Demilitarisation would involve India losing both strategic and tactical advantage, while for Pakistan it would be a great strategic gain traded off against a small tactical loss. Indian strategists should not neglect this fact that Pakistan chooses to gloss over.

The Siachen imbroglio is part of the overall Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) problem and its genesis goes back to Pakistan’s aggression of 1947-48 and not in 1984. The problem emanates from not following through what was spelt out in the Karachi Agreement in 1949. There would be no Siachen problem if the agreement was followed in letter and spirit. The agreement was signed by senior military officers from both sides (as a follow on to the ceasefire agreement) clearly demarcating the ceasefire line (CFL) based on the factual position on the ground as on that day. However, the CFL was demarcated on a one-inch map but only up to what came to be known as Point NJ 9842. The bilateral agreement on that historical day clearly specified that the final stages of the CFL would be demarcated up to Khor and “thence north to the glaciers”.

A careful scrutiny of the agreement would reveal two interesting points. One is the mention of Khor and second, the use of plural in mentioning the CFL from Point NJ 9842. The line was left demarcated at this point because it was not expected at that time that the high mountains to the north could become a source of conflict. But both governments had agreed that from Point NJ 9842, the line would continue to Khor, “thence north to the glaciers”. Another interesting point is that the CFL—now known as the line of control (LoC)— runs south to north for over 10 km before it stops at NJ 9842. The use of plural in mentioning glaciers clearly indicates that there are many glaciers in consideration here. Amongst these, two major glaciers stand out, which descend in near opposite directions from the heights of the famous Saltoro Mountain Range. Siachen Glacier lies to the east of the Saltoro Ridge flowing approximately from North-west to South-east with its mouth lying at the ‘Base Camp’ —from where the Nubra River originates. Baltoro Glacier, on the other hand, initially flows northwestwards from Saltoro Ridge in an opposite direction from Siachen and then takes on a more westerly orientation into Pak-occupied Baltistan region. Both glaciers laterally stand separated by more than 30 km from each other in an East-West orientation (see map).

A well-established principle and custom of demarcating borders and lines of control in mountainous areas is to follow the high crest separating the two watersheds on either side. This is also why mountain passes in a large number of cases mark the boundaries. Indian Army posts defending the Siachen Glacier are located on the Saltoro Ridge, which as can be seen, forms a natural watershed between the two glaciers and therefore qualifies to be the natural (also consistent with customary as well as formally defined borders) boundary in the Siachen region. Logically, Saltoro Ridge (which runs NNW-SSE before it alters halfway to northwest heading towards the K-2 Mountain) should be defined and demarcated as the mutually accepted line. This would be in keeping with the unfinished agenda of the Karachi Agreement—and later the Shimla Agreement—which was to specifically denote the line from NJ 9842 “thence north to the glaciers” and by implication, extending it up to the Chinese border.

Unfortunately, and possibly due to force of habit, Pakistan has once again demonstrated its unwillingness to accept what are the well-established international principles and refused to abide by the provisions of the Karachi Agreement, it had signed. Perhaps it was also the result of an earlier US cartographic mischief (perpetuated during the height of the Cold War with a mistaken belief that non-aligned India was actually part of the Soviet Camp) by which the actual ground position line (AGPL) was deliberately extended from Point NJ 9842 to Karakoram Pass. Pakistan tried to convert this off-track notion into reality with a plan to militarily usurp the Siachen area. Fortunately, India got timely information and pre-empted the Pakistani Military from committing another perfidious act by quickly deploying Indian Army troops on the Saltoro Ridge/Siachen Glacier, in a well-planned joint operation with the Indian Air Force (IAF). That they had been totally outmanoeuvred, struck the Pak troops when they arrived on the scene.

That Pakistan had definite plans in the early 1980s to take over Siachen Glacier militarily is quite evident from a recent interview given by General Parvez Musharraf where he claimed that Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil was a “tit for tat” for Siachen while conceding that Pakistan had actually laid claim to some part of the Siachen Glacier which in his view was a “no-man’s land”. Sheer naivety of such a remark, that too coming from a former Director General Military Operations (DGMO) of Pakistan Army and later not only its chief but also the military dictator of Pakistan cannot be over emphasised. Would it be possible that a soldier of his standing had never read the Karachi Agreement? Also, wilful violation of a well demarcated line of control (LOC) with a well-planned military aggression just because of an individual’s frustration can only add to the aforesaid naivety. Self-respecting countries and professional armies are not known to commit such irresponsible acts.