined offender could get potentially dangerous material into the airside, which could also be flown into a metro.

Alliance Air, an Indian Airlines subsidiary, was introduced in 1996 with the objective of serving the regional air travel market; it failed to meet that objective as its fleet (mainly Boeing 737s) was not only ill-equipped to operate in regional airports, but also not suited for short haul flights. In addition, its four ATR aircraft could not be pushed for service elsewhere, as they were positioned to serve the Northeast market. When the second Indian aviation boom began in 2003, the Indian concept of regional aviation, an adapted mutation of the hub-andspoke model, was again mooted as a response to the wanton proliferation of airline routes connecting big cities at the cost of neglecting the rest. In 2007, the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) introduced a regulatory mechanism for promoting “air connectivity between specific regions and to enable more efficient air travel within the region, as well as linking such regions and expanding air travel services for Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities within the country’s aviation network”. The airports at Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bengaluru and Hyderabad were formally declared as “metros”. The various “regions” were identified as North, South, West, East/Northeast coinciding with the Flight Information Regions (FIRs); the airports in a particular region were those enumerated by the Airports Authority of India (AAI) for the respective regions. The laudable objective of providing connectivity to smaller cities and towns has, however, not been achieved in the four years since the promulgation of the policy. The single major reason for this has been the lack of adequate airports with the support infrastructure necessary for the sustenance of efficient operations safely. This article appraises the safety aspects of regional aviation in India.

Availability of Airport Data

The first concern that comes to mind is the suitability or otherwise of many of the non-metro airports for regular and sustained operations. Of the over 500 airports in India, only 44 in the public category and 16 in the private one are licensed by the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) for operations. The qualitative difference that may exist between licensed and unlicensed airports is open to debate. After all, airports were in use for operation by civil aircraft much before the licence regime was introduced by DGCA. However, the issue here is that there is no guarantee that unlicensed airports meet the minimum theoretical standards of safety prescribed by DGCA. By extension of the logic, DGCA cannot at any time authenticate the suitability or otherwise of some of the airports although all airports are available to any operator for use for scheduled operations or diversion in case of bad weather or for other reasons. While AAI has published details of airports operated by it all over India, it is almost impossible to obtain an authenticated all inclusive list (including privately operated) of airports in India. Updated information on contact details, leading particulars of runway(s) and manoeuvring areas, navigational aids and watch hours, etc is thus not available to aircraft operators.

While the metros are generally under scrutiny of DGCA officials transiting through as also through regular audits, the infrastructure related problems at smaller airports often elude attention and opprobrium. Their shortfall could include runway and manoeuvring area surface condition, serviceability and reliability of airfield and runway approach and landing aids, runway incursions due to inadequately sterile perimeter walls/fencing, insufficient crash and fire fighting services, scant medical support services, poor tarmac discipline especially on the part of vehicles plying on the airside and so on. Even when unserviceability and breakdowns are reported at small airports, the priority accorded to the necessary repairs would always be lower than that at the metros.

Limitations of DGCA

The DGCA, working at a sub-optimal efficiency due to a shortage of suitably qualified and trained personnel, is incapable of ensuring that every airport in use measures up to the stringent requirements for supporting aircraft operations. It may be said in DGCA’s defence that it does have the intent but lacks the capability in this respect. According to one report, of the total 997 posts in the DGCA, 437 are not filled as of now. The Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) is trying to ensure that vacancies are filled up soon and has taken up the matter with the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC). However, the actual recruitment process is taking inordinately long. Some more time will be lost in the process of training new incumbents for the job descriptions they are hired for. Meanwhile, the oversight of the non-metro airports continues to be at a low level.

There is also the issue of security infrastructure at smaller stations. While security arrangements at the metros are visibly and oppressively stringent, smaller airports have comparatively lax structures and setups for security. Thus, while getting access to the airside of a metro is well nigh impossible for a mala fide individual, there is another stratagem available to beat the system. On a smaller airport, where security is not so rigorous, a determined offender could get potentially dangerous material (explosives, incendiaries, weapons) into the airside. Once through the security gate and on the airside, the material could be used to cause damage to aircraft on the ground or in the air. In an even more chilling scenario, the material could be flown into a metro and used against aircraft there. This modus operandi would be of special interest to the terrorist whose main aim is to inspire terror through maximum visibility. The attention that a terrorist organisation would get at a metro would be much more than at a small regional airport which would have provided the gateway for the terrorist act at a metro. The situation in this respect is unlikely to be redressed in the near future as the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), the primary agency responsible for airport security, is woefully short of manpower and does not seem to be in a hurry to get its numbers up to the strength required to man all airports, metros and regional, with the required degree of assurance.